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From the Dengist leadership onwards, China sought to increase its capabilities -  
economic, military, and diplomatic - in its quest for great power status in the 
international system. Internally, China began a series of domestic reforms in the 
economic, military and high-technology areas. Externally, China directed unusual 
energy to establishing normal relations with other major powers as well as with the 
Third World. These actions testify to the Chinese leadership’s aspirations and 
determination to build China into a strong nation. This study, taking cognizance of 
the endeavors begun under Deng, attempts to follow through with post-Deng China’s 
continuing quest for great power status.
Methodologically, this study will draw upon the linkage-politics paradigm and 
geostrategic theory, in order to take care of both the domestic and external aspects of 
the topic that need be examined. The former is useful in explicating the links 
between domestic political developments and foreign-policy initiatives. 
Geostrategic analysis will illuminate the change in China’s international status from 
the Maoist era to the post-Cold War era. It will help explicate how change in the 
international environment has presented new challenges, as well as opportunities, to 
China in its role and status in international relations, calling for new responses.
To understand China’s perceived great-power status in world politics, two 
elements should be considered. The first is the perception of other states in the 
world. Being a great power is not self-claimed, it requires recognition by other
members of international society. The second element is China’s self-image. 
Whether China sees itself as a great power depends on both its own aspirations and 
its calculated endeavors to achieve i t  This study addresses both of these elements.
In this study, ， I hope to trace both the external and internal changes affecting 
China’s position in the world in the post-Mao period. During the 1980s through to 
the 1990s, most evidence supports the view that China’s participation in regional and 
global activities was increasing. As its role in international relations expanded, its 
visibility and status also improved correspondingly. Barring unexpected changes in 
the continuing expansion of its involvement in world affairs, all indications are that 
China’s quest for great-power status is heading towards the right direction， , as 
intended by the post-Mao leadership.
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CHAPTER 1
MAIN THEME OF THE STUDY: THEORIES, METHODS, AND 
HYPOTHESES
INTRODUCTION:
This chapter introduces the research goal, significance, hypotheses and structure 
of this study. There are precise ideological differences between Mao Zedong and 
Deng Xiaoping in China’s domestic and diplomatic policies. Although the Chinese 
leadership wished to make China a strong country after a “Century of Shame” since 
1842, China’s national capabilities and the international system strictly confined this 
hope. However, the situation was changed under the leadership of Deng. China’s 
continuous domestic developments and changes in the international system give a 
chance for China to search for great power status. The main theme of this study 
will follow this logic.
CHAPTER 1
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PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY:
The study has two goals. The first is to explain China’s great-power 
aspirations after the Maoist era by the use of linkage politics and geostrategic 
analysis. To understand China's great-power quest, two set variables must be 
considered, the first is associated with domestic changes and the second is changes in 
international relations. These international and domestic changes serve to illustrate 
why China has reasons to change its foreign policy behaviour and adjust its 
international posture in the post-Mao era. Linkage politics and geostrategic
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thinking can help explain the shape of change in China9 s diplomacy and global 
politics.
Linkage-politics is used to explain China’s domestic change in the Dengist era 
in so far as it bears on China’s foreign relations， whereas geostrategic analysis is 
used to discuss change in China’s international status from the Maoist era to the post- 
Cold War era. Starting from the 1980s, the Chinese leadership began to launch a 
series of domestic reforms, including economic reform, military modernization 
programme, which require a new orientation in foreign policy. The reforms were 
aimed at increasing China’s comprehensive national power that would boost China’s 
capabilities and status in the world. In this sense, the linkage paradigm can help us 
to understand the relationship between the domestic policies of the national 
leadership and their foreign-policy endeavors in the external environment. 
Meanwhile, change of the international environment, mainly in the late 1980s, 
created an opportunity for China to become a rising power in world politics. Due to 
this global change, the overall reactions of the other nations towards China are no 
more as antagonistic as before, but became more conciliatory to China in the 
international arena. Though China is the remaining Communist great power in the 
world after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, its ideological difference from the 
democratic West does not stop China’s integration into the global economy. The 
overall attitude of the rest of the world seems quite positive for the rise of China. 
This phenomenon is probably the result of change in the international environment: 
from geopolitical to geoeconomic global structure. Hence, geostrategic analysis 
will tell us more about China’s strategic considerations towards other states in the 
international system. The combination of the paradigm of linkage politics and
CHAPTER 1
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geostrategic analysis will help illuminate and explicate this Chinese endeavor to 
become a great power in the post-Mao era.
CHAPTER I
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The second goal of this research is to examine relations between the self-image 
of Chinese leadership and their foreign policy behaviour， in connection with China’s 
quest for great power status. After Deng Xiaoping consolidated his position as the 
second-generation leader in the People’s Republic of China in 1978, he turned a new 
page in the annals of China. During the past two decades, from the 1980s to the 
1990s， China started to strive to join the ranks of the great powers in the world. In 
Deng’s tenure， he principally focused on domestic economic development. He 
believed that only an economically strong and prospering China could enjoy political 
stability and international respect (Gurtov & Hwang, 1998, p.l). Deng also said:
We must set up economic construction.........Without sound economic
foundations, it will be impossible to modernize our national defence, and 
science and technology should primarily serve economic construction.
Modernization is the core and essential condition for solving both our 
domestic and our external problem... The role we play in international 
affairs is determined by the extent of our economic growth. If our 
country becomes more developed and prosperous, we will be in a position 
to play a greater role in international affairs. Already our international 
role is not insignificant. With a stronger material base, we will be able to 
enhance it (Foreign Languages Press, 1984, p.225).
In Jiang9s era, beginning with the 1990s, he continued to carry out a series of 
domestic reforms but turned more attention to China’s diplomatic policy, in search of 
a great power status in the world. Under his leadership， China’s diplomatic power 
was enhanced to a large extent in international relations at the end of the 1990s. 
Besides, Jiang intended to reshape the world order into a just and reasonable new
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international political and economic order, in order to help bring about a peaceful and 
prosperous new century of humanity.
As a whole, the self-perception of Chinese leadership is a fundamental element 
by which to judge whether China is a great power. In the following chapters, 
evidence will be provided to justify that China is on the road to becoming a great 
power in the international system in accordance with the diplomatic policy of the 
Chinese leadership after Mao.
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SIGNIFICANCE:
Modem Chinese history shows that China has the potentials of a great power. 
The First Anglo-Chinese War in 1842 marked the beginning of a “Century of 
Shame95 in Chinese history. It is well known that for centuries the national self- 
image of China had been one of superiority to other nations. Each emperor in 
previous Dynasties treated himself as the Son of Heaven, and China was the Middle 
Kingdom. Foreigners were thought to be “barbarians.” However, China’s 
superiority self-image was severely damaged by the brute power of Gunboat 
Diplomacy of the West. Following the end of the Qing Dynasty， China’s continuing 
weaknesses in terms of national power made its status and influence limited in 
international relations. In the eyes of the world, China was categorized as a feeble 
and developing country. The traditional pride had to be buried for decades before 
China could rejoin the ranks of nations as equals under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping in the late 1970s.
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Starting from Deng5 s leadership onwards, China began to acquire the ability to 
stand up as a great power in international relations. Throughout the 20th century, 
what the Chinese people wished was to seek an equal status between China and the 
world and reestablish their national dignity. From the realist point of view, the 
continuous weakness of the Chinese economy denied to China its rightful place 
among nations. In the Dengist era, China started to treat itself as a great power 
mostly because to Deng’s ambitious personality. Deng prepared to make China a 
great power in the international politics. He said, ''China will be truly powerful, 
exerting a much greater influence in the world.” （ Harding, 1988， p.14). This 
statement showing that he had ambitions to make China one of the great powers in 
the world.
The pursuit of great-power status became a doctrine of China’s foreign policy 
ever since. This expectation, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, seems to be 
more concrete in practice. Jiang^s ideas, on building a just world, spreading 
Chinese cultural influence abroad, and establishing strategic partnership with other 
great powers, are meant to launch China on the road to becoming a great power.
After two decades of sustained development, China has successfully built up 
and consolidated its image as a great power at least at the regional level. The next 
step is to extend its present status to the international level. If the trend continues, 
there is a high possibility that China will reach its goal in the new century. The next 
contribution in this study is to discuss China’s self-perception as a great power，  
combining linkage politics with geostrategic analysis.
CHAPTER 1
MAIM THEME OF THE STUDY: THEORIES, METHODS, AND HYPOTHESES
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CHAPTER 1
MAIN THEME OF THE STUDY: THEORIES, METHODS, AND HYPOTHESES
HYPOTHESES:
(1) China9s international status is a function of both its capabilities (military, 
economy, and diplomatic leverage) and the general perception of other major 
powers.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
H (1) is from an objective perspective to testify whether China is a great power 
in the international system. A great power is not self-claimed, it requires the 
recognition by other members of the international society, especially of the major 
states (actors). China’s national growth which begun in the 1980s and the 
acceptance by other nations are the two pillars supporting China’s claim to be a great 
power in the world system. This hypothesis can be justified by the documents and 
commentaries from other states about the great-power status of China in the world.
(2) China perceives itself as a great power as well as the worlds recognition of
6
China’s global status， as a result of China’s endeavors to upgrade its national 
capabilities and of strategic changes in the international balance of power.
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
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H (2) tries to discuss China7 s quest for great power status from two perspectives. 
First, China^s self-image as a great power is the result of domestic reforms and 
change in the external environment. Second， the world’s recognition of China’s 
great power status is due to China’s national capabilities and change of international 
order. Whether China perceives itself as a great power depends on its own 
calculated endeavors and the state of the international system. Without the reforms 
of the 1980s, China cannot have upgraded its national capabilities in quest of big- 
power status. Without the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, China 
cannot have become one of the potential poles in the global system. China^ self­
perception as a great power can be shown in its active participation in the
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international arena. This hypothesis can be justified by the publications and 
documentation from the Chinese government and Jiang9s visits and his speeches 
concerning the world order.
Besides, the general acceptance by international community of the rising China 
is most probably caused by the change from bipolar to multipolar international 
system. In addition， China’s economic clout in recent decades has shown an 
impressive image to the world. The two independent variables -  China’s 
capabilities and change of international order， contribute to the world’s positive 
perception of China’s role in the world
CHAPTER LAYOUT:
The overall structure of this study will be divided into three parts. Part One 
gives a preview of this study, including introduction, literature review. Part Two 
presents evidence how China perceives itself as a great power in the post-Mao era. 
Part Three is discussions and conclusions.
Chapter 1 introduces the research goals of China’s great-power aspirations，  
states the hypotheses and major arguments of this study. There is a great deal of 
difference in ideology on foreign policy between the leadership of Mao and Deng. 
The development of China after Deng has reached a certain achievement that allows 
China to pursue great power status in the world. Both China’s domestic 
development and attitudes of other states contribute to China’s perception of itself as 
a great power in the future.
CHAPTER 1
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Chapter 2 briefly and selectively reviews literature on theories and methods in 
the study of China’s position in international relations. The concept of linkage 
politics and the geostrategic point of view will be operationalized in the discussion of 
China’s change in both internal and external spheres. And how these changes are 
related to China’s great-power aspirations will be explained.
Chapter 3 uses the linkage-politics paradigm to explicate how China^s domestic 
capabilities affect its foreign policy posture and how foreign-policy success 
contributes to its domestic growth. China, after two decades of economic refonns 
and continuous development, has upgraded its national power. These achievements 
directly affect China9 s new approach to foreign policy, which is increasingly more 
active in international activities. Besides, the expanding state to state relations 
between China and the other states will bring benefits to China’s capability building. 
Linkage politics helps understand this interdependent relationship between domestic 
development and foreign policy.
Chapter 4 applies geostrategic analysis to illuminating the change in China’s 
international status from the Maoist era to the post-Cold War era. It will help 
explicate how change in the international environment has presented new challenges 
to China in its role and status in international relations, calling for new responses. 
This approach tries to place China in a global perspective by noting that China’s 
changing role is circumscribed by the international structure.
Chapter 5 analyzes China’s great-power status from two angles. The first is to 
examine the perception of other states in the world. Great power status requires the
CHAPTER 1
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recognition of the other members of the international society. The second is to look 
at China’s self-image. Whether China sees itself as a great power depends on its 
own aspirations. Combining these two approaches， both China’s image in the 
world and its self-perception as a great power, we will be better able to trace and 
analyze China’s quest for global power status.
This chapter is quite important for linking together Chapters 3 and 4, since the 
evidence provided in the previous two chapters contains both the elements of the 
recognition of the international society and China’s self-image. First, China sees 
itself as a great power probably depends on its own capability building. Second, the 
changes in the international society make China one of the potential countries 
seeking great power status in the 21st century. Finally， combining the US’ positive 
attitude towards China in this decade， an objective recognition of China’s status in 
the world is described in front of us.
Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, notes both the external and internal changes 
affecting China’s position in the world in the post-Mao period. As China’s national 
capabilities increased, its role in international relations expanded correspondingly. 
As China’s international ties with other nations grew， so did its national 
developments. China’s expanding involvement in world affairs in the new world 
order demonstrates that its quest for great-power status is heading the right direction.
CHAPTER 1
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CHAPTER 2
DEFINITIONS, THEORIES AND METHODS -  PERSPECTIVES 
ON CHINESE GREAT POWER FOREIGN POLICY
INTRODUCTION:
The study of the Chinese quest for great power status is a very complicated task 
due to the highly interdependent and interactive world in the post-Mao era. First, it 
is necessary for us to give a definition of “great power”. Second, a relevant 
theoretical framework is an essential part for the study of rising China. Up to this 
moment, there is no one single comprehensive analytical framework for the study of 
China’s foreign policy in quest of great power status. However, there are two 
notable frameworks that can be used in an attempt to discuss changes in China^s 
power and prestige in the international system.
As I outlined in Chapter 1, the first such framework is the linkage-politics 
paradigm, and the second is geostrategic analysis. These two frameworks provide 
different points of view in analyzing China^s great-power aspirations. The former 
is a cognitive approach, stressing the links between domestic developments and 
foreign policy initiatives whereas the later is a global approach, specifying how 
changes in the international structure will affect the fulfillment of China9 s aspirations 
in the world. Due to the complexity of the world, it is not enough to employ just 
one approach in this study. The following sections discuss how these two 
approaches are used in combination in my study， to shed light on China’s quest for
CHAPTER 2









China stands for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in this study. As in 
world politics, the PRC government is recognized by nearly all the worlds countries 
except the 23 that recognize Taiwan. In other words， the international status of the 
PRC is recognized by the world. When the seat of China in the United Nations, 
including the Security Council, was transferred from the Kuomingtang (KMT) 
regime to the Communist government of mainland China in 1971, it marked the re­
entry of China in world politics. Taiwan’s prestige and influence in the world 
began to decline after withdrawing from the United Nations. On the other hand, the 
PRC has increasingly established its solid political status in international relations 
after joining the United Nations. From that time onwards, it gradually acquired the 
credentials necessary for a great power. Actually, its permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council, to a certain extent, represents a symbol of great power in global 
terms.
DEFINITON OF GREAT POWER:
Power, in its modem form, is concerned with which groups or persons dominate, 
get their own way or are best able to pursue their own interests in societies (McLean, 
1996， p.396). In international relations, power is a key concept that defines an 
international system and the status of its actors. The basic meaning of “power” in 
the international structure is the ability of one actor to influence another to do, or not
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to do, something desired by that actor. K. Waltz categorizes and ranks power to be 
the capabilities of states with reference to “how they score on all of the following 
items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, 
military strength, political stability and competence (Waltz, 1979, p.131). This 
explanation shows that there is a close relationship between exerting power and 
actual capabilities of the actor.
CHAPTER 2
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FOREIGN POLICY
The core definitions of power or paradigms of power relationships are as 
following (McLean, 1996, pp.396-397):
(1) A has effects on B5s choices and actions.
(2) A has the capability to move B?s choices and actions in ways that A intends.
(3) A has the capability to override opposition from B.
(4) The relationship between A and B described in propositions 1, 2, 3 is part of a 
social structure and has a tendency to persist.
In the complex world, the above tenets just describe part of the meaning of 
power， but cannot give a foil meaning of power. In its basic meaning, power 
connotes the ability of one actor to influence another actor to do, or not to do. 
Actually, there is a wide diversity of definitions of power in the realist sense. N. J. 
Spykman defines power as the ability to move the individual or the human 
collectivity in some desired fashion, through ''persuasion, purchase, barter, and 
coercion.” （ Spykman， 1942, p. 11). According to R. Gilpin, power encompasses the 
military, economic, and technological capabilities of states, while prestige consists of 
the “perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capabilities and its ability and
13
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willingness to express its power” (Gilpin， 1981， p.33).
From the above definitions, we can see that there are total three important 
components: “power”， “influence”， and “prestige”. The power of a state is said to 
consist of different kinds of capability, such as the military, economic and 
technological capabilities as shown in the study. Influence is the capacity to affect 
the decisions of others. Indeed, influence is derived from “power”. In 
international relations, when a state owns a certain degree of capability, its capacity 
to affect others9 decision will increase at the same time. Thus, in most cases, power 
and influence are interdependent in describing how powerful a state is in the 
international system. Prestige is the respect which is paid to a power by other 
powers.
The definition offered by R. Gilpin is particularly suitable for this study. What 
the Chinese leadership pursued in the early 1980s was to make China become a 
strong state in the world. To do so, in the views of Deng, China had to boost its 
national capabilities in the areas of economy, military, and technology. The twenty 
years5 reform and modernization programmes have been supportive of this pursuit. 
The next step to the goal of great power status is to gain the respect of and equal 
footing in the community of nations. In fact, great power status is not self-claimed, 
it has to be recognized and accepted by other great powers. This means that China 
has to show its ability to stand up in the world, through participation in regional and 
international forums. Great power status also depends on whether China can 
demonstrate its contribution to the maintenance of world peace and stability. In R. 
Giplin’s definition of power， both comprehensive national power and perceptions of
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other powers are equally important. It is equally applicable to the case of China.
In a rapidly changing international environment, the concept of great power is 
subject to continuing redefinition and reassessment. Within different periods, the 
definition of “power” may require somewhat different combinations of ingredients. 
During the Cold War period, a great power was one that mainly commanded strategic 
military weapons and technological know-how. After the Cold War, the notion of 
great power tilts toward a combination of high-tech knowledge, military capabilities, 
and the ability to influence major decision making in international affairs. The 
concept of power therefore needs to be modified in view of the changing 
international setting. In other words, embedded in an interactive and interdependent 
world are multiple games on multiple chessboards (issue areas) requiring different 
kinds of power (Baldwin, 1979, p.161). Based on this interpretation， “power” is an 
idea, which needs to be conceptualized in simulated terms. Synthesizing various 
conceptions of power, the most appropriate definition of a great power is as follows: 
A state that is among the top five in the primary global structures -  economic, 
military, knowledge, and normative -  and that, because of massive resource and skill 
differentials and relative economic self-sufficiency, enjoys security interdependence 
(Kim， 1998, p,9).
Having discussed the definitions of power, a clear picture of this study is shown. 
As will become clear， “hard power” - a state’s economic and military power to 
coerce - is adopted in this thesis in order to discuss China’s aspirations on becoming 
a great power. “Soft power” - the ability to attract through cultural and ideological 
appeal - will not be included in the discussion in this study. It is true that soft power
CHAPTER 2
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possesses a significant role in the current world environment. However， a state’s 
values and culture will be spread to the world when its hard power is strong enough 
to challenge the world’s predominance. According to this precondition, hard power 
is more important than that of soft power in the following discussion.
CHAPTER 2
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The concept of great power status in this study includes two items: power and 
prestige. In terms of power, the definition is not static, but dynamic in nature. The 
changing international environment may require a re-definition of what is power. 
This characteristic of power， consequently, will bring a different index of 
international prestige that a great power commands from other states. During the 
1980s to 1990s, the Chinese leadership resolved to search for great power status, by 
upgrading the country’s comprehensive national capabilities (diplomatic leverage，  
economic and military power) and seeking due recognition from the rest of the 
world.
IMPORTANCE OF THEORY IN STUDYING CHINESE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS:
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
Several decades ago, there were not so many researchers and specialists who 
were interested in investigating China’s behaviour in foreign policy and its status in 
international relations. On the one hand, China was still a closed country, and it 
was not so easy to get information from mainland China. The study of this field 
was a difficult task for scholars outside mainland China. On the other hand, during 
the first half of the Maoist regime, China was still a very weak country in terms of
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economic, military and industrial-technological capabilities. Its diplomatic network 
with other nations was still under-developed. China’s strategic power in terms of 
exercising influence abroad was very limited. This condition could not arouse 
much interest abroad in making China’s foreign policy and its external behavior a 
serious subject of study.
By the late 1960s, the study of Chinese foreign policy was regarded as an 
“emergent discipline” in international relations (Hsiung， 1980， p.l). There were 
two reasons contributing to this change. First of all, the Sino-Soviet split and the 
shifting winds in Sino-US relations in the late 1960s made China become an 
increasingly prominent actor besides the two superpowers in the bipolar system. 
The Washington government was showing signs that it would try to play China as a 
counter weight against the Soviet Union. Second, China was the only power other 
than the superpowers with a fully independent nuclear force in that period. The 
international environment was predominated by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence 
and high technological development in the Cold War period. If a nation possessed 
powerful nuclear weapons, its international status would be boosted accordingly.
Due to changes in the international environment and within China, these 
developments altered the mind of specialists. To the world, China was on its way to 
becoming the next important force in the global system. From the Chinese point of 
view, the possession of a nuclear arsenal of China9 s own making gave it the 
necessary credentials for the quest of great power status. Under these 
circumstances, China9 s ascendancy on the world stage became an important topic for 
students of global politics. Also from this time onwards, China’s international
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status and its national power became a contentious issue as well.
IMPORTANCE OF THEORY:
This the background of how the study of Chinese foreign policy became a 
research focus from the late 1960s on. However, much of the literature was largely 
Sinocentric and ideographic, uncommunicative with the body of theory, methodology, 
and findings that had developed in the broader fields of comparative foreign policy 
and international relations (Hsiung, 1980, p.l). In fact, analytical framework and 
methodology are the essential elements in the study of China’s foreign policy. 
Without them, the whole research will lack a skeleton in explaining why the 
phenomenon occurred.
Indeed, most studies use an idiosyncratic approach in analyzing China’s 
international status and its foreign policy in the world nowadays. From the 
methodological point of view, this approach contains the problems of 
conceptualization, operationalization, and hypothesis testing and theoretical 
framework. Ad hoc explanations just focus on the discussion of a particular issue in 
a particular period, they cannot provide any cumulative meaning to the study of 
Chinese foreign relations. For example, when the NATO “accidentally” bombed 
the Chinese embassy of Yugoslavia in May 1999, most experts believed that it would 
create a hostile relationship between China and the US. In addition, they would 
probably predict that the Sino-US relationship entered into a dead end, and that it 
would affect China’s entry to the WTO. Nevertheless, these speculations failed to 
explain why China reacted the way it did, why it insisted that the NATO must
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apologize for the incident. The idiosyncratic approach fails to account for the 
changing international environment, the perception of the larger world towards China, 
and China9 s self-perception. In other words, this approach does not highlight the 
importance of causal relationship between variables.
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To understand China9s journey to become a great power, theory should be 
brought in, to bear on the subject. Theory is an explanatory device derived from 
generalizations of earlier cases applicable to future similar cases, all things being 
equal (ceteris paribus). A coherent theoretical framework can illustrate a logical 
causal relationship between independent variables and dependent variables. After 
identifying this causal relationship, findings regarding China’s foreign policy 
behavior will become more comprehensible and credible. This research aims at 
asking three main questions: (1) How do changes in the international environment 
and in the domestic development affect China’s great-power aspirations? (2) What 
is the other states9 perception of China as a great power? (3) What is China5s self- 
image on this matter? To search an answer to these questions, we need a coherent 
theoretical framework.
DIFFERENT APPROACHES ON THE STUDY OF CHINESE FOREIGN 
POLICY:
COGNITIVE APPROACH:
The cognitive approach to the study of Chinese foreign policy is trained on the 
top policy makers, in particular their perceptions of the domestic and international 
environments. The premise of the cognitive approach is that “human perception
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and motivation is the ultimate source of human behaviour.(Shih, 1992, p.56). A 
cognitive study of foreign policy entails the examination of the beliefs, ideals, and 
experiences of the policy makers. The main focus of the approach is the element of 
“perception.” It emphasizes the importance of cognitive beliefs of people in the 
actual process of foreign policy making. In this regard, Shih developed a 
“psychocultural cybernetic mode,” which contains two main arguments. First, it is 
argued that foreign policy mainly serves to dramatize, actualize, and confirm 
statesmen’s national self-image (Shih， 1990, p.17). Second, it is asserted that, in the 
event of inconsistency between the self-image and the reality of world events, the 
policy ultimately adopted boils down to the statesmen’s commitment to the 
fulfillment of their world view (Shih, 1990, p.17). This means that self-image and 
world structure must be analyzed in combination.
Applying this approach in this study, the idea of national role as a source of 
foreign policy behaviour and motivation can be used. After Mao, China entered a 
new era, in which it strove to have the ability to pursue a first-rank status in the 
world. The implication of this change in Chinese foreign policy is that China has 
certain self-expectations in the contemporary world. After having experienced a 
century of humiliation, the Chinese people wish for an equal status among the 
nations in the international community. This aspiration is the motive force behind 
China’s foreign policy. Hence, the cognitive approach can give a full exposition to 
this point.
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LINKAGE-POLITICS PARADIGM:
The theoretical model known as the linkage-politics approach aims at 
explicating the causal relationship between domestic level factors and the 
international system, which is the determinant in foreign policy decisions. This 
approach recognizes the force of external pressures and their impact on foreign 
policy decision-making, but it also keeps an eye on the importance of domestic 
political institutions and policies in the timing and framing of specific responses to 
such external pressures (Kim, 1998，p.23). That means, the linkage between 
domestic factors and external factors is an interdependent and reciprocal interaction. 
''Instead of being a cause of international politics, domestic structure may be a 
consequence of it. International systems, too, become causes instead of 
consequences.” (Gourevitch, 1978，p.882). Linkage, in the study of a nation’s 
foreign policy, is defined as any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in 
one system and is reacted to in another (Rosenau, 1969, p.45). Due to the 
increasing globalization dynamics, the linkage between domestic and external 
variables becomes a prominent factor affecting a state’s foreign policy.
For the study of China’s great-power aspirations in the post-Mao period, the 
model of linkage-politics leads us to searching for a causal relationship between 
domestic variables and international variables that will help explain Chinese leaders5 
psychological profile and their perceptions of and responses to international material 
and normative pressures. During the late Maoist regime, China began to integrate 
into the global system, as indicated in its entry to the United Nations in 1971. In the 
Dengist era, the Chinese leadership carried out an open door policy as well as
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domestic reforms, which were designed to develop the nation’s national capabilities, 
in the economic, military, and diplomatic sphere. However, these internal changes 
inevitably brought about the reformulation of Chinese foreign policy behaviour. To 
fulfill the national development goals of making China a strong power, the Chinese 
leadership realized that they cannot continuously follow the doctrine of self- 
sufficiency and isolation of the Maoist era. From this time onwards, the Chinese 
leaders have come to understand and appreciate the implications of the domestic and 
external linkage.
Due to the increasingly complex and interdependence between domestic and 
foreign policies, the model of linkage-politics is appropriate to the task of explaining 
the existing Chinese foreign policy behaviour. However, the indicators of domestic 
and systemic factors are very complicated and some of them are not very relevant to 
the study of the Chinese quest to be a great power. This study will simplify the 
causal relationship in the linkage-politics paradigm in order to explain China’s 
aspirations to become a great power. There are two steps in establishing a causal 
relationship between Chinese domestic power and foreign policy. First, in Deng’s 
time， the most urgent domestic policy was to establish China’s economic 
development. To fulfill this goal, China carried out several types of reforms, which 
included agriculture, industry, finance, and property estate in order to enhance its 
economic capability domestically. Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership realized that 
merely depending on internal reforms could not make China into an economically 
strong country, and that foreign investments would also play an important role in 
China’s economic development. Therefore, the orientation of Chinese foreign 
policy became more open-mined, and it showed a cooperative goodwill towards the
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outside world. The change of Chinese foreign policy was based on the needs of 
national development.
Second, the relationship between China’s quest for great power status and 
linkage politics can be illustrated in this way: in the post-Mao era, Deng sought to 
make China into one of great powers in the world. From Deng’s point of view, 
China should have a thorough preparation to fulfill its great-power dream in terms of 
its economic power, military power and diplomatic leverage. This overall concern 
continues to guide China in Jiang’s period If China’s great-power aspirations are 
to be fulfilled the most essential element to make China become a great power is the 
possession of a strong comprehensive national power. If China is a weak country 
and has less power capability; its international status will be less respected by the rest 
of the world. When China's national power increases, its status will receive greater 
respect, and its foreign policy will become more active. China has accumulated its 
national power after two decades of reforms and continuous developments. These 
achievements directly affect China's new concept of foreign policy, which is more 
active in international activities and establishes normal ties with other nations. In 
addition, the expanding state to state relationship between China and the other states 
will relatively benefit China's capability building. Since the Chinese leaders 
increase their practice in international arena, at the same time, the established trade 
with other countries on military and economy will strengthen China1 s national 
capabilities.
As a whole， there are two types of linkage to describe China’s great-power 
aspirations in these two decades. The first step started from the Dengist era, which
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mainly focused on the complementarity between domestic development and external 
relations. The “vertical” domestic-foreign linkage has been established for the two 
decades. Since the Chinese leadership realized the importance of foreign 
investments on China9 s economic capability building, the integration into the global 
system was an inevitable trend for the Chinese modernization. A cooperative 
goodwill towards the outside world and friendly relations with the other nations are 
the main elements in the Chinese “vertical” domestic-foreign linkage. The second 
step began in Jiang5 s tenure, which developed the expansion of China9 s influence 
abroad. In the 1990s, China has accumulated its certain economic power in the 
Asian-Pacific area. These achievements make China become more active in both 
the regional and international institutions. This “horizontal” linkage vis各 vis other 
countries was achieved by China9 s participation into different kinds of organization 
in the world. Hence, the links between China9 s great-power aspirations, domestic 
development and foreign policy can be explained under the concept of linkage- 
politics paradigm. The next chapter further illustrates this relationship with 
evidence in order to make this structure more concrete.
GEOSTRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW:
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The concept of geostrategy uses a global perspective to describe the relationship 
between the nature of international structure and the role of a nation in the world. 
Actually, geostrategic concept is primarily derived from geopolitics. Before 
examining the concept of geostrategy, it would be appropriate to touch upon some 
traditional concepts of geopolitics. According to the supplement to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, geopolitics is the study of the “influence of geography on the
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political character of states, their history, institutions and especially relations with 
other states.” （Mazari, 1998, p.l). This theoretical conception is given to 
understand the principal international security issues. It is about the “high politics” 
of security and international order; about the influence of enduring spatial 
relationships for the rise and decline of power centers; and about the implications of 
technological, political -  organization, and demographic trends for relations of 
relative influence (Gray, 1988, p.4). Therefore, it is an approach, which takes a 
worldwide perspective in discussing state relations. Typically, this theoretical 
approach focused only on superpowers or great powers in international power 
relationship, and concentrated on the relation of international political power to the 
geographical landscape. From this point of view, geopolitical ideas provide a 
framework that let us realize how international politics runs in a dynamic world, 
from what considerations, what aim, and what strategies the state will behave like 
this.
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Geopolitical concepts are grand theory indeed. It concerns with the essential 
nature of phenomena, and gives a precise argument on existing international politics. 
Basically, geopolitics is identified as three main notions in discussing politics at the 
international level. First is the geographical setting which means the size, the 
contained raw materials and the defensive capability of a state. Second is the 
difference of ideology. This factor is prominent in the “game” of geopolitics, since 
the ideological differences would determine the military and technological strategic 
principles of states. It indicates that countries with same official ideology will be 
close to each other and may form alliances in the sense of military defense. For 
instance, NATO is formed by Western capitalist states, which share similar
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ideological principles after WWII. Third, there is a doctrine over oppositions at 
several aspects, such as land power versus sea power, Heartland versus Rimland, and 
individualistic Western philosophy versus a collective Eastern philosophy. In 
modem time, after the end of the Cold War, many experts focus on the doctrine of
land power versus sea power, because the international environment follows the 
pattern of bipolar system in the Cold War period. USSR, the landpower of the great 
continental state, is on the opposite of, USA, the seapower of the maritime empire. 
If a country can either dominate landpower or seapower, its military status in the 
world would be enhanced.
There is another substantial concept that is similar to geopolitics in discussing 
international politics during the 1990s. Geoeconomics seems to be another trend 
that counterbalances the idea of geopolitics. This concept even surpasses 
geopolitics in the post-Cold War era, and its importance in international system 
should not be ignored. The definition of geoeconomics includes two levels. On 
the marcolevel, all matters pertaining to manufacturing, marketing, financing, and 
research and design (R&D) are globalized, while on the microlevel, national power is 
no longer measured exclusively by a state’s military might (Hsiung，1997, p.203). 
It thus, implies that economic security has eclipsed or overtaken military security in 
world order. The “game” of geoeconomics is very similar to that of geopolitics， but 
the most significant difference seems to be the strategic principle. The main idea of 
geopolitics is on the military strategic principle - one nation’s security is all 
determined by how powerful of its military strength. Although geoeconomics also 
concerns the strategic principle, its focus is on economic strategy. The essence of 
geoeconomics is the national economic self-containment; the hold of natural
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resources; the independence of trade; and the formation of economic bloc. If a 
country can establish an economic strategic principles and autonomy, its national 
power would enhance simultaneously. Therefore, geoeconomics is derived from 
the concept of geopolitics, both are based on strategy that develop national power of 
state and form alliance with other states, but the most typical difference is their
essence.
Applying geostrategic point of view in the study of China’s great-power 
aspirations provides a world perspective to discuss the relationship between China9 s 
role in the world and changes in international environment. Geostrategic analysis is 
applied to illustrate the changes in China's international status from the Maoist era to 
the post-Cold War era. Traditionally, the theoretical analysis of geostrategy focused 
only on state relations among great powers and superpowers in international relations. 
The international structure is determined by some powerful states, this ideology is 
famous in realism. China's quest for great power status in the global system is 
bounded by the international structure. International relations is a dynamic process, 
not static. Changes in the international environment have imposed both new 
chances and challenges to China in its role and status. In the post-Cold War era, 
China has gained a higher international status due to the breakdown of the 
international bipolar system.
FRAMEWORK OF CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS:
Having reviewed different approaches to the study of Chinese foreign policy, it 
is necessary to describe a conceptual framework of this study. In the study of
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China’s foreign policy and its great-power aspirations in the post-Mao era， two 
approaches, linkage politics and geostrategic point of view will be used. The 
former provides a systematic paradigm explaining the interrelations between 
domestic and external variables. In the post-Mao period, the doctrine of 
exploitative constraints is released, and the interaction between China and the world 
is enhanced. Changes in Chinese domestic developments and the detente of tight 
international bipolar system stimulate the thought of Chinese leaders that China 
possesses capabilities to quest for a great power. Hence, it is definitely true that 
China is entering into world politics, the integration would make the internal and 
external factors more complex. The model of linkage-politics is appropriate to 
explain the existing phenomenon of Chinese foreign policy behaviour in the world.
Geostrategic concepts developed a macro-level analysis in China’s foreign policy. 
Since international relations is a dynamic process, not static, changes in the 
international environment have imposed new challenges to China in its role and 
status. China’s quest for a great power in post-Mao era is bounded by the 
international order. The detente of Sino-US relations in the 1970s marked the 
watershed of China9 s foreign policy and laid down the foundation of China9 s great- 
power aspirations in the Dengist regime. In the Dengist period, he stated that the 
closer relationship with the United States was a long-term strategy of China5 s foreign 
policy (Yahuda，1982, p.36). It is a geopolitical consideration - establishing a good 
relations with the US would be beneficial for China for the long run, because the US 
is the only superpower in the existing international environment. This geopolitical 
idea fully represents that Deng has a hope to make China a great power in the 
international arena. Moreover, Deng’s Open Door policy and economic
CHAPTER 2
DEFINITIONS, THEORIES AND METHODS -  PERSPECTIVES ON CHINESE GREAT POWER
FOREIGN POLICY
28
development came from the concept of geoeconomics. Deng perhaps forecasted 
that the concept of geoeconomic capability would be the most important element in 
evaluating one’s national strength. During Jiang9s period, he basically follows 
Deng’s idea in foreign relations. In the post-Cold War period, China has gained a 
higher international status due to the breakdown of the international bipolar order. 
Jiang is more aggressive in developing China as a great power in the world. He 
may not wish China would be “first among equal”， but “equal among firsts”. 
Despite the favourable factors of Chinese national growth, the wish of Chinese 
leaders to make China a great power is partly determined by the change of 
international structure. Therefore, combing the two approaches, linkage-politics 
paradigm and geostrategic analysis would give us a detailed and comprehensive 
explanation of China’s great-power aspirations in the post-Mao period.
The cognitive approach, in the study of Chinese great-power aspirations, 
provides a background information for this study. China9 s self-perception as a great 
power is mostly caused by its history. After China experienced a century of 
humiliation, the Chinese people wish to ask for an equal status between China and 
the other members in the international community. To fulfill this goal, the Chinese 
leaders should have a self-conception that China is a great power in order to spread 
Chinese value abroad. Hence, this approach can give an explanation why Chinese 
leaders will have an aspirations to become one of the great powers in the world after 
the Maoist era.
Based on a set of theoretical frameworks, two hypotheses are formed in this 
study. In the following chapters (3 & 4), evidence will be given in accordance with
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these two hypotheses, two approaches and China9 s great-power aspirations.
(1) China9s international status is a function of both its capabilities (military, 
economy, and diplomatic leverage) and the general perception of other major 
powers.
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
H (1) is from an objective perspective to testify whether China is a great power 
in the international system. A great power is not self-claimed, it requires the 
recognition by other members of the international society, especially of the major 
states (actors). China’s national growth which begun in the 1980s and the 
acceptance by other nations are the two pillars supporting China9 s claim to be a great 
power in the world system. This hypothesis can be justified by the documents and 
commentaries from other states about the great-power status of China in the world.
30
DEFINITIONS, THEORIES AND METHODS -  PERSPECTIVES ON CHINESE GREAT POWER 
FOREIGN POLICY
CHAPTER 2
(2) China perceives itself as a great power as well as the world’s recognition of 
China’s global status， as a result of China’s endeavors to upgrade its national 
capabilities and of strategic changes in the international balance of power.
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
H (2) tries to discuss China’s quest for great power status from two perspectives. 
First, China9 s self-image as a great power is the result of domestic reforms and 
change in the external environment. Second, the world’s recognition of China’s 
great power status is due to China’s national capabilities and change of international 
order. Whether China perceives itself as a great power depends on its own 
calculated endeavors and the state of the international system. Without the reforms 
of the 1980s, China cannot have upgraded its national capabilities in quest of big- 
power status. Without the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, China 
cannot have become one of the potential poles in the global system. China5s self­
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perception as a great power can be shown in its active participation in the 
international arena. This hypothesis can be justified by the publications and 
documentation from the Chinese government and Jiang’s visits and his speeches 
concerning the world order.
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Besides, the general acceptance by the international community of the rising 
China is most probably caused by the change from bipolar to multipolar international 
system. In addition, China’s economic clout in recent decades has shown an 
impressive image to the world. The two independent variables -  China’s 
capabilities and change of international order, contribute to the worlds positive 
perception of China’s role in the world.
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CHINA’S GREAT-POWER ASPIRATIONS: A LINKAGE-POLITICS PARADIGM
Linkage-politics paradigm is used in this chapter to describe how China’s 
domestic capabilities affect its foreign policy behaviour and how foreign policy 
contributes to its domestic growth. For these two decades，China’s great-power 
aspirations have been stimulated by its increasing national development, especially in 
economic growth. This chapter is divided into three parts in discussing how 
linkage-politics can be applied to explain China^ quest for great power status. 
Firstly， we will discuss the links between China’s domestic development and its 
external relations，hence， the “vertical” domestic-foreign linkage. China’s domestic 
policy shift has helped its foreign relations. In the early 1980s, the most urgent 
domestic policy for China was to push for economic development. Contrarily, 
China’s expanding foreign relations will relatively benefit China’s capability 
building, since international trade ties will enhance China’s economic development 
and military advancement. The change of Chinese foreign policy was based on the 
needs of national development. The Chinese leaders realized that merely depending 
on internal reforms could not make China into economically strong country and that 
foreign investments would also play an important role on China5 s economic 
development. As a result, the orientation of Chinese foreign policy became more 
open-minded, more active to establish normal ties with foreign states, and it showed 
a cooperative goodwill towards the outside world. Evidence will be given to justify
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the change in China5 s internal growth and its external relations and how they have 
complemented each other.
Secondly, we will use the linkage-politics paradigm to explain China’s 
“horizontal” linkage vis-i_vis other countries. Due to the impressive growth of 
China’s economy， the expansion of China’s influence abroad has been enhanced. 
These achievements can be justified through China’s active participation in both the 
regional and the global institutions. The large gains in China’s economic clout in 
recent decades improved its influence in the world. This linkage will be supported 
in the following paragraph.
Thirdly, due to this positive inter-relationship, what the Chinese leadership did 
in the past two decades testified China had self-perception to become a great power. 
Based on the concept of linkage-politics paradigm, the Chinese leaders realized the 
important link between national development and external relations. When China 
has strengthened its national power around the 1990s, Jiang Zemin began its great 
power foreign policy, which aimed at making China one of the great powers in the 
world. According to Jiang’s views on foreign policy, he believes that China’s 
strong national power will directly expand its influence on foreign relations. Hence, 
the linkage-politics paradigm can help explain the great-power aspirations on the 
doctrine of China^ foreign policy.
CHINA，S CAPABILITY IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC POWER:
This section discusses the relationship between China’s increasing and
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comprehensive national development and its active behaviour in foreign policy. 
The political victory of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 marked the starting point for the rise 
of China in the world. Deng gave priority to economic modernization in domestic 
construction, which put China on the road to fulfilling the goal of obtaining a 
superpower position. From that time onwards, China’s domestic policies started to 
play an influential indicator of its foreign policy. The phase “open door policy” 
describes China’s new doctrine on foreign policy consideration， which highlights the 
specific nature of its changes. In reality, the main principle of the Open Door 
Policy is the reflection of China’s domestic development. The linkage between 
domestic and foreign policies are inter-related due to the increasingly globalization.
INDICATORS TO ILLUSTRATE CHINA’S ECONOMIC CAPABILITY:
Based on the economic foundation in the Maoist period and rapid economic 
growth in the Dengist era, China is the fastest growing economy in the world (Kristof, 
1993, p.59). If this trend continues, according to this source, China may displace 
the worlds largest economy -  the United States, and become a global economic 
superpower around the mid 21st century. In the post-Cold War world order, the 
United States has processed the world’s largest economy for more than a century， but 
at present projections China may displace it in the first half of the 21st century and 
become the number one economy in the world (Kristof, 1993, p.59). Although this 
prediction is conceivably overly generous in evaluating China’s economic capability 
in the world, there is undoubted evidence that the existing international 
environment — an era of geoeconomics, is favorable for China’s economic growth in 
this century.
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In the following paragraphs, four areas will be employed to operationalize 
China’s economic competency. They include China9s national growth, its trading 
volume in the world, its inflow of foreign direct investment, and its accession into 
the international economic organization -  WTO. First of all, gross domestic 
product (GDP) may be regarded as the best single indicator to measure a state’s 
power, which combines overall size, technological level, and wealth (Goldstein, 1999, 
p_57). The index of GDP, thus, can show the comprehensive national capability of a 
state. Second, the trade volume, foreign investments, and integration of the world 
economic order are the prominent factors to indicate a state’s economic capability in 
terms of global perspective. Since the world is on the right trend towards 
globalization, the interaction among states, especially the economic ties, will increase 
in this century. Hence, these two indicators play a significant role in judging 
China’s economic power.
I  CHINA GDP GROWTH IN THE PAST TWO DECADES:
Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee 
convened in December 1978, the central government made the strategic decision of 
shifting the focus of work to social modernization and defined the guiding policy of 
revitalizing the domestic economy and opening up to the outside world. From that 
time onwards, a brand new situation appeared in economic development through 
vigorously balancing the proportions of the national economy and reforming the 
outdated economic system. This changing economic strategy brought an enormous 
enhancement on China’s economic growth.
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In terms of GDP, China has reached a satisfactory and surprising growth level 
for the last two decades. According to People’s Daily (September 14， 1999)， 
China’s GDP， which came to only RMB 362.41 billion yuan in 1978, totaled 7955.3 
billion yuan, a 20-fold increase over 1978. From 1979 to 1997，China’s average 
annual growth rate is 9.8%, or 6.5% points higher than that of the world. The other 
statistical data in People’s Daily (October 23，1999) mentioned that from 1952 to 
1998, China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7.7%， much higher than the 
world average of 3% in the same period. China’s present economic boom has 
resulted in real annual growth averaging about 7-8% per year, and reached the 
highest GNP growth at 12.8% in 1992. China5s GDP in 1995 was nearly double 
that predicted by the World Bank in 1985 (World Bank, 1997, p.20). This 
continuously rapid development was not impeded by the Asian financial crisis in the 
late 1998. In fact, the GDP for 1998 increased by 7.8% over the previous year 
(People’s Daily， September 14, 1999). The increase was just slightly lower than the 
target of 8%. This achievement fully testifies that China possesses enough 
economic foundation to meet the challenge in a local regional crisis.
II. CHINA’S TRADE VOLUME:
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After the initiation of economic reform and opening to the outside world, the 
growing foreign trade became and constituted a major element in promoting China9s 
economic development. China is likely to be an increasingly important trading 
nation in the world, its exports are likely to continue to grow by 10 to 15% annually, 
and trade value in 1995 is likely to be between $220 billion to $250 billion (Lardy, 
1994, p.105). The growth of China’s foreign trade is shown in figure 3.1. During
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the late 1990s， the data shows that China’s trade volume kept on a right pace even to 
meet Asian financial crisis. The trade value is to be between US$324 billion to 
US$360.7 billion, and its growth rate is around 11.3% increase. As a result, we can 
predict that the trend of China5 s foreign trade will be on the positive, increasing 
trend.
Figure 3.1 Dual Growth of China’s Foreign Trade in 1999 (Unit US$ 1 billion)
1998 1999 Growth Rate
Export 183.7 194.9 6.1%
Import 140.3 165.8 18.2%
Import & Export 324.0 360.7 11.3%
Source: Beijing Review Vol. 43 No. 14
In terms of China9s imports and exports in GNP? the growth is staggering. 
During the late 1970s，China’s imports and exports accounted for about 13% of GNP， 
the lowest ratio in the world. In 1995, China’s trade has surged to more than 30o/〇 
of GNP (World Bank, 1997, p.84). In US dollar terms, trade increased nearly 
tenfold between 1978 to 1995. From $36 billion to $300 billion (World Bank, 1997, 
p.84). As a result, according to figure 3.2, China5s total export and import values 
have ranked 9,h and 11th respectively in the world, accounting for 4 percent of world 
trade. And by 2020, China could be the world9s second largest exporter and 
importer, accounting for 10% of world trade (World Bank, 1997, p.103). Moreover, 
the view that China will become an economic superpower stems in part from the 
widely publicized International Monetary Fund report that China’s economy is 
poised to overtake that of Japan in absolute size (Lardy, 1994, p.107). In sum, the 
evidence justifies the fact that China will continue to be a major participant in
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international trade and international capital markets.
Figure 3.2 Import and Export by China in 1999.
Import and Export by China in 1999 Ranking The Top 9th of The World 
Trade 1999 in (Unit: US$100 million)
Country
(region)







U.S.A 1 17,549 8.0 1 6,950 1.8 1 10,599 12.5
Germany 2 10,131 0.0 2 5,405 -0.4 2 4,726 0.4
Japan 3 7,271 8.8 3 4,175 7.6 4 3,096 10.4
U.K. 4 5,891 0.2 5 2,684 -1.6 3 3,207 1.7
France 5 5,850 -1.6 4 2,990 -2.1 5 2,860 -1.2
Canada 6 4,588 8.6 6 2,386 11.3 7 2,202 5.8
Italy 7 4,468 -2.5 7 2,308 -4.7 6 2,160 0.1
Netherlands 8 3,931 6.7 8 2,041 1.5 8 1,890 12.9
P.R.C. 9 3,607 11.3 9 1,949 6.1 11 1,658 18.3
Hong Kong 10 3,543 -1.4 11 1,748 0.0 9 1,795 -2.8
Belgium-
Luxemburg
11 3,535 2.4 10 1,841 3.0 10 1,694 1.7
Mexico 12 2,849 14.8 13 1,367 16.3 12 1,482 13.5
Source: Beijing Review Vol. 43 No. 14
III. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
In respect of foreign direct investment (FDI), the growth is gigantic. Starting 
from 1978 on, the opening of China’s market attracted a lot of capital and 
management know-how from the west. Before 1979 China attracted nearly no FDI, 
however, by 1995 net inflow had reached $38 billion, accounting for 13 percent of
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domestic investment (World Bank, 1997, p.90). In 1995 one-third of China’s 
exports and half of its imports involved joint ventures between Chinese and foreign 
partners (World Bank, 1997, p.90). China was the second-largest recipient of 
foreign direct investment in the world during the late 1990s, just behind the US? and 
was probably the largest developing-country host for investment (Lardy, 1994, 
p.106). Since 1979， foreign investment has played a critical role in 
internationalizing China’s economy and trade， introducing capital， technology and 
management and marketing skills. In the long term, FDI will bring further benefits 
of China’s comparative advantages and provide clearer domestic signals on where to 
allocate resources. Over the past 21 years, the significant increase portfolio 
investment by foreigners is as the result of China’s expanding open markets. In 
sum, the role of FDI becomes more important for China’s economic growth when the 
Chinese leaders still keep on the trend of open door policy.
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IV ACCESSION INTO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
In the post-Cold War world order, the world not only entered into the multipolar 
system, but there was a trend towards globalization as well. Economic 
globalization is the general trend in the existing international order. If China wants 
to become one of the most major participants in the international economic order, the 
integration into the world is an inevitable movement for the development of China9 s 
economy. The WTO is one of the most extensive international economic 
organizations. Its main functions are: First, formulating international economic and 
trade regulations and supervising their implementation; second, organizing its 
member states to conduct negotiations on opening markets; third, establishing a sort
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of mechanism for coordinating and solving economic and trading disputes between 
its member states. Thus， the success of China’s entry into the WTO promotes 
China’s rapid economic growth in today’s world trading order. The most important 
aspect is that China’s accession in the WTO can strengthen its external relations with 
other nations, and accelerate its integration into the global economic system.
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH TO ITS GREAT POWER 
ASPIRATIONS:
I. THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN CHINA’S DOMESTIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS:
Since China has focused on its economic development for two decades, the 
open door policy helped China establish its foreign relations. China’s growth rates 
in its GDP, foreign trade, FDI and the accession into the WTO are the indicators that 
show the interaction between China and the rest of the world has become more 
cooperative than that of before. In addition，China’s expanding and open foreign 
relations have proven instrumental in fostering China9 s domestic development.
First of all，China’s global trade volume， ranking 9th in export value and 11th in 
import value illustrates the developing economic ties between China and the other 
nations. The United States has even become China9 s largest export country. 
President Jiang Zemin, in the late 1990s, paid visits to the developed countries, such 
as the US, Japan, and Western Europe. One of his aims was to establish cooperative 
ties in economic development. Hence, China’s growth in global trade volume 
accelerated its links with the world.
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Second, China5 s rapid and continuous GDP growth quickens the process of 
economic integration. Economic globalization is one of the important tasks in the 
post-Cold War period. When the other Western countries view that China possesses 
an enough economic foundation in developing its economy, the economic 
cooperation between China and the other developed countries will be established and 
strengthened. Thus, the relations between China and the other countries will fasten 
China’s GDP growth in the long run.
Third, China9 s WTO entry will improve and promote the overall development 
of China’s trade and economic cooperation with other economic superpower blocs, 
such as the US, the European Union and Japan. From the data shown in figure 3.3, 
Japan， the US and the EU are China’s three largest and major trading partners in 
1999. Two-way trade volume is on an increasing trend in these years. According 
to People’s Daily (November 16，1999)， Jiang Zemin said that the signing of the 
Sino-US bilateral agreement on China’s WTO accession demonstrates both sides 
have adopted an overall point of view and made unremitting efforts in line with the 
spirit of equality, mutual benefit, mutual understanding, and mutual compromise. 
Recently, the US House of Representatives in Washington has passed on a fiercely 
contested trade bill granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China on 
May 25, 2000. The PNTR issue will help both China and the US develop trade and 
economic ties. It will also help create conditions for the healthy and stable 
development of Sino-US relations. This achievement demonstrates that China’s 
entry to WTO has helped build a good trading atmosphere in international relations.
The European Union was China’s third largest trading partner; the trade volume
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hit 55.7 billion US dollars in 1999, up 14% from a year ago, according to figure 3.3. 
At the same time, China was the fourth largest trading partner of the EU last year. 
The bilateral trade relations should keep to an increasingly trend, because China and 
the EU signed a bilateral agreement on China’s accession into the WTO in Beijing 
on May 19，2000. In fact, the signing of the agreement will accelerate bilateral 
relations. In the agreement, the EU officials negotiated access to the mobile 
telecommunications and insurance sectors; greater flexibility for auto manufacturers; 
and substantial tariff cuts on a wider variety of goods. The document is not only an 
agreement of commercial importance, but also important for the improvement of 
bilateral trading relations among China and the EU. Through China’s accession 
into the WTO? the trading development and economic ties between China and other 
WTO member countries will be improved.
Figure 3.3 China’s Top Trading Partners in 1999 (Unit US$ 1 billion)





i Japan 66.2 32.4 33.8
2 USA 61.5 42.0 19.5
3 EU 55.7 30.2 25.5
4 Hong Kong 43.8 36.9 6.9
5 ASEAN 27.1 12.2 14.9
6 ROK 25.0 7.8 17.2
7 Taiwan 23.5 4.0 19.5
8 Australia 6.3 2.7 3.6
9 Russia 5.7 1.5 4.2
10 Canada 4.7 2.4 2.3
Source: Beijing Review Vol. 43 No. 14
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Fourthly， Hong (People’s Daily， January 26, 2000) mentioned that China’s entry 
to the WTO can cause development through taking an active part in international 
economic cooperation and competition. Joining the WTO, further opening their 
domestic markets and participating in global competition will unavoidably exert a 
certain impact and pressure on some of China’s capital and technology intensive 
industries. However, accession to the WTO also provides a golden opportunity for 
China to absorb and assimilate advanced foreign technologies and management 
expertise, as well as quicken technological innovation. In this sense，China’s 
international competitiveness will be raised at the same time.
Finally，China’s economic growth will inevitably bring a series of domestic 
reforms and development in order to enhance its economic competitiveness in the 
global economy system and its international influence. The most substantial task 
recently is the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). During the 4th Plenum of 
the 15th CPC Central Committee discussed the major issues related to the reforms 
and development of SOEs. The state-owned economy is now facing operational 
and production difficulties. It is a vital time for China to carry out reforms; 
otherwise the problem of SOEs will interfere with China5 s economic performance. 
To achieve a sustainable， fast and healthy economic growth, speeding up the 
technological renovation and industrial upgrading are the main goal of SOE reform. 
Active efforts should be made to import advanced technology and make it a point of 
digesting and absorbing the technology and then China can make their own 
inventions. In reality, Beijing understands that economic sources of power are of 
increasing importance as the central element of comprehensive national power in an 
increasing multipolar world (Ross, 1995a, p.94). Chinese leadership is standing
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firmly on choosing reform over inaction. Thus, the Chinese leaders will still stick 
to carrying out economic reform. If China continues the trend to upgrade its 
economic capability in the future; it is possible for the Chinese to reach the goal of 
superpower in the-mid 21st century.
II. THE EXPANSION OF CHINA’S INFLUENCE ABROAD:
After Deng Xiaoping became China’s leader in 1978, he tried to cause China to 
become a great power in the world. One reason is that he perceived China would 
become a strong nation, which could compare with the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the future; the other reason is he claimed that modernization and more 
economic growth were the prerequisites for the rise of China in the world order. 
The doctrine of the formulation of the general policy of readjusting, restructuring, 
consolidating and improving China’s economy in the early 1980s signified that the 
Chinese leadership had a hope to become a great power. The tool to fulfill this goal 
was through the advancement of economic strength. In the views of the Chinese 
leadership, if China could enhance its economic strength and develop its economic 
system, other development and national growth will continued to be increased. In 
the following paragraphs, several implications for the achievement of China’s 
economic development will be discussed in order to realize China9 s great-power 
aspirations during these two decades.
Firstly, a greater economic power will help China build up a larger role in the 
international order. Economic capability is one of important elements in the 
definition of power as aforementioned. Power, in terms of this meaning, is
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capability. After the end of the Cold War, the international environment is on the 
right trend towards economic globalization, and becomes more interdependent on 
trade development. Wang Jisi, the director of the Institute of American Studies at 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said that economics is now central to world 
affairs, and so China’s overall foreign and global posture would be advanced by the 
kind of integration (Bergsten，2000, p.6). When China’s economic capability 
increased to a great extent, it was an undeniable fact that China’s comprehensive 
national strength increased simultaneously. During the new century, comprehensive 
national strength has become an increasing leading factor to determine the future and 
date of a country. In sum, the direct consequence brought by economic growth is 
the rise of the diplomatic leverage of China in the world.
When China began the Open Door Policy in the late 1970s, its increasing 
interdependence with the world’s trade and investment systems was perhaps the most 
striking phenomenon of China’s recent development China was active in 
participating in regional multilateral financial institutions and regional forums such 
as APEC, ASEAN Post-ministerial Conference and ARF. Recently, China has 
successfully completed talks on its WTO entry with more than 30 members of the 
global trade organ. China’s participation in regional organizations will be 
illustrated in more detail in the next section.
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What is the most important evidence to signify the positive relation between 
China’s economic development and its international role is that China has enjoyed a 
certain degree of independence and respect to act in the world. Specifically, 
China’s diplomatic leverage has counterbalanced the international status of the US —
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the dominant state in the post-Cold War world order, in this new century. Let’s look 
at some examples to illustrate this point. Last year, the US-led NATO bombed 
Yugoslavia and the hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. This Belgrade Embassy 
disaster killed three Chinese and prompted days of angry demonstrations outside the 
American Embassy in Beijing. Protests were heard not just in Beijing but also in 
other cities around the world. The Chinese government showed a strong stance to 
protect its dignity and its international status in the world through continuously 
criticizing the US’ arbitrary intervention on other nations’ internal affairs. From 
this event, China gained the support in the rest of the world. Regarding the 
negotiation between China and the US on China’s accession into the WTO, China 
did not make a great compromise to the demands of the US. Both sides are on the 
equal footing to discuss the bilateral agreement on China’s entry to the WTO. It is 
true that the entry to the WTO will bring lots of benefit to China as its economy is on 
the rise. However, the Chinese leaders also realize the importance of defending 
their national interests. Finally, the agreement was signed by US Trade 
Representative Charlene Barshefsky and Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Shi Guangsheng on behalf of their respective governments. According 
to People’s Daily (November 15, 1999)， Shi called the agreement a “win，win” deal 
because the deal was mutually satisfactory. This agreement showed that China 
possessed enough diplomatic bargaining power on its economic activities.
As a whole, this evidence illustrates that there is a positive relation between 
China’s economic growth and its international status. In the views of the Chinese 
leadership， without a strong economic power， China cannot play an active role in the 
international arena. At the same time, China cannot fulfill its goal of great-power
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aspirations. Thus, economic capability seems to be a prerequisite for the rise of 
China and an essential factor to enhance China5 s competition for superpower status 
and prestige in international politics.
Secondly, the economic achievement in the past two decades has enlarged the 
Chinese spirit and confidence to reach its goal of becoming a great power in the new 
century. There are many studies, which focus on the prediction of China9 s power in 
the new century. A lot of research uses China’s economic capability to forecast 
China9 s power in the 21st century. The world economy these days is in tri-polar, 
revolving around the United States, Japan and the European Community (Kristof, 
1993，p.61). This is true that these countries have developed their completed 
financial markets, and have owned the financial capability to invest in other countries. 
However in terms of global trade, market size and sheer economic bulk, China is 
becoming a fourth pole in the international system (Kristof，1993, p.61). Having 
examined the IMF, Work Bank, Department of Commerce, Maddison, and Penn 
World Tables data, a conclusion is that China, at current growth rates, will pass the 
United States in GDP in the middle of the first quarter of the twenty-first century 
(Tammen, Kugler & Lemke et. al, 2000, p.210). Most analysts view that China will 
become the next superpower in the first half of the 21st century. Bergsten (2000, p.2) 
said that the United States is now the great superpower, however, China is clearly the 
next superpower, certainly in economic terms and more broadly as well. Bracken 
(2000, p.104) believed that the rise of Beijing does not automatically translate into a 
decline for Washington， but it is a challenge to America’s superpower position. 
A.F.K. Organski even said:
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The question is not whether China will become the most powerful nation 
on earth, but rather how long it will take her to achieve this status ... The 
United States will retain world leadership for at least the remainder of the 
twentieth century, perhaps even for a longer time, but the position will 
eventually pass to China (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke et. al, 2000, p.210).
These favourable data will probably influence Chinese leaders on developing a 
long lasting goal of the Chinese -  a superpower status for China. In fact, the 
economic gap between China and the West has narrowed due to the opening up of 
China in the late 1970s. The success of China’s integration into the world economy 
signifies the precise and accurate strategy that was built in the Dengist period. 
Indeed, the view of China9 s economic cultivation articulated by Deng Xiaoping and 
developed by Zhao Ziyang has become a central element of official Chinese 
nationalism (Crane, 1999, p.220). In this sense, the advancement of economic 
development does represent the Chinese leadership on the achievement of China’s 
great-power aspirations in the world. In the new century, it is believed that China 
will still keep on a right pace fulfilling the goal of superpower development, which 
has been based on an economic build up in the past two decades.
Third, Hong (People’s Daily， January 26, 2000) stated that China’s joining the 
WTO represents a major practical step it takes in its active participation in the 
economic globalization process, and the necessary choice in persisting in 
development. Over the two decades of opening up to the outside world, the 
Chinese leadership has realized that “development is the final choice” for the future 
of China. Acceleration of the economic globalization process is the salient
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tendency for China to speed up its rapid economic growth in order to consolidate its 
economic capability in the world. Although economic globalization is unequal to 
the developed and developing countries in terms of profit and risk, the developing 
nations must go with the tide of historical development if they do not want to remain 
in a long term, backward state and stay in a passive position. China is a developing 
country, its open door policy over the past 21 years testified that China can develop 
itself in a faster and better way by unswervingly opening to the outside world and 
making full use of international and domestic markets and resources.
In actuality, China’s accession into the WTO is an important practical step it has 
taken in its active participation in the economic globalization process, in further 
perfecting the pattern of its opening to the outside world and in vigorously 
developing its exported-oriented economy. According to People’s Daily 
(September 16, 1999), Jiang stressed that China will push forward the reform and 
opening-up drive, steadily expand the mutually beneficial cooperation with all 
countries in the world. At the same time, China will continue its efforts for the 
establishment of a complete and open international trading system so as to make 
positive contributions to world peace and development. If China succeeds in its 
admittance to the WTO after the negotiations with other members in this year, it is 
possible for China to achieve more development opportunities in the vast 
international economic arena. Moreover, China can gain a greater say in the 
formulation of international economic and trading rules and in handling trading 
disputes, and receiving relatively fair and just treatment. In this sense，China’s 
WTO entry will probably bring the enhancement of China9 s prestige in the world as 
well as China’s continuously economic development.
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Moreover，China’s accession into the WTO has accelerated the integration of 
China into the global economic leadership. Specifically, China can move 
deliberately toward membership in the inner steering committees that really run the 
world economy: the G7 and the so-called Quad group of four within the WTO that 
does the real decision making (Bergsten, 2000, p.4). China is a major rising power 
in terms of economy. However, the influence of China in the global economic 
network is limited. If China can play a central role along with the US, the EU and 
Japan, its leading role in the international trading system is consolidated. Thus, this 
advantage is very important for China to make any strategic plan of its economic 
development at home and prepare changes in the international economic order.
As a conclusion, in terms of China’s GDP growth， foreign trade volume， and 
FDI, China can reach its goal of becoming a superpower in several decades. 
Obviously, China will become a potential economic superpower in the world. 
Based on the above evidence, it is possible to predict that China will become a 
balancing power, which may challenge the dominant position of the US. Moreover, 
economic growth will directly bring the expansion of China9 s influence abroad. In 
the following paragraph， cases will be illustrated to explain how China’s increased 
influence abroad
CASES SHOWING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA’S 
ECONOMIC POWER AND ITS INFLUENCE ABROAD:
As China’s national power has increased, its foreign policy has become more 
active and aggressive. From the above evidence, China has accumulated its
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national power in terms of economic capability, and other continuous developments. 
These achievements directly affect China’s new concept of foreign policy. This 
section focuses on discussing China’s regional participation to show China’s quest to 
become a superpower.
REGIONAL PARTICIPATION:
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Asian-Pacific region can be proclaimed as 
an ascending area in worldwide intercourse. With the descending intensity of the 
US-Soviet conflict in the Pacific, a tight regional unfavourable environment in Asia 
is being released. In the Cold War period, this region took the role as a rivalry spot 
between the two superpowers, the nations such as the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam 
and even China became competitive places which these two great nations aimed at 
capturing as their satellites in Pacific. Some regional wars were fought at earlier 
stages of the Cold War.
However, entering into the 21st century, Asia-Pacific today is a region that will 
embrace not only Japan and the NIES, but also the ASEAN nations and China, as 
well as the Pacific Coast of North America. This is a potential region that most 
observers agree will most probably become the centre of both political and economic 
activities. China, in this region, is the most energetic continental power nation, 
which could possibly serve as a leader in connecting the international regime to 
regional affairs. To enhance China’s participation in world activities in order to 
consolidate its influence in international intercourse, it is not enough for the Chinese 
leadership to get a constructive relationship with those great powers outside the
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regional level. Searching superpower status, simultaneously, China realizes the 
importance of developing its status and prestige in regional diplomacy. Therefore, 
starting from 1990s, China has been active in integration in regional activities.
Firstly, the most typical and oldest of institutions is the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN was founded on August 8， 1967 as a 
regional cooperative organization of the developing countries in Southeast Asia. 
According to the “Bangkok Declaration”， the goal of the organization has been “to 
strengthen the basis for peace and prosperity of the South East Asian nations, and, 
through joint endeavors, to promote economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region in the principle of cooperation and equality.” From the 
wording of the declaration, the association laid more stress on the promotion of 
regional economic cooperation than on political cooperation. Nowadays, there are a 
total of 10 formal nations in ASEAN. The expansion of membership will stimulate 
economic integration in the Asian-Pacific region.
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Secondly, based on the idea of regional cooperation since the late 1960s, the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum established in 1989 represents 
the first and only regionwide official multilateral forum in the Asian-Pacific Rim. 
APEC has expanded to 18 countries since its beginning. The membership of APEC 
stretches from North America to New Zealand， from North Asia to Southeast Asia. 
It, then, forms a Pacific belt around those regions. APEC is the most influential 
economic forum and one of most dynamic organizations for economic cooperation in 
the world. In fact, the sole mission of APEC is to promote economic cooperation, 
and give a direction for intra-regional economic activities. From this perspective,
53
the function of APEC is slightly different from the ASEAN, the latter only focuses 
on economic development within the Pacific Rim; from a narrow scope to enhance 
the growth of a nation. However， the principle of ASEAN concentrates on regional 
development, not just specifically on the importance of economic development. 
Moreover, the core of ASEAN aims at dealing with East Asia affairs, while APEC is 
more worldwide, its members come from the two sides of the Pacific Ocean.
The third substantial regional institution in the Asian-Pacific region is the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This institution， as a multilateral security 
organization embracing some 22-member states from the Asia-Pacific, was begun in 
1994 with a yearly summit of foreign ministers. Now, it includes senior officials 
meetings, and starting from 1996， military officials have become involved the 
deliberations. The main task of the ARF looks like the most promising avenue for 
gauged security discussions at the regional level. The mission of ARF is a forum 
that concerns peace and military development in the local level. However, over the 
longer term, the ideal is to create an Asia-Pacific Community, in which ARF not only 
strengthens preventive diplomacy, but also functions as a conflict-resolution 
mechanism.
Actually, these three regional institutions are very influential for the 
development of the Asia-Pacific region in several areas. The nature of ASEAN is 
like a connection within those Southeast Asian countries. It is probably in creating 
a sub-regional community, let all developing countries gather together in order to 
enhance their political claims internationally. With respect to the APEC， it is an 
economic institution that includes more powerful states around the Pacific, such as
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the United States, Canada, Japan, China and even Russia. The importance of APEC 
is to bring those East Asia countries to an international level, and to make those 
countries strong enough in bargaining with the dominate West. Also the function of 
ARF serves the function as the security-related forum. Similar to the APEC, the 
members of ARF comprise those great powers, which will have a meeting every 
year.
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Without a doubt, the end of Cold War provides a chance for the development of 
Asian-Pacific region. Those three organizations, except the ASEAN, are founded 
in this period. And the common characteristic of APEC and ARF are that both 
communities include the US, Japan, and China. In the new world order, these three 
states play a dominant role in political, economic and security aspects in the Pacific 
region. Taking an optimistic view, the involvement of great powers will likely to 
enlarge the prestige of the regional institutions in the world. On the contrary, this 
type of development will reduce the local power in solving a regional crisis. Back 
to the essence, the idea of forming these kinds of communities must be traced back to 
the formation of ASEAN. Those small Southeast Asia countries aimed at creating a 
community that was strong enough to prevent colonialism again and develop a 
connection between the regions. However, from the development of ASEAN, it 
cannot achieve its goals. From 1989 and on, APEC and ARF are derived from the 
pivot of ASEAN. Although the ASEAN members are the essential members in 
these three institutions, it must greatly depend on great powers. This definitely 
shows that the trend of regional institutions was to increase the membership to the 
world. In ARF, the European Union and Russia are the newly joined members. In 
APEC, Russia joined in the late 1990s. From this direction, the Asian-Pacific
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region has become a strategic area, which draws the others^ institution in it.
China, under this favourable condition, increasingly became incorporated into 
the Asia-Pacific at the early 1990s. The Chinese new regional foreign policy was 
commensurate with its great-power aspirations, and aimed at seeking an international 
role and status. If the above statement is correct, then China needs to begin with the 
regional area. First, the Chinese leadership intended the climb up in the 
international arena through regional cooperation, and treated this kind of 
participation as a stepping stone to become a great power in the world. Second, if 
China needs to upgrade its power, it is necessary to develop and consolidate its 
regional regime in the Asia-Pacific. Meanwhile, the rise of those regional
institutions have attracted the focus of the world. Thus, by the end of Cold War, 
China5 s foreign policy turned to be a more comprehensive one. And the link of 
regional countries becomes the main task of China’s diplomacy in the new world 
order.
It is widely understood that China has showed its active role and influence in 
those regional institutions. From the development in 1990s, China got on the right 
track to develop its strategy in East Asia. During the first half of 1990s, China has 
joined key regional organizations, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum in 1991 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. In July 1992, 
China Foreign Minister Qian Qichen suggested that ASEAN and China sign a treaty 
that formed the ASEAN Post-ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) with other 
great nations. During the second half of 1990s, the Chinese leaders tried to get 
more deeply involved in these regional institutions and other regional affairs in the
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Asia-Pacific. By 1997, China became an active participant both in ARF and the 
unofficial dialogue，so-called “track two”. At the same year, China co-chaired with 
the Philippines an “intersessional support group” (ISG) meeting of ARF on 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in Beijing. Qian Qichen pointed out that 
this would be the “first time for China to host an official multilateral conference on 
security issues” （Foot, 1998, p.426). Meanwhile, other Chinese officials praised the 
success of ARF, and appeared sanguine about the continuance and development of 
ARF discussions. In their economy, China has succeeded in developing the 
Northeast Asian sub-regional regime, which includes China, Japan and South Korea. 
This regime attracted the attention of the ASEAN. In 1999, heads of governments 
from these three big nations in Asia and 10 South Asian nations held the 3rd ASEAN 
Informal Summit in the Philippines, so called “ASEAN plus Three” meeting. 
During the meeting, all the governments5 declared that in future they would present a 
united front to the world and agreed to find concrete ways of enhancing the flow of 
funds and technology within the region. From this trend, China has successfully 
integrated into the regional institutions; both formal and informal, China is always 
counted as a prominent participant in every meeting. Moreover, this development 
still continued to the Asian financial crisis and would last for this century.
From the two decades of development，China’s participation in these regional 
institutions is on a rising trend, both on economy and military aspects. These 
regional activities serve as a symbol to show that there is a close relationship 
between China’s national capabilities and its active foreign relations. When China 
carried out a series of domestic reforms in the early 1980, its national power also 
increased simultaneously. This development stimulated China’s active manner in
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foreign relations. During this two decades, China has succeeded in reaching its goal 
of being a regional great power in the Asian Pacific region. China’s “horizontal” 
linkage vis-a-vis other countries, mainly in the Asian Pacific region, can be proven 
by the above evidence.
CHINA， ROLE IN REGIONAL CRISES:
During the late 1990s, several events happened, which created an opportunity 
for China to perceive a great power nation in solving regional crisis. Firstly, China, 
in the mid-1997 Asian financial crisis, posed as a benevolent regional leader in Asia. 
The financial crisis really destroyed the financial systems in several countries, such 
as Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea and Hong Kong. The turmoil in Asia was 
derived from this financial contagion. Although China was affected in this crisis, 
its decision has won goodwill in this region. From an economic perspective, 
China7 s leadership protected the region by pledging not to devalue its currency and 
by dispensing aid. In the most serious nation -  Indonesia, China offered $200 
million export credit facility and $3 million in medicine and food aid to the 
government. This action has released the painful burden of International Monetary 
Fund. Moreover，China’s benevolent doing undercut Japan which clearly owned 
the region’s most advanced economy. However, Japan suffered in this crisis too 
and could not provide any assistance to the region. Thus, from this crisis, China 
made a quiet bid for regional political leadership. At least, the Beijing government 
sacrificed China9 s benefits in order to preserve the economic and political stability 
within the region. This was similar to the US, which also took the leading role after 
WWII. To become a world leader, a nation must give up something in order to take
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some actions in a crisis that protects the peace of the world order. Moreover, a 
nation should carry the responsibility in maintaining world and regional peace. 
China, in this case, fully fulfilled these criteria which made it a potential leader in 
Asia both in politics and economy.
From the Asian economic crisis, actually， it is a fact that Asia’s multilateral 
institutions -  the APEC forum, ASEAN and ARF -  had failed to play any role in 
addressing the crisis, and underscoring the extent to which regional economic and 
strategic stability depend heavily on the policies and initiatives of major players, that 
is the US. This means that Asia’s welfare depends on strategic understanding in 
Washington. Take the financial assistance between South Korea and Indonesia as 
an example, South Korea received quick and significant economic assistance from 
the US, because it seemed to be the last buffer of the US in this crisis. Indeed, 
South Korea maintained its strategic status for the US in the Asian affairs. If the 
financial system of South Korea is broken down, the Communist North would take 
action, which would threaten the security of Northeast Asia. However, Indonesia 
did not receive any financial support from the US immediately. The Washington 
government even let the International Monetary Fund (IMF) impose dangerously 
destabilizing measures on Jakarta, including the removal of the national subsidy on 
fuel and the government’s monopoly on the distribution of basic food commodities. 
Since Indonesia did not serve as an important country for the US against communism 
in the Cold War. Thus, this shows that the US is no longer a reliable great power in 
Asia when its regional interests are not been threatened. The uncertainty and 
limited power of the US in Asia is a continuous strategy over five decades even in 
the new world order. To secure peace and stability in East Asia, the most
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appropriate strategy for the Asian countries is to offer a real regional great power. 
This strategy will fill and constrain the vacuum of the US strategy interest in Asia.
Second， the case of East Timor shows the weakness of ARF and the apparent 
leading gesture of China in the regional level. The foundation of ARF aims at 
preserving peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region. However, ARF cannot 
contribute to resolving actual security problems. In fact, the multilateral 
arrangements of ARF seem very weak to build understanding and trust between 
nations, which involves 22 members. There is no major step forward for ARF in 
issues such as North Korea and the Spratly Islands. Recently, ARF has taken no 
action concerning the uprising in Indonesia. From the idea of ARF， those countries 
can build a strong sense of common regional strategic interests through practical 
multilateral cooperation (Dibb, Hale, Prince, 1999, pp.18-19). ARF should offer 
resources for helping nations in crisis. However, ARF has played no role in 
assisting Indonesia when it has security trouble. Actually, Indonesia should be able 
to call on ARF, as an independent and neutral body, to help to broker and finance a 
way forward (Dibb, Hale, Prince, 1999, p.19). Finally, East Timor, after its 
referendum, became an independent state and separated from Indonesia in late 1999. 
If ARF could take a role as a peace broker in this crisis, the internal instability of 
Indonesia perhaps would be under control. In regional security, the function of 
ARF has been insipid on the case of East Timor. ARF cannot play a meaningful 
role in regional security and that indirectly provides a chance for China to build its 
superpower status in Asia.
Due to the weakness of ARF, beyond confidence building, this institution has
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failed to move on to preventative diplomacy and conflict prevention at the regional 
level. This provides a chance for China to bolster its position in the Southeast area. 
It is a fact that the ASEAN countries are the pivotal members of ARF? but in the case 
of East Timor, the attitude of ASEAN towards sending troops to Indonesia truly 
reflects the diversity of those countries. Vietnam refused to let Thailand troops 
travel to East Timor. Malaysia and Thailand reluctantly took military action. 
Because of different strategic interests among the ASEAN, it causes ARF to become 
a secondary supportive organization in regional crisis. After East Timor claimed to 
be an independent state, the United Nations (UN) formed a Transitional 
Administration in East Timor in order to maintain a peaceful environment for the 
development of new government. From the request of the UN, China has sent a 
police contingent, which includes 15 civil policemen to East Timor in January 2000. 
This mission seems very important for China, not just to assist the UN in settling the 
regional crisis, but also implies a significant role of China. It is the first time China 
has sent members of its force abroad at the request of the UN. This event shows 
China has consolidated its active role in maintaining regional peace. In world 
politics, it is a successful step to build up a good image to China9 s neighbours. To 
be a potential great power, good diplomatic skill is an essential criterion to establish 
a nation’s political power in the world. The first step must start from its neighbours 
around China, with a good relationship with regional nations; China will gain more 
time to enlarge its influence towards the world.
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CHINA’S CAPABILITY IN TERMS OF MILITARY POWER:
MILITARY CAPABILITY OF PLA，S FORCES:
In the modem history, the role of militaxy always serves as a significant 
component to evaluate the comprehensive national strength of a nation. Before the 
outbreak of the First World War in 1914， those great powers in Europe had 
completely finished their military development. Both Germany and Britain owned 
huge and powerful naval forces, while France and Russia had the preparation to 
mobilize their ground forces to the regional disputes. From this development， a 
global conflict could be started and only caused by a local quarrel. Indeed, it is 
believable that an armament race between the great powers is one of the underlying 
causes for the outbreak of WWII. Similarly, the technological military contest 
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period also 
explains the importance of military development in the terms of a nation9 s strength 
and its international status. Thus, these phenomena indicate that the position of the 
military， in every historical process， plays a prominent role in representing a nation’s 
power in the world.
In fact, the role of the military has not been weakened even through the world 
has increasingly emphasized global trade activities from the detente of the Cold War 
period to the new century. As mentioned before, to evaluate a nation’s power in 
terms of global level, both military, technological advances and economic 
development should be counted as equally significant components that constitute 
measuring national capability. Christoffersen (1996，p. 1067) claimed that China 
should develop its “grand strategy” to articulate its great-power aspirations. The
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term C6grand strategy^ refers to a political-military-economic means-ends chain that 
integrates the military and nonmilitary instruments employed by a state to achieve a 
broadly defined goal of national security. In sum, each component cannot be 
ignored to measure a nation’s power in the world. In the meantime， it is worthwhile 
considering the factor of military technology in discussing China’s comprehensive 
power in the world system.
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Owing to the parallel importance of military and economic capacities in 
constructing a country^ comprehensive national strength, this section focuses on the 
discussion of China’s military power and high technological advances. First， this 
section will describe China’s military strategy after the Maoist era. Having viewed 
the overall picture of China9 s strategy, we can understand its active foreign policy 
behaviour during these two decades. Second， it will examine China’s military 
capability in terms of global level. Though the component of the military is just 
one of indicators to measure China’s national capability， its importance to assess 
China’s great-power aspirations must not be neglected. Third, several cases will be 
shown to describe China9 s self-perception as a great power in the Asia-Pacific region. 
These cases can help demonstrate China9 s military power at the regional level and 
China’s ambition to become a great power.
L THE RATIONALE OF CHINA’S MILITARY SECURITY STRATEGY AFTER 
THE MAOIST ERA:
Starting from 1979, the new Chinese leaders formulated a new military doctrine 
and strategy, which was more practical, and made the Chinese military enter a high
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rate of development. In Deng’s tenure，China’s defense modernization programmes 
mainly focused on updating the military equipment of the PLA9s force and reducing 
the overall size of the PLA. The strategy in the early stage of military reform tried 
to simplify the abundant size of the military force in order to achieve an advanced 
military force. In Jiang9s period, the military doctrine has become more active than 
that of Deng’s time. The Chinese leaders believe that the high technological, 
powerful and modem weapons will increase China9 s national strength in the existing 
world order. In the following text, two periods of leadership will be divided in 
order to discuss changing China’s military strategy.
(1) 1980s:
During Deng’s office，China’s military strategy was different from that of the 
Maoist doctrine. The intention of Chinese military growth, obviously, shifted from 
the concept of “people’s war” to that of “local war”. In the Maoist era, faced with 
the threat from the Soviet Union, the doctrine was very aggressive and active to 
defend Chinese territory. In the meantime, the international atmosphere was 
covered by a global nuclear armament competition. To protect China’s security 
interest, Beijing’s defense policy brought strategic weapons advocates into debates 
about national priorities (Feigenbaum，1999b，p.96). Yet, this rapid military growth 
required an economic trade-off during the Maoist era. All the economic resources 
were just the supplementary instruments for the development of military. This was 
the main reason for the Chinese economic backward and stagnation in the 1950s to 
1960s.
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However, this military doctrine was changed under the Dengist regime. As the 
1970s ended, the emphasis on strategic weapons as a basis for national high-tech 
efforts began to erode (Feigenbaum, 1999b, p.96). The Chinese leaders had not 
focused on the concept of global war again. In contrast, the ‘local war” doctrine 
was applied which means political objectives can be achieved without nuclear 
escalation (The Military Balance, 1995, p.270). This new doctrine indicated that 
the Chinese central government aimed at altering the security strategy on the military 
from a global nuclear war to a local regional war. The other characteristic of the 
“local war” doctrine is the large reduction of PLA force. Several reasons contribute 
to this decision.
Firstly, China9 s overall strategic environment of international relations 
underwent a change. The threat from the Soviet Union towards China had declined 
due to the rapprochement with the United States and Japan in the early 1970 
(Feigenbaum, 1999b，p.96). Indeed, the international environment has been on the 
right trend towards the detente of the Cold War period. The crisis of global war 
faced by China tends to be less threatening in the late 1970s. The post-Mao 
leadership under Deng Xiaoping felt sufficiently confident of China5 s national 
security by reducing the armed forces. He believed that, even if the world situation 
deteriorates, this reduction will still have been necessary (Foreign Language Press, 
1994, p.131).
Secondly, Deng highlighted the importance of economic development; so other 
kinds of national construction had a lower priority. Deng believed that a good 
economic foundation made it possible for China to modernize its army’s equipment
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(Foreign Language Press，1994，p.133). The highest priority was shifting from 
being military oriented to economic oriented. In Deng’s view， everything must be 
subordinated to the development of economy. From this idea, it was necessary for 
the Chinese leadership to give up resources to develop military force.
Thirdly, due to the changing resource allocation, the central government finance 
for research and development (R&D) system on weaponry also needed to take a 
certain modification in adopting a new strategic consideration. Definitely speaking, 
the military strategic doctrine had moved from fighting against a great war to a small 
localized war. This implied that there would be reform in the PLA, which aimed at 
decreasing the abundant numbers of PLA armed forces.
Fourthly, however, the expense of technology and equipment would be 
increased in order to accompany the modernization of PLA5s force structure. 
China5 s defense R&D community began to confront mounting evidence that its Mao- 
era technical system had ossified (Feigenbaum, 1999b, p.96). Under the violent 
phase of China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-76)，China’s military force and other 
technological development were stagnated which could not compare with the other 
great powers. To make China strong in terms of military defense, it was necessary 
for Chinese leaders to reorganize its military programmes in order to counterbalance 
the high-tech development of the West. The main approach of military reform 
focuses on pursuing high technology of all ground, navy and air forces.
Based on the above reasons, the strategy of national security accommodated the 
doctrine of “local war”. Since China’s military strategists predicted that the world
CHAPTER 3
CHINA'S GREAT-POWER ASPIRATIONS: A LINKAGE-POLITICS PARADIGM
66
order would become a multipolar world, and military strength should focus on the 
increasing crisis of local wars around China’s boundary. Chinese analysts focused 
on the operational requirements for local, limited wars of a short duration (Godwin, 
1996, p.467). To tackle the risk of small-scale and limited wars in the future, the 
demand of equipment must on the swift and effective application of military force. 
This strategic approach is quite different from that of Mao’s strategy of “people’s 
war”. The doctrine of “local war” would not mobilize the entire country to conduct 
a protracted and an extensive war. Modem limited war used advanced military 
technology, modem combined arms warfare and advanced equipment in the opening 
of the war, the involvement of populations for war was no longer feasible (Jia, 1988, 
p.48). In fact, the PLA’s force was still on the stage of obsolescence and 
backwardness. Thus, from the early 1980s, the Chinese armed force, based on the 
concept of small-scale war, prepared to carry out a series of military reforms and 
reconstruction in order to enhance the capability of Chinese armaments.
Yet, by the end of the Cold War, the PLA5s basic military doctrine and concepts 
of operations during the 1980s met another amendment that aimed at increasing and 
upgrading China’s military capability. Actually, in the decade of the 1980s，China’s 
military development had comprised capability to hold limited and local war. It is 
definitely a fact that the quality of PLA5s force was improved compared with the 
Maoist era.
(2) 1990s:
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s? some incitements brought about the
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revision of the national military doctrine. The new Chinese military strategy was 
slightly different from the doctrine of “local war” in the 1980s. In the post-Cold 
War era, China entered a period of rapid military modernization. The PL A’s force 
was sharply increased both in quality and quantity. Some incidents happened in the 
1990s that contributed to the new doctrine of military strategy for China.
Firstly， the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 did block and constrain the PLA’s 
access to advanced military technology from the Western high-tech countries, 
especially the United States. In actuality，China’s military advances should depend 
on western technology. The Chinese leadership in the early 1980s realized the 
weakness of its PL A’s force. Therefore, its military strategy in the 1980s initially 
focused on the organization of elite units, so-called rapid-response or fist forces, that 
are better supplied and take the lead in using more advanced equipment to master the 
techniques of combined arms and joint service operation (Goldstein, 1997, p.42). 
After ten years’ development, the PLA’s force did improve its ability to exercise new 
weapons and equipment. It was an appropriate time to continue the other wave of 
modernization. However, the June Fourth Incident created a sour feeling between 
China and Western countries. Most western countries not only suspended trade 
activities, but technological activities with China too. In the aftermath of the 1989 
crackdown， Washington suspended arms sales and “Peace Pearl” programme which 
was China9 s largest military transition to update the air force with the West in the 
early 1990s. This indicated that China’s military modernization would not depend 
on the West only in the following years.
Secondly, in the meantime, the resumption of military contacts between China
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and Russia played an important role in the modernization of the PLA9s weaponry, 
especially the PLAAF. Since China’s deteriorating relationship with the United 
States, China started to knock at the door of its northern neighbour -  Russia. When 
Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed as Soviet General-Secretary in 1985, it was a 
symbol for Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The ideological rift between Moscow and 
Beijing formally ended with the restoration of party-to-party ties during the May 
1989 Deng-Gorbachev summit (Menon, 1997, p.101). Starting from that year 
onwards, military-to-military relations and the initiation of negotiations over arms 
sales reopened between two states. In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the new government — Commonwealth of Independent States accelerated the 
modernization of the PL A’s weaponry. This change did not stall the military 
relationship but facilitated the weaponry exchange among two states. During the 
1990s, Russian arms sales to China accelerated the modernization process of China5 s 
military force.
Thirdly, the Gulf War in 1991 provided another stimulus to the PLA’s 
modernization programmes. From this regional war, it highlighted the absence of 
modem armaments of the PLA?s force. In fact, the 1991 Gulf War had a profound 
influence on the Chinese military leaders; at least, it created a sense of insecurity of 
the PLA9s force when compared with the western countries. China’s military 
strategists were much impressed by the accuracy and destructive capability of the 
high-tech weaponry employed and the speedy victory of the coalition forces (Yu, 
1993， p.308). This devastating display of military technology destroyed the 
doctrine of limited war formulated in the 1980s. It is not enough for the PL A’s 
force to prepare a limited war9s requirement but with combined arms warfare too.
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Thus, following that war, several hundred scientists and defense specialists 
reformulated the new doctrine of China’s defense technology, which tried to 
modernize the equipment of PLA’s force.
During the 1990s, China’s strategists reformulated the doctrine of military 
capability after some stimuli at the early stage. The crisis of regional conflicts, such 
as the Taiwan issue and “Nansha” islands in the South China Sea, still existed. This 
created a threat to China around its territories, then the doctrine of limited war still 
applied to China’s survival in a real world. However, the concern of China’s 
military strategists was not restrained on this idea only. Following a series of events, 
they placed even greater emphasis on technology, modifying their depiction of future 
conflict from limited war to “limited war under high-tech condition” （Godwin, 1996, 
p.473). This incentive did accelerate the PL A’s modernization programme on 
ground, air, and naval forces. This doctrine has lasted for a decade. In the new 
century, it is predicted that China will still follow the idea of this strategy.
From the development of China’s military strategy and doctrine during the 
1980s and the 1990s, the emphasis on military establishment is on a renewed trend. 
When we trace back to Deng9s strategy in the early 1980s, his idea seems to be 
correct that economy means security in the modem world. If a country owned 
economic capability, its national strength will increase at the same time. In the 
post-Cold War period, economic might precisely represents the power of a nation in 
international relations. However, the military cannot be excluded in terms of 
comprehensive national strength in a complex world. China’s burgeoning arms and 
technology developing arrangement reflects the idea of Chinese leadership in dealing
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with the new world order. Military technology for China, nowadays, is still being 
modified. The following section will demonstrate China’s military capability. 
How China can become a superpower in terms military will be answered.
II. MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGOCAL CAPABILITIES OF CHINA:
A great power, traditionally, is a state that plays a leading role in the 
international system. Actually， in measuring a nation’s great power status, there are 
several indicators. The ability to exert significant influence on the course of 
international politics and on the security, interests, and status of other states all are 
crucial factors that should be considered in evaluating a nation’s power on a global 
perspective. Though the world is entering military deterrent period in the post-Cold 
War world order - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is an important 
agreement between big powers on strategic arms reduction, military capability still 
poses as an indicator that can not be neglected to assess one’s current and future 
international power.
Frankly speaking, in terms of military capability, China cannot be regarded as a 
“first-rank power” in the post-Cold War period. Even China began military reform 
from the mid-1980s until now, and China’s military modernization programme has 
reached a great success in the late 1990s, but its military warheads still cannot 
compare with the only superpower -  the United States. Comparing the two 
strategic warhead totals， the United States force is 375 times larger than China’s; 
United States nonstrategic nuclear warheads number 1150, outnumbering China9s by 
11.5 to 1 (Godwin, 1999, p.261). China, for the several decades, experienced the
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ravages of civil war and Cultural Revolution, its domestic development was greatly 
damaged and this has made China’s military progress far behind other great nations. 
Though China had established its nuclear warheads in the Maoist era, and China was 
the third country countering the US and the USSR in the Cold War era, its 
conventional arms, military technology and military industrial complex were still 
backward. This background was a key factor for China to begin a series of 
modernization programme of the PLA5s force in the past two decades. Besides, the 
United States, the only superpower in the post-Cold War world order, is the leading 
military power in the world today; it alone has the capability to project force 
throughout the globe (Yauhuda, 1999, p.266). Moreover, the United States has 
outpaced all other major powers in the development of the latest and high-tech 
military technologies, this dominant trend would probably continue into the 21st 
century. Comparing China and the US, there is still a great distance between two 
countries in terms of military weaponry. However, China is a regional great power 
in the Asian Pacific region. China’s new military doctrine and its offensive strategy 
are evidence to support that China is acting as a military great power in the local area. 
Several fields will be shown in the following text.
After two decades of military reform, China has established its national 
strategy -  local war under high-tech conditions. To fulfill the goal of advanced 
techniques, the whole military modernization and technological programmes support 
this doctrine. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the biggest employer in the 
world. It has 2.82 million personnel, including 1.27 million conscripts. There are 
also 1.2 million reserves. Structurally it is split into the Strategic Missile Force, the 
Army, Navy, Air Force and People’s Armed Police. It is hoped that the
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modernization programme will streamline the bloated military and make the PLA 
more professional.
Examining things from the perspective of a strategic pattern, the main potential 
threat of China comes from the sea, such as the Taiwan Strait, the Spratlys, and 
Diaoyu island territorial dispute. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is 
manned by approximately 268,000 officers and men, including 28,000 coastal- 
defense forces, 25,000 naval air forces and some 7,000 marines (Kaplan, 1999, p.29). 
In these years, the PLAN’S maritime mission has evolved from a role of static coastal 
defense to one of “active off-shore defense”. The objective of this new strategy is 
to assert China’s role as regional maritime power in Asia (Kaplan，1999，p.28). 
According to the existing PLAN capability, China cannot compare with the super 
status of the US. Where China can upgrade its military capacity must be focused on 
regional level first.
Recently， the Russian Government considered transferring more naval weapons 
to China. Undeniably, this action will improve China9 s naval force in the regional 
area. The Russian government is considering transferring more SS-N-22 Moskit 
supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles China to go abroad (eight launchers per ship) its 
new Sovremenny-class destroyers, and well-defended SA-N-7 Shtil surface-to-air 
missiles (Copley，2000, p.2). In fact, Russian arms sales to China play an important 
role in China’s military modernization. Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers 
will improve the PLAN’S surface-combatant capabilities. Besides, the sale of the 
SS-N-22 to China is potentially enormously effective against US aircraft carriers.
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In terms of nuclear forces, China can be counted as a great power in Asia. 
Besides India， Pakistan and North Korea, China is the fourth country， which owns 
nuclear warheads. But its capability must not be underestimated at the regional 
level. China possesses ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), some of which 
have MIRVs (multiple independent targeting re-entry vehicles), and also a range of 
IRBMs (intermediate range ballistic missiles). As well as land-based missiles, 
China owns several submarines quipped with nuclear tipped ballistic missiles. In 
the late 1980s? Chinese analysts have adopted the concept of ciimited deterrence 
(Godwin，1999, p.263). This doctrinal concept incorporates nuclear fighting, which 
provides China with the ability to respond to any level of nuclear attack, from tactical 
to strategic.
In the new century, satellite technology can support a military application. 
China’s first experimental spacecraft， part of the country’s manned space flight 
programme, successfully concluded its first flight of the system in November 1999. 
This launching and retrieval of the spaceship marks China9 s new major breakthrough 
in manned space flight technology and is a milestone in China’s astronautical history. 
The space vehicle， named “Shenzhou” was launched with new model of “Long 
March” rocket. Indeed, the spacecraft and carrier rocket were made by China itself. 
In the 21st century, China will still continue to help other nations launch satellites. 
The success of this launch shows that China has the ability to take a predominant 
position with satellite technology in Asia. Moreover, space technology can help 
improve military advancement. The radar system of the military will be improved 
when satellite technology develops at a right pace.
CHAPTER 3
CHINA'S GREAT-POWER ASPIRATIONS: A LINKAGE-POLITICS PARADIGM
74
In conclusion, China is building up its military capability in these two decades, 
especially its naval and missile forces. The above evidence illustrates that China 
has become the dominant power on the Asian continent. However，China’s 
capacity to project power beyond its borders is limited (Halloran, 2000, p.55). First, 
Chinese naval units are not yet up to the standard attained by the navies of Japan, 
South Korea, or even Taiwan (Kaplan, 1999, p.33). Second, its nuclear warheads 
cannot create any threats to the US in global means. Third, its aerospace 
technology lags far behind the US and Russia. Thus，China’s military status at this 
moment can only be called a regional power.
However，China’s military actions in the late 1990s show that it has the ability 
to act as a great power. The following section will prove this statement.
III. CASES SHOWING CHINA ’S MILITARY CAPABILITY:
(I) The Spratly Islands:
The South China Sea, in the 1990s, is undeniable ranked at the top of Southeast 
Asia’s potential hot spots. There are total five nations, having a territorial dispute 
with China about the Spratly Islands, including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Taiwan and Vietnam. All the nations believe that they own parts or all of the 
Spratly Islands. For China, there is only one major reason, which makes the leaders 
stand for a strong stance in the South China Sea. Although the South China Sea 
contains potential oil deposits and other seabed resources, the core issue makes the 
Chinese government concerns this area is sovereignty. The Chinese leadership 
often claims that China maintains indisputable sovereignty over the Spratlys and
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their adjacent waters. During WWII, Japan launched a war of aggression against 
China and occupied most of China’s territory, including the Spratlys. It was 
explicitly provided in the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the other 
international documents that all the territories Japan had stolen from China should be 
restored to China, of course, this included the Spratly Islands.
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Beginning from the 1970s, countries like Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia 
have by military means occupied part of the islands and reefs of the Spratlys, gone in 
for big-scale resource development in waters adjacent to the Islands and laid claims 
of sovereignty over them. In view of these activities, the Chinese government has 
made solemn statements that these acts constitute a serious infringement upon 
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
At the very beginning, China claimed sovereignty of the Islands in terms of 
words and diplomatic leverage. When China’s military capacity increased to a 
certain level, its action to protect China9 s territorial integrity has become more active 
and aggressive. In early 1995, Beijing used the PLA naval forces to protect its 
sovereignty. The Chinese navy forcibly ejected some Filipino fishermen from a 
reef in the disputed Spratly Island archipelago (Rodman, 1998, p.46). The Chinese 
government stands in sharp contrast to decisions by the ASEAN states and Taiwan. 
China has stated that joint military exercises are prohibited in the South China Sea.
From the case of Spratlys, we can see that China’s military power at a regional 
level is increasing. China exerts its claim of sovereignty not by words but by deeds 
also. Its military action in the regional conflict verifies that China is on the way to
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act as a great power. Without enough military capacity, China cannot take an 
aggressive stand to proclaim its sovereignty externally. Hence, the conflict among 
China and the other nations on the Spratly Islands in the 1990s shows that China 
possesses the capability to quest for great power status in terms of military in the 
Asian-Pacific region.
(2) The Taiwan Issue:
The other event to demonstrate China5 s strength in military development is the 
Taiwan issue. In the views of Chinese leaders, the development in Taiwan in the 
1990s seems to be one of a road towards independence. In this event, the Beijing 
government tried to apply its military force to make the Taipei government go back 
to the basis -  unification of China. Around 1993, the Chinese force emphasized 
primarily China’s air force. This focus derives from the Taiwan problem, where 
China will need to establish air dominance in the event that hostilities break out in 
the Strait (Feigenbaum，1999a, p.81). Between the summer of 1995 and the spring 
of 1996, Beijing deployed ground, air, and naval forces to the region, staged military 
exercises including the repeated launching of missiles that disrupted the sea-lanes 
around the trade-dependent island (Goldstein, 1997, p.53).
The Taiwan Straits “military exercises” in March 1996 provided some 
implications on China’s quest for great power status in global terms. First, Beijing 
tried to scare Taipei off from any thoughts of independence by conducting live-fire 
missile exercises. The Beijing government was prepared to use force if necessary 
to ensure Taiwan’s future political reunification with the mainland (Goldstein，1997,
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p.56). Second， the “military exercises” showed that China’s military capacity grew 
up in the regional level. It was the first time that China used its military area to 
carry out missile bombardment. Third, China demonstrated to the world that the 
PLA had the ability to reply on the military to coerce Taiwan in order to preserve its 
territorial integrity. Though China did not have the amphibious and airborne forces 
capable of crossing the 160-kilometre-wide Taiwan Strait to defeat Taiwan’s armed 
forces totally, the growth of China9 s military capacity was definitely a fact in the late 
1990s.
As a conclusion，China’s military development is following the doctrine of 
limited war under high technology. To evaluate China’s great-power aspirations in 
terms of military power, China can only be counted as a regional great power in the 
Asia region. Though China9 s military capacity is very active in its maritime border, 
its navy force can only be effective around China9s periphery. In fact， the US’ 
superior maritime capabilities make the US a great sea power in the Asian region, 
and even in the world. In terms of military, China is not a superpower， and its 
leadership in global military issues and institutions is more limited, but its leadership 
in the Asian-Pacific region may satisfy its demands for regional leadership.
JIANG ZEMIN，S VISITS AND SUMMITS:
In Jiang9 time, China has established enough national capabilities in economic 
and military perspectives. Meanwhile, Jiang consolidated his power in the late 
1990s and that provided a favourable internal environment for him to take the active 
role in foreign relations. There is a lot of information to show that China9s intends
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to be a superpower in Jiang’s tenure.
As of March 1997, the draft of Jiang’s report to the fifteenth party congress, 
which was held in autumn, met a barrage of criticism from the left. He had to 
comprise with the left. Since the Tiananmen Square incident, the power of left 
wing greatly dominated and affected the decisions of the central government. The 
opposition from the left eliminated some progressive reforms. Even Deng had a 
trip to southern China in support of the reform effort in 1992; obstacles from the 
conservatives still played a prominent position in the Political Bureau. However, 
this situation altered a lot after the death of Deng Xiaoping in early 1997. In late 
May 1997, it can be proclaimed as the launch of “Jiang Zemin era.” His position 
was not swung even due to the death of Deng. Jiang had grasped his domestic 
power among the central party members. His speech in Central Party School in 
May seemed to be his most important political speech of his career (Fewsmith, 1998, 
p.252). Jiang， for the first time， publicly declared that “there is no way out if we 
study Marxism in isolation and separate and set it against vivid development in real 
life.” （Fewsmith，1998, p.252). Apparently, these words directly pointed to the left 
and criticized their interference on reform. Moreover, his action also showed a 
strong stance of being a moderate and open-minded reformer in Chinese history. 
Jiang9s position further developed after the 15th National Party Congress in 
September 1997.
In this party congress, Jiang Zemin previewed his major theme which led China 
be a more powerful state. First， Jiang highly appreciated the contribution of Deng’s 
reform and his ideology to China. This idea shows that Jiang would follow Deng’s
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theory in guiding China， and based on Deng’s thinking in order to accelerate the 
integration into the world. He put Deng9s theory into the party constitution during 
the congress aimed at giving a proper status of what he would reform afterwards. 
Indeed, to confirm the achievement of Deng was a necessary process of Jiang, 
because it made his reforms， which followed the blueprint of Deng， sound more 
persuasive. Second，Jiang’s report restated the “primary stage of socialism，，’ which 
was originally expounded from Zhao Ziyang in 1987. In his party report, Jiang 
used this thesis to endorse the joint-stock system as a way to reform state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Fewsmith，1998, p.252). This action indicates that Jiang will 
recycle and carry out Dengist economic pollicies, enhances the theory of "building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics.” In fact, the theory mainly provides a 
rational explanation for Jiang to carry out Chinese economic reform in the years 
ahead without deviating from the doctrine of Marxism. He declared that China had 
its own style and interpretation of Communism and every nation contained different 
situations to apply the idea of Marxism. To make a nation strong enough to 
compete with the challenge from the capitalist west was the most meaningful and 
substantial matter in carrying out the spirit of Marxism. Jiang’s speech implied that 
he would still follow the instruction of Deng and speed up China’s integration into 
the world.
However, Jiang Zemin did not completely imitate Deng Xiaoping theoretical 
rationale in China’s reform， and did not just accelerate the openness to the world. 
In other words, Jiang5s central government in the late 1990s adopted a further step to 
fulfill the goal of making China become great power. The essence of Deng’s theory 
concentrated on national economic development, focused on self-strengthening
CHAPTER 3
CHINA'S GREAT-POWER ASPIRATIONS: A LINKAGE-POLITICS PARADIGM
80
programme. This idea can be expressed fully from Deng’s four cardinal principles， 
Deng’s theory of building Chinese-style socialism， and Deng’s Open Door Policy. 
All these policies allowed economic changes in order to make China a strong country 
to contest in world arena. From this explanation, this means that Deng’s 
concentration aims at building internal strength rather than external strength. In his 
mind, the international status of one nation can be highly reflected from its domestic 
capability, economic power is one of the most concrete indicators to measure one9s 
position in world politics. Although Jiang is still stuck to Deng’s model， his 
speeches, starting from 1996, seem quite obvious which has deviated from 
developing China’s economic power only. More specifically, Jiang tried to carry 
out some outstanding policies which were not touched by Deng Xiaoping’s theory， 
and those policies can make China stronger in the existing world order. From this 
logic, it implied that Jiang seemed too aggressive to do more constructive work for 
China.
After the Fifteen National Party Congress in 1997, Jiang took command and 
consolidated his power in the Central Committee. First, the dismissal of Qiao Shi 
from the leadership of the Central Committee lessened the threat of Jiang9s power in 
the Politburo. Qiao is a more moderate leader in the Politburo Standing Committee. 
His political reform on enhancing the power of the National People’s Congress 
causes to be an attack target from the left conservatives. Indeed, Qiao does really 
present a political problem for Jiang. Without a liberal minded person in the central 
government, the challenges from the left wing will be decreased to a certain degree. 
Moreover, this can cause Jiang5s works to sound more constructive for China. The 
second factor is that the congress further established Jiang9s era in the central
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government. His position was being consolidated during the congress. Military 
representation on the committee has declined, and, more important, no military 
representatives now sit on the powerful Politburo. Moreover, his position of 
commander in chief in military seems solid. In reality, the support from the military 
is a crucial factor to strengthen a leader’s position in domestic politics. During the 
congress, Jiang had definitely showed his strong leadership in front of the world. 
The core leadership led by Jiang Zemin was initially formed and that provided a 
suitable environment for Jiang to carry out a series of reforms internally and 
diplomatic policy externally.
To make Jiang5s work sound more contributive to China, the first step was to 
build his own style of governing instead of following Deng’s framework. What 
Jiang could do to enhance his prestige in Chinese history was very limited. 
Substantially, Jiang Zemin, perhaps, should establish his achievements in two aspects. 
The first is political reform. After the adoption of the Open Door Policy in 1979, 
the Chinese leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping only focused on economic 
development and developed its economic ties with other countries. However, in 
addition to the economic aspect, Deng still strictly controlled the political power in 
the hand of the communist party. There was never any intention for Deng to carry 
out political reform during his office. The party determines the central decision, 
and the communist party leads all the policies. This then meant that besides 
economic development, China will probably maintain its authoritarian form of 
government under the control of Communist leadership. The second was to cause 
China to become a great power of world importance. During the Dengist era, there 
was a rapid growth in internal national development, especially in agriculture,
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industry and service industries. The total living environment was improved due to 
the Open Door Policy. The inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) stimulated 
economic activities around the coastal provinces. All these achievements basically 
came from the ideas of Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s leadership put China on the right 
track to becoming an economic superpower in the world. For the past twenty years, 
Deng mainly concentrated on the development economy, and was less concerned 
about foreign policy. Actually, Deng just kept a good-neighour policy towards 
other Asian countries when China’s foreign policy met its lowest point after 1989. 
He had no ambition of enhancing China in international relations. What he put 
effort in during his office was the economy and national development. Deng 
believed that the foremost work for China was that it must establish economic 
capability rather than puts efforts on political reform and international status.
For Jiang Zemin, the second choice was a rational way to establish his 
contribution and make himself remembered in history. First, political reform or 
institutional reconstruction of a government was a long-term project for China. The 
road reaching for democracy seems to be a remote goal in China. Moreover, Jiang, 
in the Fifteen Party Congress, called for the ^gradual institutionalization and 
codification” of rules and procedures governing socialist democracy (Baum, 1998, 
p.146). And he reiterated his basic political vision for China’s future was that 
China should uphold and improve the existing fundamental political system, instead 
of copying any Western models (Baum, 1998, p.147). This implies that Jiang will 
not use political transformation as a tool to establish his reputation. Second, due to 
the failure model of the Soviet Union, Jiang prefers to establish economic reform 
instead of political reform. China would not carry out any great institutional
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changes in the foreseeable future. What Jiang could touch in the political system 
was to improve the quality of cadre and communist members, fight against 
corruption, and maintain the party stability. In fact, the ideology behind the 
governing must keep a strict attitude and the Chinese leadership should uphold it, 
otherwise, the sovereignty of Chinese Communist Party will collapse just like the 
former Soviet Union. Thirdly, it was viewed that to make China into the great 
powers in the world was the best and quickest method for Jiang to establish his 
achievement for China. As to the existing situation, China had become a potential 
economic power in front of the world. To show and upgrade China’s position to the 
international was the next step to consolidate China’s economic capability. If Jiang 
hoped to make his name parallel to Mao - the founder of the People’s Republic of 
China, Deng - the chief reform-architect who made China economically strong, then 
diplomacy would be the only area for him to make China politically strong in the 
world.
Since the second half of 1990s, Jiang has had an ambition to adopt new foreign 
relations， which is away from Deng’s direction. Jiang’s attitude is quite different 
from that of Deng. To make China into strong power, it is not enough to develop 
internal competitive power, but to establish a diplomatic network is also important to 
China as Jiang proclaims. Jiang’s “great power diplomacy” has added in Chinese 
foreign policy as well as Deng’s “good neighbour diplomacy” in China’s foreign 
relations during the late 1990s. Actually, his idea to make China a world power, 
which can compete against other strong powers, is very obvious. There has several 
characteristics to indicate Jiang’s ambition to make China a potential great power so 
that its position is “equal among firsts” in international relations.
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Firstly, Jiang paid more attention to developing relationships with great powers 
like the US, Russia, Japan, and European Union as well as the third world countries. 
During the Maoist era, China preserved itself as the leader of those developing 
countries, and maintained the just demands of the developing countries. It is the 
fact that there was no foreign policy principle to construct a relationship with those 
great powers of the capitalist west countries during Mao Zedong’s leadership. 
Since the introduction of the reform and open door policy, some adjustments 
concerning some aspects in international strategy and foreign policy have been made 
under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory. And these guidelines are 
continuously carried out by the third generation of collective leadership with Jiang 
Zemin at the core. Jiang still follows the principles like upholding the principles of 
self-independence and absolutely safeguarding China1 s national sovereignty and 
national dignity, establishing and developing normal relations with other countries 
according to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, strengthening solidarity 
and cooperation with the developing countries, opposing hegemonism and 
safeguarding world peace. However, despite the basic foreign principles, Jiang 
Zemin built his own style based on this after he had consolidated his leadership.
The most important characteristic is Jiang’s great-power aspirations. Jiang’s 
visit and speeches in the late 1990s fully indicated that he has an ambition to 
establish China as one of great powers, competing against other major powers in the 
world order. To achieve this goal, Jiang started his own foreign relation principle 
around 1997. First, he focused on dealing with the US. Through the two high 
level summits between 1997 and 1998, both China and the US have strengthened the 
idea of “strategic partnership” in the new century. Though there are still issues such
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as the Taiwan problem, human rights, and the trade deficit that create many obstacles 
to formulate a long lasting normal relationship between two nations, the success of 
forming a “strategic partnership” testifies that China has climbed to a higher stage 
which contains a bargaining power with the US. The recent diplomatic relations 
between the two powers seems more equal than before. At least, China will be a 
partner of the US on some cases, such as the negotiation of Korean Peninsular, Asian 
financial Crisis, and bilateral trade relations. However, it is far too soon to claim 
that China has reduced, contained, and diluted the US influence - the only 
superpower in the world. There are still major differences between two states, but 
the development shows that the US government cannot despise the rising power of 
China. The US’ China policy has become a significant item in Washington 
government during the late 1990s. This perhaps proves Jiang has aroused the 
concern of the West and that China is active in playing a superpower position of 
world importance. Jiang declared that the Sino-US relationship would enter a new 
stage of sound and stable development， and both nations would share responsibility 
to preserve peace and stability. From his speech, Jiang has put China on the same 
status of the US, two great powers from the east and the west worlds. According to 
the Financial Times (December 1， 1998)， Michael Yahuda said that Jiang has 
personally attached himself to Chinese reform initiatives, he is the one defining 
China’s power place in world affairs as a major power equal to the US.
Besides visiting the US, Jiang Zemin also visited Russia, Japan and European 
countries during the late 1990s. The aim of his speeches in those countries mainly 
showed China is a strong power, and implied that China owns the ability to compete 
against them to a certain extent. Russia and China established a strategic
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partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination towards the 21st 
century in April 1996. Both two countries signed a joint statement on the 
multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order in 
April 1997. Recently, the two countries signed the joint declaration in 1999, which 
reconfirmed the standpoints of two countries on a new international order. In fact, 
the good relationship between China and Russia contains geopolitical strategy. 
Both nations are mutually benefited. To achieve a high-ranking of status, Russia 
will be a good partner for China to reach the goal in the short run.
CONCLUSION:
After having reviewed China economic and military capabilities, and Jiang 
Zemin’s ambition to make China one of the great powers in the world, we can draw 
the two concluding remarks. Firstly, when China is more active in international 
activities and establishes normal ties with other nations, this expanding state to state 
relationship will relatively benefit to China’s capability building. During the late 
1990s, the visits between China and the other states were quite frequent. The 
normal relations between China and the other states assist China5 s continuous 
domestic developments.
When Sino-Russia established “strategic partnership” in 1994, the military 
interaction increased to a great extent. The reduction of Russia’s military on 
quantity enhanced its military ties with China. After the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union, the functions of its military-industrial complex and high-level aerospace were 
sharply decreased due to economic hardship and the international agreement on
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conventional force reduction with the west. Under this circumstance, China became 
a good partner in the buyer’s market” for arms. In April 1990, Premier Li Peng 
visited Moscow to sign a border agreement between China and the Soviet Union. 
During the meeting, the senior Deputy Chief of Staff, General Xu Xin, had raised 
with his Soviet counterparts the possibility of arms sale and technology transfers 
(Godwin, 1996, p.473). Following in early June, Beijing sent a high-level military 
delegation to Moscow, headed by General Liu Huaqing, vice-chairman of the Central 
Military Commission. Thus, the successive military exchanges between two states 
were established in the 1990s. China’s massive demand for high-tech weaponry 
with Russia’s difficulty in its internal economic problem，hence， constituted a large 
amount of arms sales from Russia to China in the 1990s, especially of advanced 
aircraft. Actually, the contribution of Russia’s arms sales to China seems very 
significant for PLAAF. The purchase of Russia’s fighter aircraft not only increased 
the capability on their air force, but enhanced the technological know-how of 
Chinese weaponry through a series of modification of models. For the long-term 
development, China should establish its own high-tech weaponry to counter the 
threat rather than “buy” technology from outside.
Moreover，Jiang’s Five-nation tour to the Middle East and South Africa in 2000 
also strengthened China’s relationship with Israel， which is one of China’s military 
partners. After the Tiananmen Square Incident, the deteriorating relations between 
China and the western countries seemed to hasten the military ties between China 
and the other non-Western countries. This achievement definitely accelerated the 
military growth in China.
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The established economic ties between China and the US and the European 
countries can strengthen China’s economic development in the new century. 
China9 s accession into the WTO will also bring a closer relationship between China 
and the western countries. These kind of economic activities, in the 21st century, 
will play an important role for the rise of China.
Secondly，China’s continuous national growth directly enhances its influence 
abroad. China’s accession into the WTO will help China strengthen its role as a 
great leading nation in the world. In addition， the rapid growth of China’s economy 
will consolidate its influence in the Asian Pacific region. China’s participation in 
the regional institutions and its role in the regional crisis during the 1990s 
demonstrate that the expansion of China9 s influence is on the positive trend.
In conclusion, the linkage-politics paradigm explains how China9 s domestic 
capabilities affect its foreign policy behaviour and how foreign policy contributes to 
its domestic growth. During the past two decades of development, the relationship 
between China’s domestic growth and foreign policy behaviour is interrelated and 
interdependent. The above discussion shows the significance of this relationship. 
Besides, the doctrine of linkage-politics illustrates how Chinese leadership perceives 
itself as a great power in the world. To become a superpower, China must 
consolidate both its comprehensive national strength and international influence. 
The Chinese leadership is on the road to reach this goal in international relations.
89
CHAPTER 4
CHINA'S ROLE AND STATUS rN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A GEOSTRATEGIC
ANALYSIS
CHAPTER 4
CHINA’S ROLE AND STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS: A GEOSTRATEGIC ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION:
To understand China9 s great-power quest in the current international order, the 
factor of global environment plays a significant role in affecting China9 s rise and 
decline. From a historical dynamic of international relations, a nation^ up and 
down is largely bounded and constrained by the situation on the chessboard - the 
international environment. In reality, change of the international environment will 
probably create an opportunity for the rise of a nation. Geostrategic reasoning is 
one kind of analytical method in investigating state relations in international politics. 
This chapter tries to apply this method in illuminating the change in China9s 
international status from the Maoist era to the post-Cold War world order. First, the 
importance of geostrategic analysis will be highlighted in explaining China9 s rise in 
international relations. Second, the general trend in the international order from the 
Maoist era to the post-Cold War era will be illustrated to see how the international 
change has affected China9s present great-power aspirations. Third, China’s 
national strategy for seeking a superpower status in the new century will be discussed 
under geostrategic analysis. This analytical framework provides a worldwide 
perspective to illustrate how China yearns for a higher rank in international arena. 
Fourth， implications of China’s geostrategy will be discussed. As the world 
structure is under the US unipolar system, China’s foreign policy is basically 
following the principle of geostrategic thinking, which on the road to achieving the
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goal of great power.
SIGNIFANCE OF GEOSTRATEGIC REASONING IN UNDESTANDING 
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
Before we discuss the importance of geostrategic analysis concerning the rise of 
China in the current international order, we first need to understand how the 
international structure is formed and who dominates or leads the world order. 
Basically, the modem international environment is shaped by the great-power or 
superpower system, which is often dated from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 
The principle of state sovereignty and the principle of state equality -  the two core 
principles of the Westphalian world order system -  are declared to be the cornerstone 
for the existing international order system as the chrysalis of a new international 
order (Kim，1995，p.48). Key to this system was the ability of one state, or a 
coalition, to balance the power of another state so that it could not gobble up smaller 
units and create a universal empire (Goldstein, 1999, p.27). However， the basic 
structure and principle of international relations nowadays are not following this old 
Treaty. In what is known as the power transition theory, Organski (1958, pp.313-16) 
argued that there is usually a dominant power that sits atop an international hierarchy, 
positioned above several lesser great powers, other medium and smaller states and 
dependencies. The dominant power shapes the “international order” in which 
relations between states are stable and follow certain patterns and even rules of 
behaviour promoted by the dominant power (Organski, 1958, pp.326-30). 
Applying this great power system into the existing new world phenomenon, the 
international order is definitely shaped by those great powers among the world.
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The term “world leaders” is used to describe the kind of great powers that have a 
significant impact on the global system (Nijman, 1993, p.2). In fact, in the modem 
history, how great powers or superpowers emphasize the development of world order, 
represents the trend of world politics to a certain extent. Great powers owe their 
special status to the unusual roles they play in the international system. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the judgement of great power is through the projection of 
power and influence into the global environment to assert the status of great powers 
in the international level. However, great powers are also under constraints 
imposed by the international environment too. Their national strategy must follow 
the change in the international system. Thus, the relationship between great powers 
and the international system are inter-related and influence each other.
In the 20th century, the study of international relations drew heavily on 
geography as an explanation for state behaviour. The role of geography seems to be 
a crucial factor to investigate state relations and world politics. Now, several 
characteristics of geostrategic analysis will be given to explain how world politics 
functions. First, the factor of geography plays a crucial role in understanding of the 
relationship between those great powers and their strategy for seeking the 
international status. From past experience， a nation’s foreign strategic planning is 
always bounded by the systemic factors. Closely related is the term geopolitics, 
which links the study of the relationship between geography and politics to include 
the study of power in its geopolitical dimension (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 1996, 
p.148). Geopolitics refers to the impact of spatial features on political power. 
Owen (1999, p.60) states that geopolitics is essentially the study of the political and 
strategic relevance of geography to the pursuit of international power. The essence
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of geopolitical analysis is the relation of international political power to the 
geographical setting. Issues of international conflict and cooperation and security 
issues have inherent geographic dimensions (Nijman, 1993, p.30). In sum, we can 
say that there is a close relationship between the systemic factors， a nation’s strategy, 
and the great power international system.
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Second, the geographical location of a superpower will directly affect its 
national strategy in the world. A century ago the world entered the first age of 
globalization. Trade and investment spread rapidly around the world. The world 
order in the 19th century was under the influence of expansion. National strategy 
and security of the great powers started to extend out from their core power, 
overwhelming smaller nations, surrounding the spheres of influence of lesser powers 
and lapping against each other at the edges (O’Sullivan，1986, p. 69). Britain was 
one of great powers in the international system at that time. Under this international 
situation, the British government, first, tried to expand its influence to other 
continents, such as Africa and Asia. It seemed to be the only method for surviving 
in the competitive world. Second, the government focused on using its geographic 
advantage to fulfill its expansion abroad. Britain is an island that is separated from 
the European continent. The British geographic condition provided a comparative 
advantage for Britain to develop its great naval force, which ensured open access to 
world markets and resources. Thus, the example of Britain helps explain that a 
nation’s geographic location will formulate a different national strategy to fulfill the 
goal of ascertaining international status.
The spatial condition of a nation often affects its international strategy. Due to
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the fact that the status of a world power is determined by the wave of global change, 
the location of a great power seems to be a necessary condition for global power 
status. Starting from 1500 onwards, sea power has been an essential part of 
international politics. It was at the beginning of the sixteenth century that the global 
system was transformed into an oceanic system, as a result of naval technologies 
linking previously isolated continents and opening the world for European imperial 
expansion and colonization (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr.? 1996, p.154). Those 
great powers, such as Portugal, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United 
States successively became major powers based on their ability to master the naval 
innovations of the era and to contribute decisively to maintaining international order.
However, at the beginning of 20th century, the another type of geographic power 
became important in international politics. The landpower of the great power 
continental state became a balancing power that competed with the seapower. The 
criteria for becoming a superpower now must contain a vast land area. Moreover, a 
landpower must possess ability to control its hinterland or periphery all around its 
border in order to increase its superpower status in the world. In sum, spatial 
condition constrains a nation’s great power seeking in international relations. The 
geographic location and natural resources of a country play a crucial role in affecting 
its rise and decline in the world.
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Third, the geostrategic scope of a great power’s interests will be influenced by 
the trends of international environment. A great power or superpower is by 
definition a vital player in the international system. The national security of a great 
power can be threatened or destroyed by the international system disruption. Great
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powers emerge as a consequence of a process of elimination -  most typically by war, 
but also through the relative economic and perhaps demographic decline of previous 
rivals (Gray， 1988，p.32). Indeed, there is no law of stable equilibrium in 
international politics. There are many unpredicted factors in international relations, 
which affect changes of a great power’s strategy. When the Soviet Union acquired 
the status of great power in 1945, its success in becoming one of the superpowers 
was largely through defeat or exhaustion of the other traditional European great 
powers in the two global wars in the first half of the 20th century. Faced with the 
superior maritime force of the United States, the geostrategic planning of the Soviet 
Union had to expand its landpower into eastern Europe in order to consolidate its 
continental capacity to counterbalance the power from the US. From the case of 
Soviet Union, we can see that geostrategic consideration of a great power, to a 
certain extent, is bounded by the trends of international environment.
Having viewed the original concepts of geostrategic reasoning, the next section 
will see how this analytical method can be applicable in the case of China. As 
China is on the road to becoming a great power, geostrategic analysis is from a 
worldwide perspective to evaluate China9 s great-power aspirations. A study on the 
bipolar system in the Cold War period can show the importance of geostrategic 
analysis in order to understand of international relations and strategic interests among 
the two superpowers. The second reason is that we can investigate how change in 
international environment affects China9 s role in international relations from the 
study of Cold War.
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GENERAL TREND OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER -  INFLUENCE ON 
CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND PRESTIGE:
This section aims at explaining how change in the international environment 
affects the role of China in the world. The discussion will be divided into two parts. 
The first focuses on describing the general trend of the international order in the Cold 
War era. The international environment in the Cold War period is an example to 
showing how the two superpowers survived and extended their influence in the 
world order. After the end of the Second World War, a new distribution of power 
emerged. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were under geographical 
strategy to compete with each other in order to preserve the dominate roles in the 
bipolar world system. The superpowers shaped the hierarchical structure of the 
international system in the Cold War period. At the same time, geopolitical and 
strategic considerations are critical in determining the focus, the substance, and 
eventually the outcome of the historical contest between the leading oceanic power 
(the United States) and the dominant land power (the Soviet Union) (Brzezinski, 
1986, p.ll). The bipolar international structure helps us understand how the world 
system is limited under geopolitical reasoning.
Second, we will see how the changes in the international structure affect the 
international role and prestige of China during the Cold War period. The 
explanation of this relationship can help us understand China’s great-power 
aspirations throughout the 1980s. Since a nation’s rise and decline is always 
bounded by the international structure, China’s perception of being a great power is 
caused by the alteration of the bipolar system. The following text will give a more
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detailed analysis on this assumption.
CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE:
I. A TIGHT BIPOLAR SYTEM:
In the 1950s, the international structure was under a tight bipolar system that 
was led by the US and the USSR. In the early Cold War period, due to ideological 
and strategic reasons, the international order was under the context of the US-Soviet 
bipolar conflict. The conflict was expressed predominantly through the extension 
of power and influence over territory and people and through acquisition by military 
might designed to intimidate or contain the opponent (Brzezinski, 1986，p.ll). 
While I am using Brzezinski5s formulation in this discussion, I am aware that 
scholars were divided on his characterization. Many referred to it as a “loose 
bipolar system”. The regional affairs were largely determined by the two 
superpowers, which was based on the idea of strategic consideration. During this 
period, the rational strategy in international relations was the idea of containment, a 
process that strengthens a nation’s alliances in periphery in order to increase its 
regional influence. If one nation could control more satellites in the regional level, 
its power in international status would be increased.
The Moscow government focused on consolidating its continental power in 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East countries. This 
geostrategic plan formed a security buffer for the Soviet Union if attacked by the 
United States. At the same time, the national strategy of the Washington 
government aimed at containing the expansion of the USSR from Eurasia. The US
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was essentially on the periphery of world affairs that applied isolation policy 
between the two global wars. To extend and preserve American’s influence, the 
control of maritime force was the essential strategy for the Washington government. 
The US strengthened its power by forming a strategic alliance with Western Europe, 
and setting up military bases in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and the Philippines. 
Hence, this strategy provided a sea belt that protected against on attack from the SU.
China, under this tense international environment, could not play any significant 
leading role. After the foundation of PRC in 1949, Mao Zedong had a belief, which 
made China an independent state without any influence from foreign countries. 
Besides the limitation of China’s national capability, there was a strategic reason that 
limited its quest for great-power status. The PRC was bom in the campaigns 
against imperialism， feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, and suffered imperialist 
hostility, as well as a blockade and armed threat at their beginning. As the 
international order was sharply separated from the two leading blocs -  the 
Communist Soviet Union and the Capitalist United States, there was no any 
diplomatic spatial area for China to develop the third pole. Therefore, China 
entered an alliance with the Soviet Union, and became one of followers of the Soviet 
camp. China was one of the geopolitical satellites for the Soviet Union, which 
preserved as the interest of the Soviet Union in the Far Eastern Eurasian territory.
As a whole，China’s international role in the 1950s was very small. Even 
though China had appeared in some international conferences, the rigid international 
environment bound its global power. In April 1954, initiated by the Soviet Union, 
the Geneva conference was held to discuss the issues of Korea and Indochina. The
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Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai was invited to be one of participants in the meeting, 
which involved the Soviet Union the United States, Britain and France. According 
to People’s Daily (September 14, 1999)，China， for the first time, took part in a key 
international conference as one of the big nations to discuss major issues. However, 
this event did not show that China possessed global influence and prestige on some 
issues. In fact, China largely depended on the power of the Soviet Union in 
international relations. China’s quest for great power status could not begin under 
this situation.
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II. A LOOSE BIPOLAR SYSTEM:
In the 1960s, the international environment entered into a loose bipolar system. 
The main reason constituted this phenomenon was that contradictions and conflicts 
between China and the Soviet Union became increasingly intensified in the late 
1950s. Ostensibly, the principal cause of the Sino-Soviet break was Soviet 
“revisionism”， the first indication of which came with Khrushchev’s 1956 anti-Stalin 
speech, which was given without prior warning to Beijing and embarrassed the 
avowedly pro-Stalin CCP (Roy, 1998, pp23-24). Since the Soviet Union was 
towards military parity with the United States, the Moscow government tried to 
avoid any conflicts with the United States, and maintain the status quo. In Mao’s 
view, the Soviet leadership appeared to be abandoning basic revolutionary principles 
and retrogressing back toward capitalism and imperialism. Conflicts of interest 
outweighed their common interest in opposing US influence. The split of the Sino- 
Soviet relationship is one of reasons that decreased the tight bipolar international 
system. Since China was the geopolitical satellite for the Soviet Union in East Asia,
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the deteriorating relationship between the two sides inevitably accelerated the 
predominance of the bipolar system.
This loose bipolar system altered the role of China during the 1960s. After the 
spilt of Sino-Soviet relationship, China became an isolated country, which radically 
advocated world revolution. Mao Zedong realized that China should adopt an 
independent foreign policy that could not depend on the Soviet Union anymore. 
Yet Mao was not a geopolitical theorist as such, but like Lenin, considerations of 
power and the balances of forces were the important components of his political 
vision (Yahuda, 1982，p.20). During the I960, Mao developed his three-worlds 
theory. He divided the world into three categories in his three-worlds theory: the 
first world consists of the two superpowers, the second of the industrialized medium 
and small powers and the third of the less developed former colonies and semi­
colonies. China placed itself within the third world, because of its backward and 
underdevelopment. In fact, China was a dissatisfied country -  undeveloped, 
humiliated, irredentist -  trying to move into a better position in the international 
system (Roy，1998, p.28). China, in the 1960s, emerged as an independent polar 
point in the configuration of world politics, because the second world was the 
satellite of the two superpowers. China, therefore, served as a representative of 
those third world countries, which fought for the interests of the Third World. 
Hence， Mao auspicated the road of independent China’s foreign policy in order to 
balance the bipolar system in world relations. China nearly isolated from the 
international activities in the 1960s.
The change indicated that China was dissatisfied with the bipolar world order.
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The international strategy of China shifted to advocating a global struggle against 
imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. The concept of “people’s war” should 
be led by the Third World and China was the representative of these countries. 
Mao’s idea has given China’s successive leaders the self-confidence to pursue an 
independent line in geopolitical area affecting the central balance between America 
and Russia (Yahauda, 1982, p.20). Although China had established a revolutionary 
role, its influence in the mainstream of international system was limited.
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III. A STRATEGIC TRIANGULAR ORDER:
Beginning in the early 1970s, the world entered into a strategic triangular order. 
As the global environment was still under a loose bipolar system, the tense 
atmosphere disappeared to a large extent. The “strategic triangle” refers to the 
relationship in which China held a flexible position vis-a-vis the United States and 
the Soviet Union, affording Beijing the opportunity to benefit by playing the two 
superpowers against each other (Roy，1998, p.28). The relationship began with the 
Sino-US rapprochement in early 1970. After the spilt of Sino-Soviet relations in 
the past decade, the Washington government recognized that China was not a Soviet 
satellite state. Moreover，China’s international status became more significant for 
the world order. The PRC government was largely admitted and then continuously 
enjoyed a global standing. The United States tried to woo the friendship of China 
in order to counterbalance the threat from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the 
Soviet Union maintained the conflicting relation with the US and China. The 
international structure, thus, was under a triangular great power relationship. The 
United States, the Soviet Union and China became the most three influential and
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important countries, which dominated the world order in the 1970s.
After the bipolar system had developed for two decades, this international 
structure began to decline. The ideological confrontation between the US and 
China was to be relieved due to the geostrategic consideration. As the US saw that 
the threat from the USSR would be increased, the best national strategy for the US 
was to establish a friendly relationship with the other great power -  China. The US 
new geopolitical concern changed the role of China in the 1970s.
First, the “strategic triangle” relationship made China one of dominate powers 
in world politics. Although China was the weakest power in this triangular relation, 
the balancing factor between the two superpowers could not be ignored. The 
segregation of the US-China pair and the Soviet Union on two opposing sides in the 
triad interactions, which has been flaunted by the China-card players as most 
conducive to the interests of combating the Soviet threat, represents what is usually 
known as a “romantic triangle” （Hsiung，1985, p.122). Second, the quasi-alliance 
with the United States had several important benefits for China. After the US 
established a normal state relationship with China in 1972， the joint Shanghai 
Communique formally recognized the position of China in the international order. 
Specifically， the PRC replaced the ROC (Republic of China) as “China” in the 
United States, taking up as well, a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. 
Moreover, China was universally accepted as legitimate actor in international politics 
(Zhang, 1998, p.59). By the end of the decade, 120 countries had established 
diplomatic relations with China, compared with 52 in 1970. Hence， China was 
regarded as an important actor in the international community. It is a fact that
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China’s status was largely increased due to the establishment of relations with the 
United States and the entrance into the United Nations. The former represented the 
predominant power in the world, while the latter represented the highest organization 
organ in the world. The recognition of China’s status by these two entities, at the 
same time, changed the others’ perception of China. Third, the connection has 
obviously provided the Chinese an added leverage in dealing with Moscow, as they 
can play the “American card” （Hsiung，1985, p.123). China’s diplomatic power has 
been increased after the establishment of US coalition. Since the power of the Sino- 
US connection could constrain the Soviet expansion, China has more reasons now 
than before to expect some concessions from the apparent Soviet willingness to be 
conciliatory (Hsiung，1985, p.124).
In sum, the triangular relationship provided a chance for China to become one 
of great powers in the world. The China factor contributed significantly to the 
emergence of a new pattern of the global distribution of power (Zhang, 1998, p.59). 
This pattern, tripolarity, was the structural transformation from the post-war bipolar 
world into a stage for a truly multi-polar world. The triangular relationship was an 
essential stage in international relations since it marked the starting point for the 
multi-polar system after the collapse of the Cold War period. China, in this decade, 
strengthened its global status by entering into the UN Security Council and 
establishing normal relations with other countries. These achievements laid down 
the foundation of China9 s quest for superpower status during the Dengist era.
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IV. REACHING A DETENTE PERIOD:
Throughout the 1980s? the world was reaching the end of the bipolar system. 
As the triangular world system had marked the decline of bipolarity in the last 
decade, the development of international relations seemed on the road to reaching a 
detente rather than sharpening confrontation in the 1980s. A series of high level 
summits between the US and the USSR on the issues of military, global peace and 
normalization between the two states demonstrated a sign of changing geostrategic 
considerations among them. The Soviet threat declined sharply due to internal 
problems and the rise of Gorbachev in the Kremlin office in mid-1980s. He 
actively developed a normal relationship with the US and China.
Meanwhile, the rise of the East Asia region accelerated the decline of US-Soviet 
strategic balance. There was a possible scenario, which predicted that the Asian- 
Pacific region would become the center of world politics in the new century. Japan 
had become an economic giant in this region and moved into a pivotal position in 
Asia. The economic success of Asian NIEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) strengthened the economic ability in this region. This development in 
the world balance increased the significant role of Asia in international politics.
Under this changing global structure, China had potential to become one of the 
poles in the world. The detente of the bipolar system began to change the 
international structure. This change formed a gap for the rise of a potential country 
that possessed the capability to quest for the position of great power. With the 
adoption of opening door policy at the beginning of 1980s，China’s integration into
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international society prepared for its rise in the global means afterwards. The role 
of China became more important when compared with the last decade. Hence, 
China’s great-power aspirations began in the Dengist regime and developed on a 
right trend under this favourable condition.
V. MULTIPOLAR/UNI-MULTIPOLAR SYSTEM:
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By 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War 
bipolar world system. The bipolarity that dominated the world system for more 
than four decades came to the end, yielding to a new multipolarity (Hsiung, 1992, 
p.68). The United States, the remaining superpower, now dominates the global 
scale, with at least six other major powers -  Russia, Japan, China, Germany, Britain, 
and France. In other words, contemporary international politics can be described as 
an uni-mulitpolar system with one superpower and several major powers 
(Huntington, 1999, p.36). The post-Cold War world order should be counted as a 
transition of the next world order. Thus, this period gives a chance for the rise of 
another superpower.
In the post-Cold War world order, multipolarity gives China more geoeconomic 
leverage and more geopolitical space than the bipolarity before. Under this global 
environment, the Chinese leaders can take a more active role in reaching the goal of 
superpower position in the new century. In the following section, China’s 
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As a whole, according to the development of international relations in the Cold 
War era, we can see that the change in the international environment will inevitably 
bring change of a nation’s global role in that particular period. This change is a 
dynamic process, not static. Geostrategy is a method, which lets us understand how 
international politics works. In fact, China’s quest to become a great power in the 
global system is bounded by the international structure. In a multipolar world, 
China can gain more spatial conditions to develop its influence over territory. In the 
following paragraph, evidence will be given to illustrate China9 s quest for great 
power status under the geostrategic reasoning.
CHINA’S STRATEGY IN PURSUIT OF GREAT POWER STATUS:
The post-Cold War global structure is characterized by American unipolarity. 
Though the world is reaching multipolarity, the US predominance in the global 
structure will still play an outstanding role in the post-Cold War transitional period. 
If China aims at strengthening its international status in order to equalize the status 
with the US in the new century, the Chinese leadership needs to consolidate its power 
in East Asia. This region contains economic and strategic importance for the 
emergence of a superpower in the 21st century. When China establishes its power 
and prestige in East Asia region, its international status will be counted as a 
superpower that shares the same influence as the US in global politics. The 
following section will try to discuss China’s geostrategic moves in the East Asian 
region in order to understand its comparative strategic advantages.
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CHINA?S PREDOMINANCE IN THE EAST ASIA REGION:
As aforementioned, geography of a nation always influences international 
structure effects. There are many factors that comprise great power status; the 
previous chapter has discussed China’s national capabilities in quest for great power 
status. Although economic development and levels of technology and education are 
some of crucial indicators, geography determines whether a country has the 
prerequisites of great power status (Ross, 1999, p.81). This part tries to use a global 
perspective to discuss China9 s self-perception in becoming a great power.
China enjoys geographic advantages, which lets it get the major strategic 
beneficiary in East Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold 
War world order, China has successfully filled the vacuum of a collapsed bipolar 
system. Firstly, China possesses a huge amount of territory and a large population. 
This geographical location provides a chance for China to become a great landpower 
that dominates the Asian continent. Secondly， China possesses the world’s largest 
supply of coal reserves (Ross, 1999, p.93). In terms of energy support, China can 
be self-reliant; it is not very dependent on foreign markets. Thirdly, the location of 
China can sustain its economic development and geopolitical strategy in the new 
century. China enjoys a long coastal line on the east. The provinces along the 
coastal line are the most convenient areas, which can obtain foreign capital and 
technology and carry out business trade with other nations easily. At the same time, 
China is located at the center of Asia; this area contains geopolitical advantages. 
Some small countries in Central Asia and Southeast Asia can serve as a geopolitical 
buffet for China in a war. Moreover, China can pass through Central Asia to extend
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its influence into the Middle East. Comparing to the other two major powers in 
Asia- Russia and Japan, China enjoys comparatively good geopolitical conditions.
Russia is a declining state in the post-Cold War era. Its superpower status 
collapsed after the end of the Cold War. Although Russia has accumulated its 
military capability in the bipolar system, the world is on the right trend towards 
strategic arms reduction. The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (STRAT II) 
will reduce Russian and American strategic weapons from 8,000 today to between 
3,000 and 3,500 each (Godwin, 1999, p.265). Hence, its large territory for 
developing warheads cannot serve as an advantage anymore. Besides, 
contemporary Russian presence in the Far East is closed to the historical norm (Ross, 
1999, p.89). China has replaced the status of Russia in the Asian region. In some 
cases, Russia must depend on the leverage of China in order to join the regional 
activities in the Asia-Pacific region. In short, Russian geopolitical advantage -  a 
nation that can bridge the east and the west, does not provide any benefits for the 
Moscow government.
Japan is constrained by its geographical conditions, and it cannot become a 
dominant pole in international politics. Rather, it will remain a second-class great 
power，or， in Schweller’s terms， “lesser great power’’， whose security depends on 
cooperation with a pole (Schweller, 1998, pp.16-19). In fact, Japan is an island that 
contains a tiny amount of territory. To become a regional pole, Japan must have the 
resources to support self-reliant regionwide military deployments (Ross, 1999, p.90). 
However, Japan lacks of natural resources is a fatal element, which makes it unable 
to become a great power in the new century. Japanese dependence on the outside
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world for energy is virtually complete: Japan imports more then 80% of its overall 
resource needs in the form of oil, coal, and natural gas (Johnstone, 1998, pi 071). In 
China9 s main exports to Japan, almost 70% are raw materials and mineral fuels, 
which are the vital resources for the development of any nation. Japan’s 
dependency on foreign resources, eventually, limits its strategic influence in quest for 
global power status.
However, Japan has consolidated its image as a great economic giant in the 
Asian-Pacific region, and even the world. Apparently, the most typical impression 
of the Asian-Pacific region to the world is its rapid economic development 
throughout the Cold War period. Most experts used the flying-geese pattern to 
describe the economic development in Asia, Japan is at the head, the East Asian 
NICs constitute the second tier, and ASEAN the third tier. In this three-tiered V- 
formation model, Japan plays the most important role in the Asian-Pacific area; its 
foreign direct investment (FDI) has contributed to other Asian countries to a large 
extent. Japanese total investment in Asia in 1992 reached $60 billion in comparison 
with $19.5 billion in 1985 (Deng, 1997, p.354). By the 1990s，Japan’s policy shift 
to “return to Asia” had reached an unprecedented level in the post-Cold War period. 
Traditionally, Japan is the economic head in Asian Basin. More specifically, it can 
be said that Japan is an economic superpower in the world.
In the post Cold-War world order, geoeconomic leverage cannot be treated as 
the sole indicator to measure a nation’s great power status. Although Japan has 
consolidated its ties with the US for over four decades, its dependency on the US 
also means that Japan cannot become a great power in the futxire. Japan’s
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dependency on access to the US market, its dependency on imported energy 
resources, including petroleum from US allies transported through US-controlled 
shipping lanes, and its dependency on US military forces, creates vulnerabilities for 
Japan’s quest for a great power status (Ross，1999, p.92). After WWII， the US and 
Japan established their closer relations both in economy and politics. The US 
government tried to make Japan become an economic great power in the Asian- 
Pacific region in order to serve as the buffer for the US in its regional interests. In 
addition, Japan was a significant nation of the Rimland strategy of the US when 
mainland China became a communist nation after 1949. This means that Japan 
contains its strategic position for the benefit of the United States. Other Asian 
states, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Philippines provided a belt of Rimland to 
contain the expansion of the communism in Asia. Due to the geostrategic 
calculation of the US, Japan could have become the economic giant in Asia, however, 
this phenomenon just shows part of the facts. From Japan’s geographic situation, it 
is insufficient for Japan to claim as a great power. Indeed, Japan will not be able to 
make a bid for full-fledged great power status in the 21st century (Ross, 1999, p.92).
CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC MOVES:
Having discussed the development of international relations under the Cold War 
period, we now see that the geostrategic considerations of the two superpowers 
shaped the global structure. After the discussion of geographical conditions in Asia, 
the chance for China to become a great power is more than that of Russia and Japan. 
In the post-Cold War period, China is predicted to be a challenging power that will 
threaten the status of the US by the-mid 21st century. During the 1990s， China was
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on the right trend to establish its influence and prestige around its territories. To 
understand China5 s great-power aspirations under geostrategic analysis, the omni­
directional foreign policy or the good-neighbour policy should be mentioned. This 
diplomatic strategy is an extension to other parts of the world of what begins as a 
good-neighbour policy toward China’s immediate fringes (Hsiung，1995, p.576). In 
other words, according to geostrategic reasoning，China’s great-power aspirations 
should start from the neighbours that surround it.
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Based on China’s geographic conditions， its geostrategic calculations in quest 
for great power status should first begin in the Asian region. Indeed, China has 
adopted the policy of “omnidirectional peaceful coexistence”， which features a 
reduction of tensions with virtually all of its former rivals and adversaries, and forms 
a friendly foreign policy with is neighbour countries. This sector divides China’s 
strategy into three categories: Southeast Asia region, Central Asia region, and Middle 
East and Africa region. The discussion mainly focuses on the development of 
China’s diplomatic relations with these three regions.
L CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC MOVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION:
Having showed China’s active participation in the regional organizations in 
Chapter 3, the importance of the East Asian area for the growth of China is 
undeniable. In the post-Cold War era, the economic might of Asia Pacific will have 
a peculiar significance for world politics in the new century (Hsiung, 1993, p.9). In 
other words, the Asian Pacific region will sooner or later become one of prominent 
economic centers in the world. This explains why China needs to have closer ties
111
with the Asian regional institutions. Besides, the Southeast Asian region serves a 
geostrategic tactic for China’s great-power aspirations. Thus, from the 1990s 
onwards, China began to develop bilateral relations with the Southeast Asian 
countries.
In the early 1990s, China established diplomatic relations with Singapore, 
Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. After the Tiananmen incident in 1989, China 
began a diplomatic strategy designed to solidify ties with it neighbours. This 
achievement testifies that China could make a breakthrough from the western 
diplomatic isolation. In the following year, China was recognized by the ASEAN 
nations. The links between China and the ASEAN countries were strengthened. 
More recently, China has signed bilateral amity and friendship accords with Thailand 
and Malaysia (Manning & Przystup，1999, p.57). When Jiang visited Thailand in 
1999, the bilateral ties between China and Thailand were enhanced. According to 
the Peopled Daily (November 26, 1999), Jiang expressed satisfaction over the long­
term and close exchange and cooperation between the two countries, which he hoped 
would to be further enhanced. China’s good-neighbour policy contributes to its 
economic and political securities.
China, in May 2000, signed two joint statements with the Philippines and 
Indonesia. China and Philippines have made great progress in their cooperation in 
the political, economic, cultural, educational, scientific and technological and other 
fields on the basis of equality and mutual benefit since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations on 9 June 1975. The two sides believe that it is now an 
opportune time to establish a framework for further bilateral cooperation. This new
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framework will strengthen their historical friendship and geographical proximity in 
order to advance their cooperation and development in Asia. A long-term and 
stable relationship on the basis of good neighbourliness, and mutual trust and benefit 
were established between the two governments. Although both sides have conflict 
about the sovereignty of Spratly Islands, they have committed themselves to the 
maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea. In the same year, China 
also signed a joint statement with Indonesia. Since the restoration of diplomatic 
relations between China and Indonesia on 8 August 1990, the bilateral relationship 
between the two countries has developed rapidly and their mutually beneficial 
cooperation has continued to expand in all areas. In order to consolidate the 
existing traditional friendship, strengthen bilateral cooperation in all areas in the 21st 
century, the two sides have agreed to establish and develop a long-term and stable 
relationship of good-neighbourliness, mutual trust and all-round cooperation. 
Hence, the increasing ties between China and the ASEAN countries has justified the 
success of the Chinese good-neighbour policy. China, at this moment, has 
established formal diplomatic relations with all nations in the Asian-Pacific region.
There is a positive trend for China to develop its influence throughout the 
Southeast Asian region. Based on the above illustration, the ASEAN countries has 
shown their willingness to establish diplomatic ties with China in the 21st century. 
Thus, strengthening the cooperative relations with the Southeast Asian region is one 
of the major task for China’s geostrategic calculation.
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II. CHINA fS GEOSTRATEGIC MOVES IN CENTRAL ASIA REGION:
Beginning with the mid-1990s, China started to extend its influence to the 
Central Asian republics. In the views of Beijing, this region contains geopolitical 
benefits for its quest for a great power position. After the implosion of the Soviet 
Union into its constituent republics, Central Asia became an important geostrategic 
region for China to extend its influence there. First, a new set of nations with 
transnational ethnic ties now bordered China9 s northwestern autonomous regions and 
provinces, which were areas of continual ethnic unrest (Walsh, 1993, p.272). China 
must establish friendly foreign relations with these new nations, otherwise, there 
could be plausible for China to be faced with the challenges of ethnic separatism. 
Secondly, following the independence of the Central Asian republic, the Chinese are 
taking a more prosperous view of the potential chance emerging forming the region. 
The decline of Russia in this region provides a chance for the rise of China. In this 
sense, it is worthwhile for the Chinese leadership to consolidate its role in Central 
Asia. In the following paragraph, China’s perception of the emerging geopolitics in 
Central Asia and the strategic choices being made by the Chinese leadership will be 
assessed to see whether the focus of this region helps justify China’s great-power 
aspirations.
Although the importance of Russia’s leadership in Central Asia has declined in 
the post-Cold War period, China still needs to depend on closer diplomatic ties with 
Russia in order to establish cooperation with the Central Asian republics. TheSino- 
Russian rapprochement in the 1990s did improve the diplomatic relations between 
two nations. Starting from 1992 onwards, China has successfully developed its
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bilateral strategic partnership with Russia. In 1992, President Yeltsin’s visit to 
China yielded the first joint statement by the two countries, affirming that China and 
Russia “regard each other as friendly states” （Ren, 1998, p.98). This joint statement 
is characterized as a good signal for improving bilateral relations. By the time 
President Jiang visited Russia in 1994, which produced the second joint statement 
defining the bilateral relationship as a “constructive partnership oriented towards the 
21st century’’， the nature of their bilateral relations had changed (Ren，1998, p.98). 
Both governments saw the need to strengthen their relations in international relations. 
The second statement also implies that both China and Russia draw closer together to 
counterbalance US dominance. In 1996, the two governments issued a third joint 
statement formally proclaiming the forging of a "strategic partnership of equality, 
mutual confidence and mutual coordination towards the 21st century (Ren, 1998, 
p.99). This statement reiterated their closer relationship in the new century by the 
summit meetings. Moreover, the term “strategic partnership” between two 
countries begins a new type of alliance in international relations. By the year 1999, 
Beijing and Moscow signed the Sino-Russian Joint Communique. The bilateral 
strategic partnership is confirmed. In fact, the establishment of Sino-Russian 
strategic partnership is beneficial for China and helps to establish its power in the 
Central Asian region.
A more multipolar world gives chance for China to take a more active role in 
regional area. Geopolitically speaking, the emergence of the Central Asian 
republics -  Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan -  
gave China the opportunity to reassert traditional regional interests (Walsh, 1993, 
p.273). China’s strategic partnership with Russia enabled China to establish its
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friendly relations with the newly Central Asian countries. When China and Russia 
signed the joint statement in 1996, Presidents of China, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Russia launched their first meeting in Shanghai and agreed on a series 
of confidence-building measures along the border. In the following every year, a 
five-nation summit held the meeting together. In 1997, the five governments signed 
an agreement on the mutual reduction of military forces in their border areas. From 
geopolitical standpoint, China’s military security is being strengthened in the Central 
Asian region. With the cooperation of Russia, China can develop its ties with those 
new Central Asian countries.
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In the late 1990s, the friendly relations between China and Central Asian 
countries have been further consolidated. In 1999, according to Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (December 30, 1999), President Jiang attended the 4th five-nation summit 
meeting, during which leaders of the five countries achieved an extensive consensus 
on the world situation, regional security and economic cooperation. Meanwhile, 
they issued the Bishkek, a document of great significance to enhancing their good- 
neighbourly relations, friendship and cooperation and their joint efforts to combat 
and curb nationalistic separatist forces on August 25, 1999. China also built 
economic links with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in order to strengthen 
their economic cooperation. The presidents of these three countries visited China 
respectively. According to People’s Daily (November 24, 1999)， on November 23, 
1999? China and Kazakhstan signed the Joint Communique emphasizing their wishes 
to strengthen bilateral relations and cooperation in the 21st century. The bilateral 
relations between China and the new Central Asian republics in the past decade show 
that China has built its preliminary role in the northwest area. It is expected that
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their relationship will be strengthened and consolidated in the 21sl century.
III. CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA 
REGION:
Since the early 1980s， the international bipolar structure has entered into the end 
of detente period. The Chinese leaders have sought to develop a foreign policy that 
reconciled the requirement of modernization with geopolitical considerations 
(Calabrese, 1998，p.351). Starting from the 1990s，China’s global geostrategic 
moves became one of prominent elements in the development of its foreign policy. 
In the post-Cold War period, the Chinese leaders regard both the Persian Gulf region 
and Africa as areas of global strategic importance for China’s great-power 
aspirations.
When the Chinese leaders decided to adopt an omni-directional foreign policy 
in the early 1990s? the Middle East was regarded as one of important regions that 
fulfills China’s foreign policy in terms of geostrategic perspective. Though the 
Middle East is located at the periphery, its global strategic value has been increased 
in international relations since the end of the Cold War period. For China, this 
region contains several strategic interests. If China extends its influence towards 
the Middle East, its great power position will be consolidated in the new century.
In the past, the attention of the Chinese government in the Middle East affairs 
was limited. For China, the Middle East was a remote place when China was under 
a bipolar Cold War system. The only thing China could do was to stress the 
similarities between China and the Middle East countries on the views of
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international politics. In addition, China firmly supported the Palestinians and 
Arabs in their struggle for liberation, which actually was the core of Chinese Middle 
Eastern policy in those years (Zhang, 1999, p.150). Basically, the Middle East 
affairs was dominated and politicized by both the United States and the Soviet Union, 
the influence of China was strictly constrained under the bipolar Cold War system. 
The relations with those Middle East countries were still on the margins of the 
Chinese foreign-policy agenda.
However, with the end of the Cold War, the international structure allowed 
China to play a more active role in the Middle East region. The world was no 
longer dominated by the two superpowers. Under this circumstance，China’s links 
with the Middle East could be extended. Chinese officials have long regarded the 
Persian Gulf as an area of global strategic importance. Their views on the 
significance of the Gulf have been derived from periodic assessments of the major 
trends in world affairs and their probable impact in China (Calabrese, 1998, p.351). 
The first step for the Beijing government to increase its influence to the Middle East 
was to establish relations with those countries.
This new diplomatic strategy started from the 1990s onwards. In 1990, China 
established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, one of important Arabian 
countries in the Middle East. Another breakthrough of China’s Middle East foreign 
policy was to establish diplomatic relations with Israel on January 24, 1992. China 
rejected establishing diplomatic relations with Israel simply because Israel occupied 
Arab territories with US support. In the view of China, the government of Israel 
was formulated by colonialist and imperialist aggression. However, this ideological
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confrontation was gradually weakened in the post-Cold War period. Moreover, 
with the progress of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the regional tension was relaxed 
by and large. Economic cooperation is placed as a high priority in the Middle East. 
Thus, the normalization of relations between China and Israel not only lay a solid 
foundation for further development of relations between the two countries, but also 
made it possible for China to participate and influence Middle Eastern affairs (Zhang, 
1999, p.152). Normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel was to be the first 
step for China to seek a more geopolitical living space in the Middle East region.
By January 1992, China had established diplomatic relations with all countries 
in the Middle East. In the following years，China’s Middle East foreign policy 
aimed at expanding trade and economic cooperation with the region. Meanwhile, 
China became more active in regional participation. From 1994 to 1997， China 
attended each annual economic conference of the Middle East and North Africa 
(Zhang，1999, p_ 153). Furthermore, during 1999 to 2000, Jiang paid a series of 
state visits to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Palestine, Turkey, and Egypt. From Jiang’s 
summits with the leaders of these countries, he emphasized the development of 
bilateral ties and cooperation between China and the Middle East countries. In 
addition, China has established bilateral friendship and cooperation with Iraq and 
Iran, both are the traditional enemy of the US in the Middle East affairs. China 
signed the Joint Communique with Iran when President Khatami paid a state visit to 
China from 22 to 26 June 2000. In the joint statement, two nations reached 
common understanding on enhancing bilateral cooperation, opening up new 
prospects for bilateral ties and establishing a 21st century-oriented long-term and 
wide-ranging relationship of friendship and cooperation. Hence， the relations
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between China and the Middle East were strengthened in the late 1990s.
Finally， the strategic importance of Africa for China’s great-power policy will 
be illustrated. Traditionally, there are relatively friendly relations between China 
and the countries of Africa. To show the similarities between China and Africa, 
Beijing stressed that both had suffered under colonialism and from foreign 
aggression, and both had experienced struggles to gain or maintain independence 
(Payne & Veney，1998，p.870). Indeed, China has consolidated good diplomatic 
relations with Africa in the Cold War era. Many African countries regarded China 
as a representative of their interests in the international organizations. Mao9s three- 
worlds theory aimed at building friendship with those developing countries, mainly 
in Africa. More importantly, African states played a pivotal role in the United 
Nations recognition of the PRC -  over US objections -  as a permanent member of 
the United Nations Security Council in 1971 (Payne & Veney, 1998, pp.870-871). 
In the post-Cold War period, African’s strategic importance for China was on an 
increasing trend.
In the late 1990s, China started to show its emphasis on African diplomatic 
relations. In May 1996, President Jiang visited Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe. In August 1996, Niger reestablished diplomatic ties with 
China. China and South Africa established foreign relations on January 1, 1998. 
During 1990 to 2000, Jiang also paid visits to Algeria, Morocco, and South Africa. 
According to People’s Daily (April 25，2000)， Jiang Zemin and South African 
President Thabo Mbeki signed a declaration on the partnership between the two 
countries. Moreover， Jiang also expressed China’s hope to discuss with African
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countries about economic and trade relations in the future. China’s African 
diplomatic policy seems very successful in the late 1990s.
As a whole, both the Middle East region and Africa are the two important 
continents for China to consolidate its influence abroad. In views of Chinese 
leaders， these two areas possess the strategic significance for developing China’s 
great-power aspirations.
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC MOVES:
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Having examined China5 s geostrategic plans in several regions, including 
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, there is a trend for China 
to develop and consolidate its continental power in the center of Asia. Except the 
Southeast Asian region, the other two regions are in the westward extension direction 
from China’s geographic location. Figure 4.1 can help us understand China’s 
strategic moves around its periphery.
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Figure 4.1 Beijing’s Strategic Moves on its Fringes 
Asia
According to Figure 4.1, the main geostrategic leverage of the Southeast Asian 
region is to preserve China’s economic growth in the new century while the Central 
Asian region， the Middle East and African countries mainly serve China’s energy 
and political fronts. Both two regions are the main suppliers for China’s energy 
import, the Chinese good-neighbour policy is needed to strengthen diplomatic ties in
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the areas. Moreover, the closer ties between Muslims and Turks will help avoid 
minority upheavals in the Chinese northwest inferior. The African countries play an 
important role for China to ask for a great power. By aligning itself with Third 
World states, China is able to gain diplomatic leverage in the international system. 
From geostrategic point of view, the surrounding regions of China can establish 
different kinds of strategic fronts, which protect China9 s interest and security in Asia 
and make China a great power in the world. Besides, there are several geostrategic 
implications for China?s consolidation in the above regions.
Regarding the Southeast Asian region, the main geostrategic leverage is to 
preserve China’s economic growth in the new century. As the friendly and 
cooperative relations between China and the ASEAN countries can maintain stability 
and peaceful environment in the region, continuously increasing economic ties and 
the inflow of FDI to China will be increased in the Asian-Pacific region. In fact, 
the consolidation of Sino-ASEAN diplomatic ties will enhance China’s geostrategic 
leverage in East Asia.
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Firstly, the bilateral ties between China and the ASEAN countries can accelerate 
and preserve the stability and peaceful environment in the Asian-Pacific region in 
order to increase China’s economic development in the 21st century. In the post- 
Cold War period, the international structure has turned toward a trend of economic 
globalization. Indeed, this world environment is beneficial for the rapid economic 
development in the East Asian region. There is still a lot of room for these Asian 
developing countries in economic growth. When China obtains friendly diplomatic 
relations with the ASEAN countries, the peaceful environment will bring about a
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steady growth in their economy. Still the lingering territorial dispute among China, 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam over parts or all of the 
Spratlys Islands in the South China Sea creates an ill feeling between China and the 
other Asian countries. Meanwhile, the anti-Chinese movement in Indonesia has 
formed a gap between the Chinese government and the Indonesian government 
recently. As China improves foreign relations with these countries, its strategic ties 
will extend to the Southeast Asian area. In addition, China9s comprehensive 
national growth will be enhanced under this favourable regional environment.
Secondly, the Sino-ASEAN diplomatic ties may increase foreign direct 
investments (FDI) in China. When China adopted the open door policy in the late 
1970s, the main task for the Chinese government was to attract foreign investment in 
order to improve its economic capability. After two decades of development, over 
80% of FDI comes from the Chinese societies, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Although the US and Japan rank as the third and the fourth largest foreign 
investment to China， their contributions are very little， less than 10〇/〇 of China’s total 
received foreign investment. This situation shows that the Chinese Diaspora plays a 
significant role in China’s economic development. In Southeast Asian countries, 
the Chinese dominates 70% of Malaysian economy, and over 90% of Indonesian 
economy, though the Chinese population is small. When China improves the 
bilateral relations with these countries, the FDI from the overseas Chinese may be 
increased at the same time. Thus, the attraction of more FDI will be beneficial for 
China5 s economic growth in the new century. And the economic ties between 
China and the ASEAN countries will bring a prosperous trading activity in the long- 
term.
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Concerning the area in the Central Asian region, the strategic link between 
China and the Central Asian republics is one of essential geostrategic considerations 
for China’s great-power aspirations in the new century. As China is a continental 
power, its geostrategic calculation should focus on the extension of land. If China 
can control the predominant position in the Central Asian region, the quest for great 
power will be fulfilled in the near future. In fact, there are several geopolitical 
advantages for China to consolidate its diplomatic relations with Central Asian 
countries.
Firstly, China9 s diplomatic relations with the Central Asian republics help 
stabilize the ethnic unrest in the areas of northwest China. Although a multipolar 
world system opens up new political and economic opportunities for the expansion 
of China9 s influence in the Central Asian region, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
presents a new threat of regional religious and ethnic instability. China’s 
northwestern provinces (Gansu and Qinghai) and autonomous regions (Ningxia, 
Xinjiang, and Tibet) are the most unstable areas, where political crisis have occurred 
under the rule of the Chinese government. Xinjiang is a province that comprises 
ethnic minorities, including Turks and Muslims. And three of the five republics 
border on Xinjiang. Both people in the newly republics and Xinjiang share the 
same religion and languages to a certain extent. Hence, a series of independence 
movement in Central Asia in the early 1990s stimulated the rise of nationalism in 
Xinjiang. And nationalist movement in the interior area may threaten China9s 
national security.
Moreover, the new Central Asian countries provide supporting bases for the
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separatist movement in Xinjiang. Former separatists continue to live in exile in 
Kazakhstan, and there are reported links between Uighurs and the Turkestan 
Liberation Movement and between Kirghiz in Xinjiang and tribesmen across the 
border who may have provided arms during the April 1990 riots (Walsh, 1993, 
pp.276-277). In the wake of independence, it is clear that resurgent Islam and pan- 
Turkism are forces that present security challenges for China (Walsh, 1993, p.277). 
Since 60% of Xinjiang’s 15 million residents are Turkic Muslims，pan-Turkic 
sentiment may cause conflicts among those ethnic minorities.
Since northwest China is a dangerous place in the post-Cold War period, 
China9 s establishment of bilateral diplomacy with the Central Asian republics may 
help China to prevent separatists from infiltrating its volatile northwest frontier 
region of Xinjiang. It is expected that geopolitical competition of Central Asia 
among China, Turkey, and Russia will become more violent in the new century. If 
China can improve the closer ties with these countries, and maintain peace and 
stability in the region, its predominant land power will be strengthened.
Secondly, the bilateral diplomatic relations between China and the Central 
Asian republics can help China search for new energy resources. China is a major 
oil-producing country, but it is also a major oil consumer. With the further growth 
of the economy，China’s demand for oil will increase significantly (Zhang, 1999, 
p.155). In 1993, China for the first time became, an importer of petrochemical 
products, and in 1996, it became an importer of crude oil (Zhang, 1999, p.155). 
The present oil fields in China are drying up and the new oil fields cannot quickly 
meet the oil demand of China in the near future. Considering that China’s oil
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resources will dry up around 2025， and in view of present and long-term 
development, a strategy for developing oil and gas resources in the Middle East and 
Central Asia should be a top priority (Zhang, 1999, p.155). For China’ energy 
security, the Central Asian republics have become the main oil suppliers for China in 
the future.
After China has developed its normal bilateral relationship with Central Asia, its 
shortage of oil and gas resources will be diminished. China plans to build and link 
a long, expensive pipeline through Xinjiang reaching Kazakhstan to the centers of 
consumption in eastern China (Menon & Wimbush, 2000, p.83). Since Central 
Asia is regarded as an oil-rich region, especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, this 
region contains strategic consideration for China to strengthen its land power. 
Moreover, Central Asia is a steeping stone for China to search for more energy 
suppliers in the Middle East. The opening of Xinjiang to Central Asia marked an 
important landmark in rebirth of the old Silk Road (Walsh, 1993, p.280). The 
Middle East and the Caspian Basin are the significant energy producers in the world. 
When China established friendly relations with the Central Asian republics, 
importing oil and gas through pipeline development from the Silk Road to Xinjiang 
became one of the choices for China to achieve long-term energy supply.
Thus, China’s strategic partnerships with those newly republics can preserve its 
energy security. From a geostrategic point of view, the control of energy is one of 
important elements to become a great power in the world. Those infrastructure 
developments preserve the long-term Chinese strategic hedging against dependency 
on oil controlled by an adversarial power (Ross, 1999, p. 108).
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Thirdly, the established bilateral relations between China and the Central Asian 
republics accelerate economic ties, including border trade, the establishment of 
various kinds of ventures, the opening of transportation, and the expansion of 
telecommunication links. According to People’s Daily (November 24， 1999)， 
Kazakhstan has become the second largest trade partner with China among all 
partners in the former Soviet Union with two-way trade expected to reached one 
billion US dollars in 1999. The transnational economic cooperation between 
Xinjiang and the republics can maintain stability among the ethnic minorities in 
order to decrease ethnic separatism in Xinjiang. In fact, economic cooperation 
among the republics and with China plays an important element in China’s 
geostrategic consolidation. Since the expanding of economic and technological ties 
among ethnic groups in Xinjiang and the republics can divide the separatist 
movement in northwest China. This development can help China strengthen its 
land power in the Central Asian area.
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The Central Asian region contains geostrategic moves for China in the post- 
Cold War era. When China needs to achieve the goal of great power status, Central 
Asia is an important area that China has to control. Indeed, this region preserves 
several strategic perspectives for China to fulfill its great-power aspirations. 
Economic integration and cultural development between Xinjiang and the republics 
maintains China’s territorial integrity. Energy resource in this region and the 
pipelines to the Middle East preserve China’s energy security. This region
possesses all geopolitical, economic and energy interests for China in terms of 
geostrategic concern. Thus, the friendly diplomatic relations among China and the 
new republics in the 1990s, confirm that the Chinese leaders have a goal to reach
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great power.
The Middle East is no longer a distant region, which seems unimportant for 
China to enlarge its influence in terms of geostrategic perspective. With the end of 
the Cold War, the strategic significance of the Middle East has become one of 
prominent geostrategic doctrines for China5 s great-power aspirations.
First， the Gulf countries serve as the largest oil suppliers for China’s total 
energy import in the 1990s. With China’s economic growth， its need for imported 
oil will increase significantly. Although coal is China’s leading energy source, oil 
is nonetheless vitally important to the well being of the Chinese economy (Calabrese, 
1998, p.357). China surprised the West in 1997 when, between June and September, 
state oil companies made a series of major investments in oil-production deals 
around the globe (Jaffe & Manning，1999, p.124). Most construction included the 
building of pipelines through the Central Asia region to Iran and Turkey. 
Furthermore, according to Turkish Daily News (July 30, 1999), Turkey constitutes a 
large energy market for further Caspian/Gulf supplies of oil and gas and independent 
power producers. For China’s long term security interest, China needs to form a 
good-neighbouring policy towards the Middle East in order to preserve the 
construction of more pipelines to the region. In the 21st century, it is expected that 
the energy strategic significance of the Middle East will become more important for 
China’s economic development.
Second, the established diplomatic relations among China, Israel and Palestine 
more or less enhance China’s influence in Middle East affairs. During Jiang’s visit
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to the Middle East, he expressed his appreciation that the Palestinian National 
Authority, led by President Arafat, has chosen the correct solution in setting the 
dispute between Israel and Palestine through peace talks. On the Middle East peace 
and stability, according to People’s Daily (April 14，2000)， Jiang said that China 
believes the peace process will succeed in the end and that region will eventually 
become one of peace, prosperity and dynamism, so long as the parties concerned 
engage themselves in the talks in a serious and realistic manner and on the basis of 
the relevant United Nations Resolutions and the principle of “land for peace”. 
Meanwhile, Peopled Daily (April 29, 2000) stated that leaders of the three Middle 
East countries (Israel, Palestine and Turkey) spoke highly of the efforts made by 
President Jiang in promoting the Middle East peace talks. Thus， after Jiang’s tour， 
China’s influence in the Middle East was strengthened and consolidated. The 
friendly relations help China elevate its international status. The most important 
implication is that China can balance the US influence in the Middle East region. 
This part will be discussed in more detail later.
Finally, the most significant geostrategic concern of Africa for China is to 
contain Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomatic policy. Since the countries in Africa are 
very weak in terms of national power, the Taipei government provided economic 
assistance to woo their relations in order to gain more political power in the world. 
The diplomatic rivalry between Beijing and Taipei indicates the importance of 
diplomatic recognition of a country. If China can establish its ties with those 
African countries, its superpower position will be confirmed to a certain extent. 
Thus, in the 1990, China put efforts to gain closer ties with the African countries.
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Having observed China’s gains in several regions, we can conclude that the 
Chinese leadership is on the road to achieving its dreams of a global power. 
Despite the above discussions, there are two other important geostrategic 
implications for China in terms of global perspective. First of all, China’s strategic 
pattern is a challenge to the dominant position of the United States. Although the 
two sides have signed a joint statement in 1997, which aims at strengthening the 
strategic cooperative partnership in the 21st century, and establishing bilateral ties 
between the two countries, they will not be strategic partners according to their 
geographic locations. Each power owns their strategic and economic regions in 
order to establish their influence around the world. Rather, they will be strategic 
competitors engaged in a traditional great power struggle for security and influence 
(Ross, 1999, p.96). When China is on an increasing trend to reach its great-power 
aspirations, simultaneously, the conflicts between China and the US will be 
heightened.
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In East Asia, China and the US are the two influential powers in the regional 
affairs. In the post-Cold War period, the power of the US could not be ignored. 
Though the US military bases are not as many as the Cold War period, the allied 
countries such as Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Singapore contain the US 
military force. Traditionally, the relations between the US and the Asian countries 
are relatively good indeed. When China established friendly diplomatic relations 
with the ASEAN nations， this diplomatic strategy may create conflicts with the US’ 
regional interests in East Asia. Meanwhile，China’s strategic front in the Southeast 
Asia directly counterbalances the dominance of the US status.
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In the same way，China’s cooperative relations with the Middle East countries 
such as Palestine and Israel affect US’ power in the Middle East. The United States 
dominates the Middle East peace progress and it certainly attempts to dominate 
regional economic cooperation (Zhang，1999, p.156). China’s active attitude and 
constructive role on the progress of the Arab-Israeli peace process may threaten US 
interest in the Middle East. It is predicted that China will take the opportunity and 
work out a Middle East strategy for the 21st century. Geopolitically speaking, China 
has also established diplomatic ties with Iraq and Iran, the enemies of the US. This 
was considered as aggressive behaviour towards the US. Beijing has cultivated 
military and economic ties with Iraq and Iran, exploiting an opportunity created and 
fuelled by the Western economic sanctions against both states (Jaffe & Manning, 
1999, p.125). China’s ties with Iraq and Iran may let it gain geopolitical leverage in 
the Middle East region. Thus，China’s diplomatic establishment in the Middle East 
creates a pattern of balance of power in the regional level.
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Secondly， the “strategic partnership” between Beijing and Moscow is just a 
tactical bond, not a long-term alliance. As discussed before, China needs to gain 
the support of Russia in order to maintain close ties with the Central Asian republics. 
The current friendliness between China and Russia is just a temporary alliance. The 
Russians want cash: the Chinese want military equipment, it is a relationship of 
convenience (Dettmer，2000，p.21). China is strengthening bilateral ties with the 
individual Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan. This development shows 
that China has the ability to play a dominant role in the Central Asian region without 
the assistance of Russia. From a geopolitical location, Russia and China must not 
have a strategic partnership in the future. Both countries are the great landpower,
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and have similar strategy fronts around their territories. The rivalries between the 
two states will surface in the future when China has offset the United States 
dominance in the international order.
In sum, the implications of China9 s consolidation of its strategic fronts aim at 
showing that China is a great power in the international system. China is a rising 
superpower, which will play a challenging role towards the US predominant position. 
From the development, China will still keep its good-neighbour policy to maintain 
cooperative relations with its neighbours. Then China9s great continental power 
will be strengthened in mid-2000.
CONCLUSION:
This chapter applies a worldwide perspective to our survey of China9 s great- 
power aspirations. The international structure is dynamic, not static. Under a 
changing international environment, the end of the Cold War world order provided a 
leadership vacuum in which China has an opportunity to consolidate its power and 
influence in different regions. Meanwhile, China aimed at establishing its 
economic and military capabilities that would increase China9 s power and status in 
the world. This kind of capability building made the Chinese leadership realize the 
importance of creating good relations with the other nations. Through the 
establishment of closer ties with the world, China’s internal building would be 
consolidated. Thus, there is a link between capability and foreign relations, which 
is discussed in Chapter 3. In the 1990s, China adopted a good-neighbour policy and 
established partnerships with the nations at its fringes. The changing international
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structure, starting from the later stages of the Cold War to the end of the Cold War, 
did encourage China to seek opportunities to develop its power and status. From a 
geostrategic perspective, China is on the road to fulfilling its dreams of being a great 
power. Geostrategic analysis, first, provides a clear structure for the change of the 
international environment. Second, it gives an explanation for why China saw its 
own ability to challenge the great power status in the world as being so important. 
Finally, it focuses on what strategy China is using to expand its influence around the 
world. From the steps taken under China’s geostrategic considerations, China’s 
hope to become a great power is clearly shown to the readers.
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CHAPTER 5
A GREAT POWER IN WORLD POLITICS: IMAGE AND SELF- 
IMAGE
INTRODUCTION:
As I outlined in Chapter 2, the definition of power includes two perspectives. 
First is self-image of a nation. This perspective emphasizes the importance of 
statesmen’s national self-image on the process of foreign policy. In other words, 
when we discuss whether a nation contains any aggressive manner on foreign policy 
and ambition to attain a great power status, the element of leadership^ self­
perception is very important on answering this question. This means that human 
behaviour is one of significant sources of foreign policy making. In fact, this 
approach is suitable for applying in the case of China. Traditionally, the Chinese 
leaders have a hope to quest for big power status. When Mao Zedong found the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, he had an intention to make China one of the 
important countries in the world. Nevertheless, constrained by the Chinese 
comprehensive national strength and the international structure in the Cold War era, 
this hope was not easily to be achieved. Not until Deng Xiaoping consolidated his 
position in the Communist party, did China9 s great-power aspirations begin to look 
realistic. For the past two decades, the Chinese leaders strove to join the ranks of 
the great powers in the world. Thus, the self-image of Chinese leadership is a 
fundamental element by which to judge whether China is a great power.
The second perspective to discuss power is the perception of other states with
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respect to a state’s capabilities and its ability and willingness to express its power. 
This is a more objective approach to any attempt to judge what is a great power in 
the international system. As great power status is not self-claimed, it has to be 
recognized and accepted by the international society. If the proposition of China’s 
quest for great power status is testified， the next step to fulfill this goal is to gain the 
respect and equal footing in the community of nations. The most directed method 
to get the recognition in the world is through participation both in regional and 
international activities. In the international community, one of prominent indicators 
to measure a nation’s status is the involvement in world affairs. Hence, the world’s 
perception on China is also important to discuss China is a big power or not.
This chapter tries to discuss China5 s great power status according to these two 
angles. The following sections are basically divided into the two main parts. 
Firstly，China’s perception of its great power status will be discussed. Secondly, the 
world’s perception of China’s status in the world will be examined later. 
Combining these two approaches, both China9 s self-perception and its image in the 
world as a great power, we will be better able to trace and analyze China9 s quest for 
global power status. After that, the readers can have their own judgement on this 
issue.
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A GREAT POWER: CHINA’S SELF-IMAGE:
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CHINA，S FOREIGN POLICY:
Although China decided to join the international organizations and take a more 
constructive role in the world affairs in order to fulfill its economic development, the
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doctrine of Chinese foreign policy was generally kept on a firm stance. During 
these two decades, China9 s diplomatic policy shows that it is a dissatisfied nation, 
which will want to challenge and change the present world order. In fact, the 
Chinese leaders always oppose a world structure with only one single pole. 
Throughout the visits to the other nations and summits with the leaders, China 
demonstrates this idea clearly in front of the world. According to Power Transition 
theory, over the long run, with reasonable growth rates and maintenance of central 
authority, China will overtake the United States and become a great power in the 
future (Tammen, Kugler, & Lemke, 2000, p.171). Evidence can be proven by the 
principles of China’s foreign policy.
The basic principle of China’s diplomacy is to pursue an independent foreign 
policy of peace. The fundamental goal of this policy is to defend China’s 
independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, to create a favourable 
international environment for the reform and opening to the outside and for the 
modernization drive, to maintain peace and promote common development. To 
fulfill these principles, a series of statements is needed to illustrate. The main 
contents can be summarized in the following seven points, as given by the PRC 
Foreign Ministry, in a statement date December 21, 1999.
(1) China consistently persists in the principle of independence and taking the 
initiatives in its own hands. China will never yield to any big power or group 
of countries, and will never establish military bloc, join in the arms race or seek 
military expansion.
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(2) China opposes hegemonism and safeguard world peace. It holds that all 
countries are equal members of the international community whether they are 
big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor. All countries should settle their 
disputes and conflicts through peaceful consultations instead of restoring to 
force or the threat of force. No country should interfere in the internal affairs 
of another country under any pretext.
(3) China actively promotes the establishment of a just and rational new 
international political and economic order. To establish an international new 
order which concurs with the development of the times and which accords with 
the needs of the common development of mankind is an aspiration shared by the 
international community and the people of the world. China advocates that 
such international new order should based on the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-Existence and other universally acknowledged norms of international 
relations
(4) China respects the diversity of the world. China holds that the diversity of the 
world should not be an obstacle to the development of relations between various 
countries but should serve as an impetus to mutual exchanges, mutual 
complement and mutual enrichment. All countries are entitled to choose the 
social system, development strategies and lifestyle that suit their own conditions
(5) China would like to establish and develop relations of friendship and 
cooperation with all the countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-Existence namely, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,
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mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality 
and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. To actively develop good- 
neighbourly relations with the surrounding countries is an important component 
of China’s foreign policy. Moreover, to strengthen China’s solidarity and 
cooperation with the developing countries is the basic standpoint of China’s 
foreign policy. China attaches great importance to improving and developing 
relations with the developed countries. It stands for transcending differences 
in social systems and ideology in handling state to state relations.
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(6) China carriers out an all-dimensional opening up policy. It is willing to 
conduct trade, economic and technical cooperation, and scientific and cultural 
exchanges with all countries of the world on the basis of the principle of 
equality and mutual benefit to promote common prosperity. Economic 
globalization presents opportunities for economic development of all countries 
and tremendous risk as well. To maintain financial stability, to take 
precautions against financial crisis and to ensure economic security are identical 
challenges facing all governments.
(7) China takes an active part in multilateral diplomatic activities. It is a staunch 
force safeguarding world peace and stability. Regarding arms control and 
disarmament, China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough 
destruction of nuclear weapons. China has signed the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty and the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 
After unilaterally cutting its forces by one million in the 1980s, China again cut 
its forces by 0.5 million in three years beginning from 1997. This is a major
139
step in international disarmament, which attracts great attention and a 
significant contribution by China in safeguarding world peace and regional 
stability.
The Chinese government has all along attached importance to human rights and 
has made unremitting efforts to this end. China has acceded to 17 international 
human rights conventions. In 1997, China signed the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In October 1998, it signed the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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At the turn of the century, the world is filled with hope. But it is also faced 
with critical challenges. To seek peace and cooperation and to promote 
development are the common aspiration of the people of the world. As it did 
so in the past, China will make its due contributions to safeguarding world 
peace and promoting the common development of mankind (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, December 21, 1999).
As aforementioned, three characteristics of the Chinese foreign policy principles 
can be concluded as follows: China9s quest for great power status and its wish to 
build a new just world, the opposition of US dominant world order, and China's 
integration into the world structure. When the Chinese leaders establish diplomatic 
ties with other countries, and increase China9 s status in the world, they will pursue 
the goal under these principles. In the following paragraphs, we will examine how 
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CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN PRACTICE:
By the-mid 1990s, China began to fulfill its quest for great power status based 
on the principle of independent foreign policy. I will select some important and 
representative examples to illustrate this proposition.
During 1997 to 1998, China and the US entered into a new diplomatic relations 
after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. The successful mutual visits between 
the two heads of state of the two countries marked that Sino-US relations have 
entered a new stage of development. Both President Jiang and President Clinton 
decided to engage in joint efforts to establish a constructive Sino-US strategic 
partnership for the 21st century. The two sides agreed to further increase the 
dialogue and cooperation in major international issues. For a long-term perspective, 
they agreed to promote the bilateral ties in a spirit of mutual respect, equality and 
mutual benefit, and of seeking common ground while reserving differences.
President Jiang paid a visit to Japan in the late 1998; China had established a 
friendly and cooperative partnership with Japan. Jiang hopes that the Sino-Japan 
relationship will enter a new phase after a historical first visit to Japan. The 
declaration defined the Sino-Japan partnership as one of the most important bilateral 
relationships on the international political landscape. Moreover, during Keizo 
Obuchi9s China tour in 1999, the two sides clarified the key points and direction for 
furthering fruitful cooperation between Japan and China in all fields. At the same 
time, China shows its consistent stance for Japan9 s aggression during the Second 
World War. Jiang said that the Japanese military had gone down the wrong road,
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which resulted in great tragedy for the people of China and other Asian countries. 
China, in this case, definitely requests for an apology from Japan.
When China and Russia established the strategic partnership in 1996? both sides 
agreed to develop bilateral ties in several areas. Both China and Russia argued they 
had no choice but to draw closer to counterbalance US dominance. The two sides 
have condemned the proposed US national missile-defense system and rule out 
accepting changes to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The bilateral relations 
between two sides are not against any third-party interference. The two 
governments are supportive of multipolarity and opposed to hegemony and power 
politics in all forms and the two countries will make further efforts to safeguard 
regional and world peace and stability.
Jiang paid a Six-Nation tour in the late 1999, which included the three western 
nations -  Britain, France, and Portugal. The speeches of Jiang in this tour fully 
showed his hope to make China a great power. In Britain, Jiang said that China 
needed to become more openness in market. China will join the world as a more 
active player and work to improve the all-dimensional and multi-level opening-up 
pattern in wide-ranging areas. Jiang said that the economic cooperation and trade 
between China and Britain have immense potentials. He also praised the steady 
development of both sides on economic cooperation and trade has brought 
substantial benefits. China is ready to work together with Britain to bring dynamic 
Sino-British partnership of all-round cooperation into the 21st century. Both in 
Britain and France, Jiang also spread the idea of five principles of peaceful co­
existence. He called for a democratic and full participation by all countries in the
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process of establishing a new political and economic order. Both China and France 
stood for a multipolar world and oppose a world structure with only one single pole. 
At last, Jiang expressed China is ready to make tireless efforts for the establishment 
of a just and reasonable new international political and economic order and 
prosperous new century of humanity.
During these two years, China has signed joint statements with several countries, 
which are the neighbours of China. In 1999, China and Kazakhstan signed a joint 
statement emphasizing their wishes to strengthen bilateral relations and cooperation 
in the 21st century. In the-mid of May 2000, China and the Philippines singed the 
joint statement that established a framework for further bilateral cooperation. At 
the same month, China and Indonesia developed the mutual beneficial cooperation 
on the expanding in all areas. In the late May 2000, China and India decided to 
establish constructive partnership of cooperation oriented towards the 21st century on 
the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. These joint statements 
expressed the idea of China with the other nations -  the establishment of a just and 
equitable international political and economic new order.
When Jiang paid his visit to the Middle East and South Africa in 2000, China’s 
quest for great power status was showed to the world. In the Middle East peace 
process, Jiang showed that China was willing to play a role in advancing the peace 
process in the Middle East. In South Africa, President Jiang and President Thabo 
Mbeki signed a declaration in the partnership between the two countries. The two 
sides take cognizance of the moral imperative for developing countries to strengthen 
capacity for cooperation and mutual support in the international economic milieu.
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Moreover, both China and South Africa share many objectives with regards to key 
multilateral issues and on the urgent need for the reform of the international 
multilateral political, economic and financial architecture to reflect new global 
realities.
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA，S FOREIGN POLICY:
After having reviewed on China9 s state to state relations recently? there are the 
strong links between China’s foreign policy principles and its practice in the 
international structure. Regarding the above contents of Chinese foreign policy 
doctrine, we can conclude Principles (1)，（2)， & (4) into the first category. 
Principles (3), (5), & (7) are the second category. Principle (6) is the third category. 
The first category mainly shows China’s dissatisfaction with the US hegemonism 
and its opposition of US dominate world order in the post-Cold War period. As 
China deems that the world should become more multipolarity, however, the US 
government always poses as an international police and interferes with the other 
nation’s domestic affairs. The second category aims at demonstrating China9s 
global role and its wish to build a just and rational new world order. The last 
category focuses on fastening China’s integration into the world， especially on global 
economic system. In fact, the Chinese foreign policy fulfills one goal -  to show 
China’s great power position in the world structure. Hence，China’s foreign policy 
during the late 1990s illustrates how the Chinese perceives itself a great power in the 
global system. In the following paragraphs, I will pinpoint some significant 
implications of China’s establishment of bilateral relations with these selected 
countries.
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First, there is one universal point on China’s establishment of joint statements 
and diplomatic relations with the other nations. Jiang always publicly expresses 
China’s willingness to keep cooperation and exchange with all countries of the world, 
especially on trading development. The last category (Principle 6) in the doctrine 
of Chinese foreign policy explains this point. As China perceives itself as a rising 
power, the Chinese leaders realize that only through both economic and diplomatic 
cooperation with the other nations can upgrade China’s capabilities. Despite the 
noticeable nationalist sentiment, aspirations, and even ambitions common to a rising 
power, China appears to have accepted to have accepted two basic facts of today9s 
international relations: First, the world is organized in a nation-state political system 
and an international market economy rather than anything like the ''Chinese world 
order” of the Middle Kingdom; second， China is still clearly a backward or 
developing nation that lacks the economic clout, capital, and technology necessary to 
realize its potential as a great power (Wang, 1999, p.22). Hence, when Jiang 
develops diplomatic ties with the other countries, he usually emphasizes the progress 
in bilateral trade and economic ties. In fact, this principle implies that China’s 
self-image of great power is displayed to the world. Although the national power of 
China cannot compare with the US or the other developed countries at this moment, 
the Chinese leaders believe that China will become a strong state through a 
continuous openness of China’s economic market.
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As China believes this logic, its diplomatic strategy should match China9 s self- 
image. Keeping the good relations, with the US and Japan, the developed countries, 
can increase China9 s economic development, since these two countries are the largest 
non-Chinese foreign investment for China. Both the US and Japan are the great
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powers in the post-Cold War world order, their economic capabilities are counted as 
the top level in the global economy. In terms of security and economic capability, 
Japan often adopts the stance of a junior partner to the US. When China develops 
partnerships with these two countries, the Chinese leadership will not expect to form 
any long-term relations between them. The relationships are founded on common 
interests -  global trade.
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Second, we can observe China’s self-perception as a great power in the first 
category (Principles 1，2, 4). In the post-Cold War period, the international 
structure is still dominated by the US. China understands there is only one 
superpower in the transitional period. Nevertheless, Beijing describes its 
diplomatic philosophy as one of “multipolarity”； a concept that officials say 
embraces a desire for a more equitable world less in the control of Washington. The 
core Chinese interest is to reduce, contain and dilute US influence in the world 
affairs. China believes the world is in a multipolar system, each state participates 
independently and on relatively equal terms with the others. Thus, China’s 
diplomatic strategy shows its discontent with US hegemonism and US’ foreign 
policy. This strategy implies that the Chinese leadership has possessed the 
perception of great power spirit, as China decides to challenge the position of 
superpower -  the United States. In this sense, China is not satisfied with merely a 
great power status, it wants to become a superpower on a par with the United States.
China’s great-power aspirations in terms of opposing US hegemonism can be 
seen in China’s foreign relations. The diplomatic ties with Russia and France 
illustrate that their attitudes towards the US control in the world affairs are very
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similar indeed. All the three countries meet a commitment that the world should be 
on the trend towards multipolarity. No country can dominate the world system. 
Both Russia and France are on the same line with China to oppose the proposed US 
national missile-defense system. Russia even supported China when the NATO 
bombed the Chinese ambassador in Belgrade accidentally. The US-led NATO is 
blamed by most of the countries that carried out hegemonic behaviour in the 
multipolar world. Thus， these examples justify that China’s diplomatic ties with the 
other countries can help build China’s great-power aspirations.
Third, the second category (Principles 3, 5, 7) fully represents China^ self- 
image as a great power. The essential point of these principles aims at giving 
prominence to China’s role in the world. China wants to promote a just and rational 
new international political and economic order, which basically follow the 
instructions of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. To fulfil this goal, China 
needs to establish diplomatic ties both with the developed and developing countries. 
Having strengthened cooperation with the other states, the advancement of China9 s 
value to the world will be solidified. When China plays an active role in different 
kinds of international organization, its influence to the world will increase at the 
same time. For the long-term, a new international order with the common 
development of mankind will be created under the promotion and effort of China. 
From this perspective -  a creation of a new global structure, it is believed that China 
perceives a great power first, then possesses anxiety to lead the world.
China’s diplomatic policy reflects this wish thoroughly. To build a just and 
new international order, China needs to extend its foreign ties all countries in the
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world. China’s relations with the Middle East and African countries are likely to 
strengthen the idea for a just world order. Since some Middles East countries such 
as Iran and Iraq are the traditional enemies of the US, the diplomatic strategy 
between China and these two countries can form a counterbalancing force, which 
assists China to be a new global power. The diplomatic ties between China and 
Africa spread the idea of China’s preservation of world peace and the promotion of 
justice. China is regarded as the leader of the developing countries traditionally. 
China9 s self-perception as a great power has influenced the leaders to seek the 
international respect and recognition generally enjoyed by major powers. This 
quest for international prominence has motivated China to establish relations with 
developing countries and position itself as the champion of world peace and justice, 
both activities functioning as ways to distinguish itself from other great powers 
(Payne & Veney，1998，p.868). The friendly diplomatic ties between China and 
Africa help China build a new international and political order, which fulfills the goal 
of China’s great power aspirations.
As a whole，China’s independent foreign policy testifies China’s self-image to 
become a global power. China believes itself emerging as a dominant force in Asia; 
its diplomacy is on the right direction to fxilfilling this goal. In the doctrine of 
Chinese foreign policy, we can see that there is step by step to make China a great 
power in the world. First, China should enhance its economic development. This 
strategy has allowed China to become a great power and may eventually permit it to 
challenge for dominant power status (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2000, p.171). 
Second, China’s balancing power with the US hegemonism shows that China 
contains a relatively equal footing of the US. This diplomatic strategy is a further
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step to demonstrate China's self-image as a global power. Third, the change of 
unequal world order and the establishment of a just global system are the final steps 
for China9 s self-image as a great power. This is the highest achievement according 
to the perceptions of the Chinese. From China’s own image， we can conclude that 
China is on an increasing ambition to quest for great power status starting from the 
1990s.
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THE WORLD’S PERCEPTION:
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF GREAT POWER:
In the international structure, there are several criteria to judge what states can 
be claimed as powerful states in the world. When we discuss China’s quest for 
great power status, perception of the global community plays a prominent role to see 
whether China is a great power. This section tries to investigate the factors, which 
affect a state’s great power status.
Firstly, great power status needs the recognition by the world through 
participation both in regional and global organizations. Traditionally, great power 
status is formally recognized in an international structure such as the nineteenth- 
century Concert of Europe or the United Nations Security Council (Goldstein，1999, 
p.81). China replaced Taiwan as the permanent member of the UN Security 
Council in 1971. In international relations, the great powers include the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council -  the United States, Russia，France， 
Britain, and China. The permanent members of the UN Security Council possess 
the highest decision of world affairs. With a creditable nuclear arsenal, a
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continuous economic and military development, and a seat on the UN Security 
Council, China qualifies as a great power. In the views of Western countries, China 
is expected to play a central role in world politics in the 21st century (Goldstein, 1999,
p.82).
In fact, China’s success in gaining recognition of the most significant 
international structure is a turning point, which makes the other major powers view 
China as one of great power in the world politics. From that time onwards, the 
Western countries put down their hostile attitude towards the Communist China and 
tried to cooperate with China. Both the US and Japan began the normalization 
relations with China in the 1970s. The ideological difference between China and 
the West will not form a great obstacle when discusses some world affairs. Thus， 
the recognition of the UN Security Council changes the view of others perception on 
China’s international status.
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Second, great power status is measured in part by participation in institutions 
that increasingly regulate interstate behaviour (Johnston, 1998，p.77). In recent 
years, China has joined in regional institutions, such as APEC, ASEM, and ARF, the 
Informal Summit between ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea. Moreover, 
China is very active in other multilateral organizations on regional and international 
political, economic, security and other issues of common interest. The image of 
great power ought to play a more important role in eliciting cooperation in high- 
profile multilateral institutions. China has done a role as responsible major power 
in the eyes of Western countries due to it shows up its multilateral diplomacy 
successfully.
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Third, the general judgement of great power in views of the international 
community is the involvement and influence in world affairs. In reality, the United 
Nations acts as the international government that solves both the regional and 
international conflicts and preserves the peace of the world; however, history of 
international relations does not like this. According to the neorelaist perspective, 
the world is dominated by the several powerful states that comprise of strong 
capabilities. In the Cold War period, the world was formally under the bipolar 
system. World affairs and stability were basically maintained by the two 
superpowers -  the United States and the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War period, 
the world is under the multipolar structure; more great powers involve in the process 
of decision making in world affairs. China9s active involvement in regional crises 
makes the other major powers perceive that China is responsible for the role of great 
power.
In the Asian financial crisis, 1997, China9 s involvement in solving the damages 
of those Asian countries makes a very impressive feeling for the other countries. In 
views of European countries, China emerged relatively unscathed, combined with the 
perceived failure of Japan to get its house in order, has meant that in both 
geopolitical and geoeconomic terms China is coming to replace Japan as the centre­
piece of Europe9s Asia policy (Bridges, 2000, p.9). Thus，China’s role as regional 
great power in Asia is consolidated in the eyes of European Union.
In terms of regional peace and stability, China has played an active and 
constructive role in Asia. On the question of the Korean Peninsular, China is one of 
participants in the Four-Party Talks. In safeguarding peace and stability on the
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Peninsular, China5 s important role as a peacemaker has been well received in the 
international community.
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As a whole, according to the international requirements of great power, China 
has fulfilled the above three norms. The perception of the other major powers, 
more or less， affects China’s international status. Thus, a positive general 
perception for giving recognition of great power of China by the world will inspire 
China9 s quest for great power status in the 21st century.
THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES:
Having discussed China’s image in the world, in general, China’s great power 
status is established in the international community. More and more Westerners 
have viewed it to be final that has become a world-class power (Wang, 1999, p.23). 
According to the Power Transition theory， the discussion of China’s potentials is to 
treat as an eloquent example of foreign image of China as not only a “big power”， 
but as a fliture superpower to vie and “overtake” the US. It is predicted that China 
will by 2050 overtake the United States to become the new dominant superpower.
The “power transition” theory came from A.F.K. Organski’s study of 
international politics. Organski rejected the power parity hypothesis that an 
equality of capabilities between adversaries contributes to peace and argued that such 
a condition of parity is more likely to lead to war (Dicicco & Levy, 1999, p.681). In 
other words, the power-transition theory holds that peace is not due to the parity 
between the major powers， but to the “preponderance” of power held in the hands of
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one hegemonic power or dominant power. Order is the intended result of actions 
taken by a dominant state, which attempts to shape the international system in such a 
way that advances stability and enhances its own interests (Organski, 1958, p.326).
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However, a breakdown in peace results in a ‘‘hegemonic war”， the results of 
which will determine the next round of power configuration across the international 
system. A “hegemonic war” results not from the loss of equilibrium, but from a 
“rear-end collision’’， when the second most power state， most likely one that is 
“dissatisfied” with the status quo of the system， is catching up from behind and 
“overtaking” the incumbent “dominant power”. A more cautious challenger, having 
overtaken the dominant country, will aim for more than a redress of grievances 
(Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2000, p.27).
Applying the power-transition theory in the views of foreign perceptions of 
China, it offers a foundation for exploring international politics. In fact, the power- 
transition theory is one kind of theory that is relevant to policy making. It provides 
a framework for understanding great power relationships as well as regional politics 
(Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2000, p.41). This concept is relevant to the 
geostrategic thinking, which I discussed in Chapter 4. Evidence shows that China is 
a dissatisfied nation that does not like the US hegemonism in the post-Cold War 
period. China9 s strategic foreign relations aim at establishing a just and rational 
new world order, which logically favors to its benefits. Hence, when China 
strengthens the power that surrounds its periphery, it is on the road to becoming a 
superpower on a par with the United States in the future.
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Nowadays, the United States can be claimed as the dominant power in the world, 
whereas China represents a potential challenger to the United States, which remains 
dissatisfied with its international role under the dominant power5s regime. Since 
China has been a dissatisfied power, China will dismantle the world order built under 
US hegemony and alter it to China’s liking. In views of the United States, China is 
not a normal nation, it is a potential challenger (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2000, 
p.173). The Organskiite group believes that China will be the first to overtake the 
United States in terms of GDP but it will take many more years before that 
momentum can be channeled into actual power (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2000, 
p.42). The US remains the dominant nation in the international community, 
commanding a very strong alliance and network system around the world. If the 
statement of China does overtake the United States in the size of its economy and 
then in international power in the-mid 21st century, the US strategy should take its 
international advantages to prevent China’s overtaking. This section tries to 
investigate how the US? response justify China is one of global powers.
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After the post-Cold War period， the US adopts the “constructive engagement” 
rather than the “containment” as its China’s policy. A more concrete description of 
this concept is “realignment”. It is a policy designed to accomplish a fundamental 
and far-reaching objective -  the realignment and harmonization of the ruling 
coalitions in both countries (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke，2000, p.158). Recently, 
the US and China have made a deal of China’s accession into the WTO. This event 
shows that the US and the other nations tend to draw and integrate China into the 
current international political and economic order, with the specific aim of 
converting China into a “satisfied” power. The subsequent foreign policy goal of
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the United States should be the creation of a satisfied China, either by direct 
integration into an alliance or by creating opportunities to socialize it into the 
existing international system whereby it accepts prevailing rules and norms (Tammen, 
Kugler & Lemke, 2000, p.34). If China moves into the world as a satisfied rather 
than a dissatisfied nation; the challenge to overtake the dominant position of US will 
be minimized. Even China?s economic development will one day surpass that of 
the US; China will not become a threat to the US economic domination.
The implication of US’ China policy -  by converting China into a “satisfied” 
power rather than a ‘‘ dissatisfied” power， shows that China is definitely a great 
power in the international community. The Washington government deems that the 
rise of China, especially on economic challenge, is a threat to the US predominance 
in international relations. Thus, creating a satisfied China is the aim of US in this 
transitional period. In views of the US, China will pursue a higher international 
recognition in the following years. What the US can do is to use its leverage on this 
situation, and cooperate with China. In this sense, China is a great power, which 
makes the US need to change its containment policy is a very good example to verify 
China’s quest for great power status.
CONCLUSION:
As a whole， the question of China’s great-power aspirations are justified from 
two perspectives. First, China9s foreign policy principles show that the Chinese 
leaders have their beliefs. They have confidence to build multilateral and bilateral 
relations with institutions and nations, since they perceive China is a great power in
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the world. Second, the international community recognizes China9 s great power 
status. This achievement demonstrates that not only China9s self-perception, but 
the other major powers also deem China is a great power. In the following years, 
these two perspectives will inspire China9 s quest for great power, until it reaches the 
superpower status in the-mid 21st century.
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INTRODUCTION:
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This chapter aims at discussing China’s quest for great power status from the 
two selected methods and perspectives. Regarding the methods, linkage-politics 
paradigm and geostrategic analysis are applied to explain the shape of change in 
China’s diplomacy and global politics. First, linkage-politics paradigm helps us to 
understand the relationship between the domestic policies of the national leadership 
and their foreign-policy endeavors in the external environment. Starting from 1978 
onwards, China began to launch a series of domestic reforms, including economic 
reform, military modernization programme, which require a new orientation in 
foreign policy. In views of the Chinese leaders, the reforms were aimed at 
increasing China’s comprehensive national strength that would boost China’s 
capabilities and status in the world. The linkage paradigm is to justify two points: 
(1) that China’s domestic policy shift has helped its foreign relations， and conversely 
its expanding open foreign relations have proven instrumental in fostering China’s 
domestic development; and (2) that with the impressive gains in China’s economic 
clout in recent decades, its influence in the world has been on the increase.
Second， geostrategic analysis tells us about China’s strategic considerations 
towards other states in the international system. This method, first, mainly 
emphasizes how change of the international environment creates an opportunity for 
China to become a rising power in the international arena. Due to the global change,
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the overall reactions of the other nations towards China are no more as antagonistic 
as before, but become more conciliatory to China in international relations. This 
phenomenon is probably the result of change in the international environment. 
Second, geostrategic reasoning provides a global perspective to understand how 
China expands its power and influence geographically, in resulting China5 s great 
power position receives a great recognition from the rest of the international 
community, which accords to the Chinese geostrategic planning.
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This study tries to combine the methods of linkage-politics paradigm and 
geostrategic analysis in order to illustrate the Chinese endeavors to become a great 
power in the post-Mao era. The linkage-politics paradigm concerns the areas of the 
domestic-foreign linkage and China’s increased influence abroad to discuss China’s 
quest for great power. The geostrategic reasoning entails a geography strategic 
angle to understand how China quests and seeks for a higher rank in the international 
arena.
In addition to these two perspectives， this study uses China’s self-image and the 
world’s perception to discuss China’s great_power aspirations. Having discussed 
China’s quest for great power status according to the above two theoretical 
frameworks, the comparison between self-claimed and the world5 s recognition can 
give a relatively comprehensive judgement to China9s global status. First, the self­
perception of Chinese leadership is one kind of motivations, which makes China 
become great power. When China believes its great power position in the world, its 
foreign policy will become more aggressive than that of before. As a result, 
China9 s search for great power status will achieve in the near future. Second, the
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other states9 perception is an objective perceptive to justify whether China is a great 
power. As China’s great power status has to be accepted by most of the nations， the 
influence of China is on the right track on an equal footing with the other major 
powers. Consequently， the world’s recognition will assist China to become more 
ambitious enhancing its power in the global system. Hence，China’s foreign policy 
will become more active questing for great power status.
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As a whole， this research attempts to investigate China’s great-power 
aspirations with the two frameworks and the two discussion methods. The rise of 
China is definitely a crucial event in the international arena; China9 s seeking for 
great power status is an important study in the 21st century. To understand China9 s 
journey to become a great power, the chosen theories and perspectives can give a 
coherent and critical analysis of answering China9 s quest for great power.
MAJOR FINDS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE:
The previous chapters have already discussed China9 s great-power aspirations 
from different angles, including national capabilities, foreign relations, strategic 
calculation, self-image and the world9s recognition. The following paragraphs will 
display the significant findings of China’s quest for great power status.
First, two essential points of this study are the words “power” and “prestige”. 
In international relations, power is a key concept that defines an international system 
and the status of its actors. K. Waltz (1979) and J.S. Goldstein (1999) rank power 
to be the capabilities of states. Capabilities are mainly divided into two categories,
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including economic and military. In reality, capabilities give a state the potential to 
influence the world affairs and its status in the world. Prestige, the other term, 
consists of the “perception of other states with respect to a state’s capabilities and its 
ability and willingness to express its power”. In sum, power and prestige are the 
two prominent concepts in this study. Some findings probably follow the ideas of 
power and prestige.
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Second, in terms of China’s economic capability， we can see at least two 
important things that imply China’s quest for great power status. First of all, the 
growth rate in China’s GDP， foreign trade， and FDI show that China’s domestic 
policy shift has helped its foreign relations, and conversely its expanding open 
foreign relations have proven instrumental in fostering China’s domestic 
development. When Deng Xiaoping decided to give priority to economic 
modernization among those domestic constructions，China’s economic development 
has met a rapid growth for the past two decades. China’s economic achievement, 
more or less， involves the contributions of other countries. Foreign investments are 
the most directly significant elements for China’s domestic economic growth. 
Hence, we can conclude that China’s expanding open foreign relations accelerate its 
domestic development and its foreign relations with the other developed countries. 
It is predicted that China’s economic power will continuously upgrade by its 
openness to the world. The domestic-foreign linkage assists China9 s great-power 
aspirations in the new century.
The second important thing of China’s economic growth is that China’s 
influence in the world has been on the increase. The impressive figures of China’s
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foreign trade indicate that China’s economic contribution in the world trade is on an 
increasing trend. When China succeeds in joining the WTO, its integration into the 
world is an inevitable movement for the development of China’s economy. China’s 
economic clout in recent decades accelerates China9 s participation in international 
economic order. As a result, China9 s influence abroad leads to the expansion of 
China’s horizontal linkage vis-a-vis other countries. China’s regional influence is 
upgraded and shown by the cases of East Timor and the Asian financial crisis.
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Third, in terms of military capability, China cannot be regarded as a ufirst-rank 
power” in the world. China’s military technology and military industrial complex 
are still backward compared with the US. China’s military capability to project 
power beyond its borders is limited. However, evidence shows that China’s 
military capability has increased for the past decades. The arms sales from Russia 
and the Middle East countries to China improve the Chinese PLA5s force. At the 
same time, the foreign military technology enhances China’s ability of building up its 
own military force in the long run. Although China cannot be counted as a global 
power in terms of military capability, its regional military power in the East Asia is 
confirmed. China’s involvement in the Spratly Islands and the Taiwan issue 
illustrate its aggressive military power in the regional area.
Fourth, the international change really affects China’s global status in 
international relations. From Mao’s era to the post-Cold War period, China’s status 
was greatly influenced by the international environment. A tight bipolar system 
interfered with China’s great-power aspirations in the 1950s. However,
multipolarity in the post-Cold War era gives China more geoeconomic leverage and
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more geopolitical space than bipolarity before.
Fifth，China’s geostrategic thinking to empower its influence abroad is through 
the adoption of good-neighbour policy. In other words, China’s quest for great 
power status starts from neighbours that surrounds its periphery. The major regions 
are Southeast Asia region, Central Asia region, and Middle East and Africa region. 
For the past decades, China has established a relatively friendly and cooperative 
relations with the major countries in these regions.
Finally, based on the facts and data, the scholars of power-transition theory 
believe that China is the second most powerful state， and a “dissatisfied power” at 
that， which is going to catch up from behind and “overtake” the United States in 
terms of GDP growth in the mid-21st century. The US’ China policy，nowadays， 
tries to create a satisfied China that will not threaten the dominate role of US and will 
prevent a “hegemonic war”.
ASSESSMENT ON CHINA’S GREAT POWER STATUS:
This section wants to give an evaluation of China’s great-power aspirations and 
foresee its international status and prestige in the 21st century. Having reviewed 
China’s national capabilities and its geostrategic plan for upgrading its status in 
world politics, we have a general picture of China’s quest for great power status 
during these two decades. The next step is an assessment of China9 s great power 
status.
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Firstly, China cannot be regarded as a global power at this moment, though 
China has achieved a rapid growth in economic capability. In reality, China’s 
technological skills, science, military power, and education still have much room to 
improve. Its backward in these areas indicates that there is a far distance between 
China and the other Western countries. When China hopes to become a great power 
in the-mid 21st century, the Chinese leaders must need to know its weaknesses. To 
make China fulfill the dreams of global power, reform is the essential task for the 
further development, especially on education. Only well-educated and 
knowledgeable persons are able to innovate. Hence, the key to China’s rising in the 
21st century is the improvement of education.
Secondly, China’s advocacy of its independent foreign policy shows that China 
believes itself as one of great powers in the world. China will become the leading 
force of the world affairs. In the doctrine of Chinese foreign policy, China is step 
by step to reach the goal of great power status in the international arena. First of all, 
China needs to establish ties with the other nations in order to strengthen its 
economic development. This strategy allows China to become a great economic 
power in the future. Next, China’s balancing power with the US hegemonism 
shows that China contains a relatively equal footing with the US in the world. This 
performance shows China’s self-perception as a global power. Finally, the change 
of unequal world order and the establishment of a just global system are the final 
steps for China’s great-power aspirations. The Chinese foreign policy principles 
show that China is on a right road to fulfill its quest for great power status in the 
future.
CHAPTER 6
CHINA'S GREAT-POWER ASPIRATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT
163
Lastly，China’s great power position has received certain recognition from the 
world. China’s permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council proves that 
China is one of great powers in the international system. In addition，China’s 
involvement and influence in world affairs are increasing. The most important 
indicator to show the world’s recognition is the US response to China’s rising. The 
US’ China policy aims at developing China as a satisfied power in the new century. 
The US’ strategy tries to avoid China’s overtaking of the position of the US in the- 
mid 21st century. Thus, China9 s influence and image in the world are being 
strengthened.
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CONCLUSION:
In sum, China9 s quest for great power status has been testified for the last two 
decades. The methods of linkage-politics paradigm and geostrategic analysis show 
that China possesses both capabilities to quest for higher-ranking status and ambition 
to expand its influence abroad. The Chinese leadership believes that China will 
become one of significant powers in the 21st century. Its foreign policy is on the 
way to fulfill this goal. The world’s recognition probably deems that China has 
already reached the qualification of great power status. Despite China as a potential 
great power, China is still on the road to achieving a dominant role in international 
relations in the-mid 21st century.
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